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

PLATO

(From the bust in the Vatican. The inscription Ζήνων is modern.)

PLATO

THE APOLOGY AND CRITO

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FLAGG'S PLATO.
W. P. I

INTRODUCTION

Dialogue, dialectic; διαλέγεσθαι, διάλογος, διαλεκτικός. These words furnish a clew to the Socratic wisdom. It was a methodical exercise of the reasoning faculty that enabled Socrates, first of all men, to realize completely the Delphian maxim, γνῶθι σαυτόν. By no other way than through self-scrutiny, critically applied in the form of question and answer, could he have been led to affirm, what no man had learned to say before, ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι, and to announce the conviction formulated in the words, ὁ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ. The identity of knowledge and virtue, as maintained by Socrates; the union of intellectual and moral excellence in the person of the sage, celebrated by both of his emiment companions, — such a consummation can hardly be comprehended without taking some account of the process whereby we know it to have been achieved.

In the time of Xenophon and Plato, whose chief writings formed a memorial and as it were a continuation of the life work of their illustrious master, a philosophical terminology had not yet been elaborated in the Greek language. At that period the word "philosophy" itself was vague and unsettled in its application, and a groundwork for the now familiar and important distinction between art and science had only just begun to be wrought out. A few words, however, were gradually assuming, side by side with their popular usage, a special meaning adapted to more exact or conscious modes of thought than properly pertain to poetry or eloquence; and other new words were coming to be framed to meet the needs of newly recognized activities of the mind. The familiar verb διαλέγεσθαι 'to converse' acquires

a special significance and value though Socrates' habitual method of testing the genuineness of knowledge, while, under the same impulse, the adjective διαλεκτικός, already employed in a technical way, is finally converted to an exclusively philosophical use.

That Socrates was himself aware of a special coloring that attached to the word διαλέγεσθαι, as he used it, is indicated by a curious pointed reference to διαλέγειν 'to distinguish,' which he makes in one of the conversations with Euthydemus reported by Xenophon. Speaking of temperance and self-control, he averred that it was the faculty of distinguishing between what was good and what was bad for a man that enabled the possessors of these virtues to direct their conduct in accordance with them; and he said that διαλέγεσθαι took its name from διαλέγειν, because it meant mutual deliberation in the way of *discriminating by classification.*[1]

The διαλεκτικὸς ἀνήρ is he who knows how to ask and to answer questions.[2] A deficiency in such skill on the part even of superior minds is apt to betray inaccuracy in the use of language and more or less of the accompanying confusion of ideas. The young men who listened to Socrates occasionally undertook to imitate him and try their own hand at cross-questioning the unwary. Xenophon has preserved a specimen of this sort of experiment in a conversation said to have passed between Alcibiades when a mere youth and his guardian and maternal

[1] Xen. *Mem.* 4. 5. 12 ἔφη τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. The Inventor of Dialectic, as Aristotle terms him, was Zeno of Elea in Italy, an older contemporary of Socrates. But the Zenonian dialectic was purely critical and destructive, a weapon wielded to overthrow the theories of the anti-Eleatics. It was in the hands of Socrates that the art first came to be employed in the logical processes of Definition and Division or Classification.

[2] Plat. *Crat.* 390 C τὸν ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον . . . διαλεκτικόν.

relative Pericles, the foremost man of Athens. — *Alcibiades.* Can you tell me, Pericles, what *law* is? *Pericles.* Certainly I can. *Alcibiades.* Do pray instruct me, then. I hear some commended as law-abiding persons, but I fancy no one would deserve this compliment who did not know what law is. *Pericles.* Well, Alcibiades, in trying to find out what law is, you are in quest of no very difficult matter. Laws are what the assembled people enact and approve, indicating what ought to be done and what not. *Alcibiades.* In the belief that what is good ought to be done, or what is bad? *Pericles.* What is good, to be sure, young man, not what is bad. *Alcibiades.* If, however, it is not the people who assemble, but supposing a few men, in an oligarchy somewhere, get together and enact what ought to be done, what is that? *Pericles.* All deliberate enactments or prescriptions by the controlling power of the state receive the name of law. *Alcibiades.* If a tyrant, then, in control of the state, prescribes to its members what they are to do, is that law too? *Pericles.* Yes, the prescriptions of a tyrant who governs the state are likewise termed law. *Alcibiades.* But what is force and lawlessness, Pericles? Is it not when the stronger constrains the weaker to do what he chooses, not with the weaker man's consent, but by compulsion? *Pericles.* Yes, I think it is. *Alcibiades.* Then what a tyrant by his prescriptions compels the citizens to do against their will, is that lawlessness? *Pericles.* I believe it is. I take back what I said about the arbitrary prescriptions of a tyrant being law. *Alcibiades.* But the enactments of the few, based on superior power, not on the consent of the many, are we to call that force, or not? *Pericles.* I think that all compulsion, exercised by one person upon another, against the will of the latter, by enactment or otherwise, is rather force than law. *Alcibiades.* And what the sovereign people, then, superior in power to those who possess property, enacts

against the will of the latter, would that be force rather than law? *Pericles.* Alcibiades, we were ourselves, at your age, tolerably clever at this sort of thing. We used to practice at precisely the same quibbles that you seem to be practicing now. *Alcibiades.* Oh, Pericles, how I wish I could have been with you then, when you were at your best in the business![1] — The story is a good one in an illustrative way, and it acquires a piquant flavor by being attached to two such distinguished names as those which figure in it. Among the several classes of persons enumerated in the Platonic Apology to whom Socrates applied his tests, the statesmen are said to have proved especially incompetent to give a rational account of the matters which occupied their attention. There would indeed be far more subtle difficulties to contend with in the discussion of political and ethical questions than the mere ambiguity of such a term as *νόμος*, before sufficient dialectical skill could be attained to command sound reasoning, either in one's own mind or in the minds of others.

To live for philosophy, *examining myself* and other men, such I conceived to be my mission — declares Socrates to his judges, in the Apology. — While διαλέγεσθαι is properly said of conversation among several persons, the word can easily be transferred to the questioning of one's own mind, the communing of the spirit with itself, ὁ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος. — Ἀλλὰ τί ἦ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός; Thus exclaims Hector, as he awaits the onset of Achilles, nerving himself to overcome the promptings of invalorous discretion.[2] — In the *Symposium* of

[1] Xen. *Mem.* I. 2. 40–46. For the imitating of Socrates by young men, Plat. *Apol.* 23 C, cp. *Rep.* 539 B. In the latter passage Plato expresses his disapproval of the practice of dialectic at an early age.

[2] X 122, cp. Λ 407, P 97, Φ 562. In Homer the self-interrogating formula quoted is employed to mark the turning-point of what would ordinarily be regarded as a *moral* conflict in the speaker's soul. In the theory and practice

Plato; Socrates, while on his way to the house of Agatho, there to meet by invitation Aristophanes, Alcibiades, and other friends of the tragic poet, encounters one of his devoted followers, whom he takes along to the banquet as an uninvited guest, promising to make his apology to their host. — Socrates seemed rather preoccupied and disposed to lag behind (relates Aristodemus), and the upshot of it was odd enough. When we reached the house we found the door open. A servant met me and conducted me at once into the presence of the banqueters already reclining at table. 'Welcome, Aristodemus,' exclaimed Agatho; 'if you have come for anything different from the dinner, pray defer it. I meant to invite you, but could not find you yesterday. But why haven't you brought Socrates?' Then I turned round, and lo! no Socrates was to be seen. 'I came with Socrates,' I said, 'by his invitation, to your banquet.' 'Excellent,' said Agatho; 'but where *is* the man?' 'He was right behind me a moment ago,' I replied; 'but I am as much at a loss as you are, where he can be now.' Upon this a servant was sent to look up the missing guest (so the history proceeds), and, returning presently, reported that Socrates was standing in the vestibule of a neighboring house and would pay no attention to any summons to the feast. 'Ridiculous! go and call him again, and don't let him off.' 'Nay, not so' (interposed Aristodemus); 'leave him to himself. It's a way he has. He steps off a bit, wherever it happens to be, and stands there. He will be here directly; but don't disturb him, just let him be.' The banquet then proceeded, and Socrates came not; nor would Aristodemus suffer the repeated orders of the host to fetch him to be carried into effect. Finally, when the feast was

of Socrates, however, as he disciplined his own character, a distinction of moral and intellectual was not recognized, nor felt. The preceding quotation is from Plato, *Soph.* 263 E.

about half over, the philosopher presented himself. 'Come and take your place by me, Socrates' (said Agatho), 'and give me the benefit of the clever idea that came to you in the vestibule. You have caught it and bagged it, I know, or you would never have left the spot.' — Again, in the campaign before Potidaea (Alcibiades is here the narrator) one day early in the morning some reflection had taken shape in his mind, and he stood studying it out. As he did not get on with it, he would not give it up, but remained standing to continue the investigation. Finally, by noonday, the thing began to attract observation, and the word passed wonderingly from mouth to mouth, that Socrates had been standing up in a brown study ever since early in the morning. At last, when evening came, some of the men brought their blankets out after dinner, and slept in the open air — it was the summer season — keeping a wakeful eye on Socrates all the time, to see if he would stand up all night. And stand he did, till day broke again; then saluted the sun and went his way.[1] — How the mind of the philosopher was

[1] See Plat. *Symp.* 174, 175, and 220 C D. The habit attributed to Socrates in these passages, that of the "absent-minded" man, "absence of mind," popularly so termed, would evince in Plato's estimation the most complete *presence* of the conscious intellect, a concentrated power of abstraction and analysis, as opposed to the inspired working of poetic and other artistic genius, where according to Plato the mind of the man is 'absent.' *Ion* 534 B *οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν [ὁ ποιητής], πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ.* Cp. *Apol.* 22 B C, where Socrates is made to say of the poets examined by him, that they could give no rational account of the poems which they had themselves composed. Aristophanes seems to have hit on somewhat of the same view, *Ach.* 398. Here the servant of Euripides, on being asked whether the poet is at home, replies that his *mind* has gone out, but he is himself in the house, upstairs, writing a tragedy: —

ὁ νοῦς μὲν ἔξω ξυλλέγων ἐπύλλια
οὐκ ἔνδον, αὐτὸς δ' ἔνδον ἀναβάδην ποιεῖ
τραγῳδίαν.

For *ἐμαυτὸν ἐξετάζειν*, Plat. *Apol.* 28 E, cp. 38 A.

occupied at such moments and to what sort of purpose his self-communings were put, there can be no doubt, in view of the solemn asseverations of the Apology taken in connection with the illustrations furnished elsewhere of the tests which he applied to other minds.

You have affirmed (says Socrates to Protagoras in the Dialogue named in honor of the great sophist) that wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, holiness, are not names of one and the same thing, but that they are parts of a whole — that whole being *virtue*. And you maintain that these parts of virtue are not quantitative and similar, like separate portions of a mass of gold, but qualitative and dissimilar, as are the features — the eyes, nose, mouth, etc., which are the parts that go to make up the whole face or countenance. *Protagoras*. I do indeed affirm that all these are parts of virtue; but while four of the five parts stand fairly upon a like footing, yet one of them, *courage* (ἀνδρεία), is quite different from the others. There are many persons who are unjust, unholy, intemperate, and ignorant, but yet in a high degree courageous. *Socrates*. Do you term courageous persons *bold*? *Protagoras*. Yes, and forward enough, where the most are backward. *Socrates*. Do you admit that virtue is a beautiful thing, and act upon the assumption that it is beautiful? *Protagoras*. Certainly I do. *Socrates*. Is virtue something partly beautiful (καλόν) and partly ugly (αἰσχρόν), or is it wholly beautiful? *Protagoras*. Wholly beautiful, by all means. *Socrates*. Do you know of men going boldly down into deep wells, under the water? *Protagoras*. Yes. *Socrates*. Is it because they understand the business that they can do this thing? *Protagoras*. Yes. *Socrates*. In fighting on horseback, is it they who understand, or they who do not understand horsemanship, who do this fighting boldly? *Protagoras*. They who understand. So in other matters, those who understand

are bolder than those who do not. *Socrates.* But have you never seen persons, unskilled in matters of this kind, yet bold in regard to them? *Protagoras.* Yes, I have, very bold indeed. *Socrates.* Are, then, such bold persons as these also courageous? *Protagoras.* Nay, in that case, courage would be an ugly thing in very truth. Such persons are simply mad! *Socrates.* But did you not term the courageous bold? *Protagoras.* Yes, and I do now. *Socrates.* So then, these persons, bold in the manner last described, are seen to be not courageous, but mad. But those previously described, the wise and skillful, they also are bold, and, in being bold, courageous. So, according to the argument, *knowledge* would be courage, would it not?[1] — The respondent in the above conversation had seen fit to assert that courage consists with ignorance. The questions and answers that ensue show that the assertion is itself inconsistent with what the maker of it believes and admits. He had, in fact, undertaken to discuss courage before *defining* the word to his own mind, and had proceeded as if ἀνδρεία and θάρρος were terms having the same connotation or comprehension. By the dialectic interrogatory he is checked and reminded that one of the terms is more comprehensive than the other. Thus: —

All courage is boldness.
Some boldness is not courage.

In a conversation with Euthyphro, a soothsayer, who had undertaken to prosecute his own father for homicide, an attempt is made to arrive at a definition of *holiness* (ὁσιότης). — Is holiness (asks Socrates) something consistent and invariable in all its manifestations, and is unholiness something consistently and invariably opposed to holiness, presenting always one and the same form or appearance (ἰδέα)? *Euthyphro.* Yes, certainly. *Socrates.* Tell me now, what you call the holy and the unholy?

[1] Plat. *Prot.* 350 c.

Euthyphro. I say that the holy is just what I am doing now, indicting a wrong-doer in a matter of bloodguiltiness, or sacrilege, or something of that sort. To fail so to act is unholy. *Socrates.* You are not answering my question. I asked you what *the* holy (τὸ ὅσιον 'holiness') is; but you have only told me that the *thing* which you are now doing is holy. Are not many other things also holy? *Euthyphro.* Yes. *Socrates.* Well, then, I did not request you to cite one or two of the many things that are holy, but to name the precise mark (εἶδος, species) whereby all things holy are recognized as holy. You remember, do you not, that you admitted just now that holy things are holy and unholy things unholy, by presenting always one and the same form or appearance? *Euthyphro.* I do. *Socrates.* Tell me, then, what that form is. *Euthyphro.* That which is acceptable to the gods is holy, the unacceptable to the gods is unholy. *Socrates.* Are we told that the gods have their mutual differences, that there is enmity among them? *Euthyphro.* We are, indeed. *Socrates.* Now, then, if you and I had a difference about odd and even in number, or about greater and less in size, or heavier and lighter in weight, would such differences render us inimical, or should we resort to counting, or to measuring, or to weighing, and settle our difference? *Euthyphro.* That is what we should do. *Socrates.* But in case we happened to differ about right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, good and bad, we might find ourselves continually at enmity, for having no criterion whereby we could settle the difference — might we not? *Euthyphro.* Yes. *Socrates.* Then it must be that the gods cherish their reputed mutual enmities for this reason, because they have no criterion to determine what is good and bad, right and wrong, etc.? *Euthyphro.* It must. *Socrates.* But they love what is beautiful and good, and hate the opposite, do they not? *Euthyphro.* Certainly. *Socrates.* But, as you concede, the same things are

held to be good by some of the gods, and bad by others — this being the cause of their dissensions? *Euthyphro.* Yes. *Socrates.* Thus, apparently, the same things would be beloved by gods and hated by gods? *Euthyphro.* Apparently. *Socrates.* Then the same things would be both holy and unholy, according to this reasoning? *Euthyphro.* It looks that way. . . . *Socrates.* So, then, you have not answered my question yet. Let us correct our statement, and say that what *all* the gods hate is unholy, and what they all love is holy. *Euthyphro.* Why not? *Socrates.* But note again, is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods? *Euthyphro.* I don't know what you mean. *Socrates.* I mean like this. Is that which is beloved, for example, beloved because it is loved, or is it loved because it is beloved? *Euthyphro.* The former. It is beloved because it is loved. *Socrates.* How, then, with the holy? Is it holy because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is holy? *Euthyphro.* The latter. It is loved by the gods because it is holy. *Socrates.* So, again, you have not told me yet what the *essence* (οὐσία) of holiness is; you have only named one of its accidents (πάθος τι), viz. that it is loved by the gods.[1] — Here, the first replies of Euthyphro are typical of the uninstructed mind that cannot readily apprehend the significance of a general term or abstract notion apart from the particulars which it denotes. He confuses τὸ ὅσιον and ὅσιόν τι. When set aright in this regard, he next betrays (to pass over Socrates' animadversion upon the soothsayer's conception of his *gods*) his inability to avoid confounding a real proposition with an identical or merely verbal one. That which is loved by the gods is holy — says Euthyphro, attempting to define holiness: ὅ τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ὅσιόν ἐστιν. He is brought to see that this, like ὅ τι φιλεῖται φιλούμενόν ἐστιν, is

[1] Plat. *Euthyphr.* 5 C, 9 D.

merely a verbal proposition, not a real proposition, nor a definition. And, finally, it is impressed upon his mind that the corrected statement, That which is holy is loved by the gods (ὅ τι ὅσιόν ἐστι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν), though a real proposition, nevertheless affords no definition of the term holiness.

The two condensed and abbreviated examples above presented — scraps from the sumptuous profusion spread out in the Platonic writings — will have served partially to illustrate the essential features of the art of which Socrates made himself the champion. By it were evolved the first principles of Logic. Forming, as that science does, the common framework of the whole edifice of the sciences since erected, Logic had its origin in the conversations of Socrates. "In our present state of knowledge . . . every student has been rendered familiar with the ordinary terms and gradations of logic and classification, — such as genus, definition, individual things as comprehended in a genus; what each thing is, and to what genus it belongs, etc. But familiar as these words have now become, they denote a mental process of which, in 440–430 B.C., few men besides Socrates had any conscious perception. Of course, men conceived and described things in classes, as is implied in the very form of language, and in the habitual junction of predicates with subjects in common speech. . . . But though this was done . . . it was wanting in that analytical consciousness which would have enabled any one to describe, explain, or vindicate what he was doing. The ideas of men — speakers as well as hearers, the productive minds as well as the recipient multitude — were associated together in groups favorable rather to emotional results, or to poetical, rhetorical narrative and descriptive effect, than to methodical generalization, to scientific conception, or to proof either inductive or deductive. That reflex act of attention which enables men to understand, com-

pare, and rectify their own mental process, was only just beginning. . . . It may be doubted whether any one before Socrates ever used the words 'genus' and 'species,' originally meaning family and form, in the philosophical sense now exclusively appropriated to them. Not one of those many names — called by logicians *names of the second intention* — which imply distinct attention to various parts of the logical process, and enable us to consider and criticise it in detail, then existed. All of them grew out of the schools of Plato, Aristotle, and the subsequent philosophers, so that we can thus trace them in their beginning to the common root and father, Socrates." And further, "His conversations . . . exhibit the main features of a genuine inductive method, struggling against the deep-lying, but unheeded, errors of the early intellect acting by itself, without conscious march or scientific guidance, — of the *intellectus sibi permissus*, — upon which Bacon so emphatically dwells."[1] The mighty consequences of such an initiative not even the imagination of a Plato was capable of prefiguring; but the fervid enthusiasm of both master and disciple, inspired by the conscious power which the new instrument enabled them to exercise, gave earnest of its future. To us, as we look back, the results of the way of reason, then for the first time clearly opened up and methodically

[1] Grote, *History of Greece*, v. 8, c. 68. In a footnote Mr. Grote adds: Socrates "sought to test the fundamental notions and generalizations respecting man and society, in the same spirit in which Bacon approached those of physics; he suspected the unconscious process of the growing intellect, and desired to revise it, by comparison with particulars; and with particulars, too, the most clear and certain, but which, from being of vulgar occurrence, were least attended to. And that which Socrates described in his language as 'conceit of knowledge without the reality' is identical with what Bacon designates as the *primary notions*, the *puerile notions*, the *aberrations*, of the intellect left to itself, which have become so familiar and appear so certainly known, that the mind cannot shake them off, and has lost all habit, we might almost say all power, of examining them."

pursued, are so momentous that, before it appeared, true learning seems hardly to have had an existence or a name. To Plato, with equal right, the Dialectic which Socrates had taught him was the culmination of all doctrines, the coping stone and crown of education.[1]

The Socratic labors were in fact a methodical quest of truth. To clear the ground for a reception of the truth, by dispelling the confusion and eradicating the error which he found inherent in the minds of men and of which by profound self-scrutiny he had sought to purge his own mind, was the end to which the efforts of that wonderful life were devoted, not only with a zeal absolutely disinterested, but with a concentration and intensity equal to the rapt devotion of inspired art. First it was Periclean Athens, then the whole period of the depressing and exhausting War, finally the brief reign of the Thirty, followed by the few years of the Restored Constitution which Socrates survived to see. In the city colonnades, at the gymnasia and the palaestrae, wherever the youth were wont to resort, or with a congenial friend or two in the plane-trees' shade by the Ilissus, at the camp or on the march in Boeotia or Thrace, back again in the teeming market-place, — each day, early and late, the singular figure of the philosopher was to be seen, the stirring voice and the responses evoked by it were to be heard. It was a unique specimen of the sophistic tribe, and a homely one enough, with his eternal illustrations from cooks and carpenters, from shoemaking and horse-breaking, always saying the same things,[2] and never

[1] Plat. *Rep.* 534 E *δοκεῖ . . . ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων.*

[2] Plat. *Gorg.* 490 E *Callicles.* *Ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.* *Socrates.* *Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ* Καλλίκλεις, *ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.* *Callicles.* *Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν*

seeming to arrive at any tangible conclusions. Here were indeed no imposing theories of the Cosmos to be promulgated, no elaborate discourses to win admiration for the learning and eloquence of their author. Here was no assumption of wisdom, nothing dogmatical to replace the seeming blank left in men's minds after the incisive interrogatory had traversed them. Burdened by no conceit of his own, he rarely was at pains to spare the conceit of others,[1] barring an often playful manner, and that *irony*, which, while it professed to mitigate, must frequently have aggravated, the humiliation of the respondent. The victim writhed, the bystanders jeered and applauded. Sometimes it was fierce anger and a blow. The remorseless dialectic, handled with a specialist's unerring skill, cut deep — whether the questioner so willed or not — into hazy conventional beliefs, the prejudices and hypocrisies of traditional, localized habits of thought. Surely (men said) there must be something behind so much pretending not to know. What was

παύει. Cp. *Symp.* 221 E. Xen. *Mem.* 4. 4. 6 (a conversation with the sophist Hippias) Ἔτι γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκεῖνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτέ σου ἤκουσα; καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· Ὅ δέ γε τούτου δεινότερον, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. *Mem.* 1. 2. 37 records a reference to one of Socrates' similes by a member of the Board of Thirty, brought home to the philosopher in a very pointed way.

[1] Of the young men who were subjected to the Socratic interrogatory some, after the first encounter, never went near the examiner again (Xen. *Mem.* 4. 2. 40); others fell under the spell of his teaching and became his constant followers. Xenophon relates, in the chapter just cited, how in dealing with Euthydemus Socrates showed consideration for the youth's feelings, and, upon finding him favorably disposed toward learning, notwithstanding the shocks already given to his pride, held a further conversation with him alone, to save him from the humiliation caused by the presence of spectators. The motives of those who attached themselves to the philosopher were, of course, not all the same. Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 39 says that Critias and Alcibiades listened to Socrates for the time being, not because they liked him, but hoping thus to further the schemes of political ambition which they cherished from their earliest years.

this threadbare sophist driving at? — this fanatical fellow with his *Daemon* that some of his mad followers could tell about, giving him signs and portents not vouchsafed to ordinary mortals. The disturbing effects of the Socratic procedure, in public and private, were inevitable and far-reaching, as they were subtle and penetrating. But of the misunderstanding sure to follow, of the ridicule, the enmity, the danger, he took no account. It was the self-forgetting ardor of the scientific observer and investigator, when science and philosophy were yet one, and when the moral phases of reasoned truth were first beginning to reveal their luster — a complete devotion such as merely human motives seemed inadequate to explain. — That you have in me (Plato makes Socrates say to his judges) one to be recognized as given by God to Athens, here is the proof: it does not look human-like, thus for so many years to have taken no thought of my own interests, letting my domestic affairs go all-unheeded, to gain time for looking after *you*. For that care I have accepted no compensation. This poverty is my witness.[1]

The temperament of Socrates, pure-human and intense, impelled his mind to proceed on the convergent lines of one unerring method toward sure and definite achievement. He was moved to carry into the province of intellectual labor an orderly concentration of energy analogous to that specializing in the field of art which his countrymen so perfectly understood. The contrast presented by the skilled artisan, on the one hand, proceeding according to an elaborate set of rules, based more or less consciously upon well-tested principles, and, on the other hand, the statesman, dealing at haphazard with the exigencies of government, or the professional sophist, complacently purveying of his store of encyclopaedic learning, was repeatedly

[1] Plat. *Apol.* 31 B C.

brought forward in the Socratic conversations.[1] Himself at first trained in the craft of his father, to be a sculptor, the son of Sophroniscus had been born for philosophy; and his birth occurred at a moment when the times were ripe for a genius such as his. The middle of the fifth century B.C. was, not too soon to begin, here and there, to give a specific direction to the purely intellectual activities, by turning the rays of reason through a burning glass as it were, with effects of irrefutable certainty, upon some chosen point. The field of cosmical speculation, as it lay before Socrates, a scene of apparently interminable strife, not only afforded no opportunity for the exercise of his peculiar powers, but was repulsive to his religious sentiment. He was instinctively led, by the very constitution of his mind, to maintain a conservative attitude toward the religious observances of his native city.[2] There were points

[1] Cp. Plat. *Gorg.* 455 B, consultation of experts by the Athenian state. *Crit.* 47 B, see note on 48 A. Xen. *Mem.* 4. 2. 5, an amusing parody offered by Socrates to ridicule the purely empirical way of taking hold of political matters.

[2] To this fact in particular Xenophon bears witness with abundant emphasis, as, in general, the most orthodox and least thoughtful of the Socratics has laid wearisome stress upon those external traits and homely virtues of the master which were common to all the best, and which he himself shared and could understand. We are not to suppose that Socrates' conception of divinity answered to the vulgar notion of gods, whatever he may have allowed his friend Xenophon to infer from his outward observance of religious rites. He knew how to respect the aspirations of the great thinkers who were his predecessors and his contemporaries, not the less because he could not accept any of their positive conclusions; and in his youth he had lived, as we are credibly informed, on terms of intimacy with Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras. The words put into the mouth of Socrates by Plato, *Apol.* 35 D, are significantly phrased — concluding, *νομίζω γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων*. Mr. Grote observes, *H.G.*, v. 8, c. 68, citing Cic. *Tusc.* 5. 4. 10, where Socrates is said to have brought down philosophy from the heavens to the earth, that "his attempt to draw the line between that which was and was not scientifically discoverable" is "remarkable, inasmuch as it

enough wherein the popular theology was conspicuously unworthy, and upon these the Athenian sage was not the first to lay his finger; but a skeptical demeanor, where no conflict between religion and morality was apparent to him, would have been logically impossible for Socrates. Such a course would have been equivalent to an overstepping of his appointed province — a meddling with matters that were not amenable to the only touchstone which he knew. He found no way of applying his *elenchus* here. Whatever misgivings may have been stirred in his heart by the great voices to which he listened in his youth, it was foreign to his disposition to suffer a speculative doubt to divert him from actions which not only involved no human wrong, but seemed to provide means of satisfying a powerful and inexplicable human craving. To find a trace of insincerity in the religious conduct of Socrates were to make him forestall some of the remotest consequences of his own labors.

Not the whole of Nature, therefore, appealed to the aspirations of such a mind or lent itself to dialectic treatment, but only that small part of Nature which is man, — of man, however, the transcendent, supremely human portion, his moral being. The primary motive of Socrates' activity must be sought, not in an intellectual (to draw for the moment a distinction which to him was meaningless), but in a moral, impulse. His philosophizing was in the fullest sense practical; it was nevertheless pure philosophy, for the very reason that he felt the springs of virtue and knowledge within himself as flowing from a common source. The identity of virtue and knowledge was a working hypothesis, so to speak, furnished by his consciousness: in his own spiritual experience he had found that right living was secured by sound

shows his conviction that the scientific and the religious point of view mutually excluded one another, so that where the latter began, the former ended."

thinking; and he applied this theory to explain the aberrations which he observed in the lives of others.[1] Socrates craved a knowledge of the truth as something preëminently *useful;* and he recognized no utility detached from moral and intellectual well-being. For the ultimate happiness of the individual he could not conceive of a disharmony between the good and the true, the true and the useful, between intellectual and moral good. To him, truth was not divisible, it was something elementary and simple. Unhappiness and discontent; the shortcomings and perversities of human conduct; the injustice, bad faith, and calamity which he was forced daily to contemplate in the social and political world, — all these he marked as radically the effects of *ignorance.* Not ignorance as popularly apprehended, but ignorance of self — and consequently of what is best for oneself: an ignorance nourished by a false conceit of knowledge. Wisdom consisted in the absence of such conceit. This purblind folly it was that caused men to grope darkly and wander far astray in search of their fancied welfare. In his own person he had proved that the cure of ignorance is the cure of evil; and the mighty force of his conviction swept him forward to apply the cure to others by the same philosophy.

When the position of Socrates as the apostle of sound thinking and right living, the determined adversary of mental inertia,

[1] For discussion and criticism of the paradox, οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνει, see GROTE, *Plato*, v. 1, pp. 398 ff.; GOMPERZ, *Griechische Denker*, Eng. Transl., v. 2, c. 4. It is touched upon in Xen. *Mem.* 4. 2. 19, and Plato (who deals with it explicitly elsewhere) brings it into the Apology, 25 D. "Considering the fanciful, far-fetched ideas, upon which alone the Pythagoreans and other predecessors had shaped their theories respecting virtues and vices, the wonder is that Socrates, who had no better guides to follow, should have laid down an ethical doctrine which has the double merit of being true, as far as it goes, legitimate, and of comprehensive generality: though it errs, mainly by stating a part of the essential conditions of virtue — sometimes also a part of the ethical end — as if it were the whole." — GROTE, *H.G.*, v. 8, c. 68.

has once been clearly recognized, there is little difficulty in apprehending why it was the Negative Arm of Philosophy (as the dialectical method has been termed) which the steadfast search for truth would call mainly into exercise. No lengthy explanation is needed to account for the sharp antithesis of dialectic and *rhetoric* that impressed itself upon the mind of the master and has been brought to view in his name with signal force by Plato the disciple. In the story of Socrates the Art of Persuasion, as commonly practiced, invites mention only to be summarily dismissed. — I am a forgetful sort of a fellow, Protagoras (he remarks at the close of a brilliant and applauded sally by the learned sophist, impatient at being held down to answers continually redounding to his own confusion), — my memory is short, and if anybody makes a long speech I am apt to forget what the conversation is about. If I happened to be a trifle deaf and you wanted to talk with me, you would naturally feel bound to speak a little louder to me than to the others; in the same way now, finding me as forgetful as I am, pray contract your replies and make them briefer, if you expect me to follow you.[1] — The proper function of rhetoric was to enforce the personal views and aims of the rhetor himself, or, at the best, to set forth matters of fact and advance arguments couched in the unreasoned and unchallenged terms of commonplace. Not only was rhetoric an inappropriate instrument of philosophy, of the disinterested pursuit of truth pure and simple, but the Socratic art and the expository art moved on lines of precisely contrary direction. Thus, further, Socrates was compelled emphatically to disclaim the name of *teacher*. The word διδάσκαλος conveyed a notion of authority, of learned acquirement and the imparting of positive doctrine. But the dialectic interrogatory rested on no authoritative basis in the mind of the

[1] Plat. *Prot.* 335 B, βραχυλογία and μακρολογία. Cp. *Soph.* 268 B.

questioner, and aimed to destroy in the mind of the questioned any conceit of knowledge based solely on the authority of custom or tradition. Even though the novice seemed to undergo a shock of intellectual paralysis, it were well so, provided his mind could be cleared and a way opened up for reasoned truth to enter. — The Thessalian Meno, in the Dialogue which bears his name, a fluent talker who had communed with Gorgias himself, cross-examined by Socrates, and repeatedly baffled in his attempts to make such replies as shall define the meaning he attaches to *virtue* (ἀρετή), — which at the outset, in an inquiry of his own, he had assumed as perfectly well understood, — exclaims, upon receiving the suggestion to start afresh and renew the search from the beginning: — Before I met you, Socrates, I used to hear it said that you were little better than a mass of perplexity yourself and an author of perplexity in others; and here you are now, calling down your spells and incantations upon me, until I am utterly bewildered. You seem — if I am to perpetrate a bit of mockery — to bear a close resemblance, as to your features and in every other way, to that flat-looking fish we have in the sea, the torpedo. It stuns and dazes everybody who comes near enough to touch it — just as you have stunned and dazed me. Body and soul, I am so benumbed that I can frame no answers to your questions. Yet I have discoursed a thousand times about virtue, to hearers without number, and with good success, as I fancied. But now I cannot even state what virtue is. Were you to practice in any other city than Athens what you are doing here, you would stand a good chance of being arrested as a sorcerer. — Well, Meno (rejoins Socrates), if this flatfish of yours only dazes people because it is completely dazed itself, I certainly resemble it; otherwise, I do not. It is no freedom from perplexity in my own mind that enables me to produce perplexity in the minds

of other men. On the contrary, I am quite as much at a loss myself as are those who find themselves at a loss to answer me.[1]

Nevertheless, we know that the mission of Socrates was to teach. His life affords a typical illustration of the distinction which requires to be drawn between the current and a more exquisite meaning of the word "teacher." The Sophists who were his contemporaries were teachers in the current sense, dealing with matters analogous to much that is comprised

[1] Plat. *Men.* 80. "One of the most important lessons in this, as in so many other Platonic dialogues, is the mischief of proceeding to debate ulterior and secondary questions, without having settled the fundamental words and notions: the false persuasion of knowledge, common to almost every one, respecting these familiar ethical and social ideas. Menon represents the common state of mind. He begins with the false persuasion that he as well as every one else knows what virtue is; and even when he is proved to be ignorant, he still feels no interest in the fundamental inquiry, but turns aside to his original object of curiosity, 'Whether virtue is teachable.' Nothing can be more repugnant to an ordinary mind than the thorough sifting of deep-seated, long-familiarized, notions — *τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμαν, ὀδυνᾷ.*" — GROTE, *Plato*, v. 2, p. 12. "Such terms as Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance, Matter, Church, State, Revelation, Inspiration, Knowledge, Belief, are tossed about in the wars of words as if everybody knew what they meant, and as if everybody used them in the same sense; whereas most people, and particularly those who represent public opinion, pick up these complicated terms as children, beginning with the vaguest conceptions, adding to them from time to time, perhaps correcting likewise at haphazard some of their involuntary errors, but never taking stock, never either inquiring into the history of the terms which they handle so freely, or realizing the fullness of their meaning according to the strict rules of logical definition." — MAX MÜLLER, *Lectures on Language*, Second Series, pp. 526, 527 (quoted in Mill's Review of Grote's Plato, *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1866). Xenophon, *Mem.* 1. 1. 16, enumerates the usual subjects of Socratic investigation thus: *περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία· τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, κτλ.* Platonic examples are: *Charmides σωφροσύνη, Euthyphro ὁσιότης, Hippias Major τὸ καλόν, Laches ἀνδρεία, Lysis φιλία, Meno ἀρετή, Republic δικαιοσύνη.*

under the term "higher education" at the present day. They were widely versed in the learned accomplishments of their time; fluent and attractive lecturers; a few of them great original thinkers, as Protagoras of Abdera; some with special proclivities, like Prodicus of Ceos, who expounded the synonyms of the language. In an era of freshly stimulated intellectual vigor and rapidly widening opportunities for its exercise they were the professors of the liberal arts and sciences as then known; and the instruction they offered was eagerly sought for by young men who could afford to pay the fees, whether the motive might be an innate love of learning, or, as would be true of the great majority of cases, the ambition to cultivate effectively those talents believed to be most helpful in enabling their possessor to rise to a position of influence and distinction in public affairs. The methods of the Sophists were not merely expository, but in a way also dialectical and critical, the fundamental difference between their activity and that of Socrates being given in the antithesis of rhetoric and Socratic dialectic already explained. An attempt to find the counterparts of the Sophists of the fifth century B.C. in modern education, not professional or technical, would require us first to eliminate those teachers of the mathematical and physical or natural sciences who are at the same time trained investigators, and further, in considering the residue, to make a proper deduction for the employment of strictly reasoned method in the teaching of subjects not themselves of scientific character, or not yet brought completely under the domain of science.[1]

[1] The suspicion and mistrust felt in early times toward all persons of studious habit and believed to possess superior intellectual attainments (cp. Euripides, *Medea*, 294 ff.) was complicated in the case of the Sophists with a popular prejudice regarding the custom of taking pay for imparting such accomplishment to others. There seemed to be especial ground for suspecting the motives of a class of men prepared to teach the art of "making the worse

For Socrates, on the other hand, so unique was his environment, so unexampled his historical position, we should vainly seek a modern counterpart, whether as typified in a class or embodied in an individual. It can be conceived as the spirit of *all* true learning personified,—as the *ideal* teacher,—imparting of himself rather than of his acquisitions, keeping first principles steadily in sight and never mistaking the semblance for the reality of knowledge.

What is called "personal magnetism" pertains to a spiritual realm unexplored and impenetrable. The ultimate sources of this influence lie in the emotional, unconscious regions of the soul; and no one undertakes to account completely for its manifestations, even in the case of individuals often seen and intimately known. To Socrates his contemporaries have attributed a power over the minds of his companions and hearers which seemed to them something magical and superhuman. In fact the Athenian sage united in his personality, to an unparalleled degree, the temperament of strong feeling, of ardent, even violent passions, and a supreme intellectual faculty, holding

appear the better reason" to any who would pay liberally for the instruction. The words "sophistry," "sophistical," so far as they are used to denote fallacious reasoning exercised with the intent to deceive, cannot be fitly applied to the Sophists of the fifth century B.C. as a class, nor to any individual among them of whom we have received accounts. In fact, a great part of the sophistry (to give the word its widest meaning) that is always rife, consists of unsound doctrine which is not recognized as fallacious by those who inculcate or disseminate it. "It has been the practice of writers on logic . . . to represent logical fallacies as frauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners. This view of the case appears to me incomplete and misleading. It substitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and essential. The various sophisms . . . are not the inventions of Sophists. They are erroneous tendencies of the reasoning process, frequently incident to human thought and speech: specimens of those ever-renewed 'inadvertencies of ordinary thinking' which it is the peculiar mission of philosophy or 'reasoned truth' to rectify."—GROTE, *Plato*, v. 1, p. 550.

the will in check and guiding it upon lines of pure reason.[1] The rare "combination of moral enthusiasm and logical discipline" could not fail to produce marvelous effects in those upon whose minds it was systematically brought to bear. It was a character complex, yet simple in its unsullied consistency; precepts of justice, temperance, courage — ideas weighed in cold thought and issuing in burning words — were to be seen exemplified in every action, proved in every ordeal or opportunity. How came such a soul to be lodged in the uncouth frame and to play behind the gross features of a satyr, unless indeed the spirit of a divinity were hidden under that disguise? — The

[1] "All centuries have produced their quota of strong, clear, cool heads; and there has rarely been any lack of warm hearts. But the two are rarely combined, and the rarest phenomenon of all is a heart of mighty power working with all its force to keep the head above it cool, as a steam engine may give motion to a refrigerating machine. Such a combination occurs but once in a millennium on any large scale. But when it does occur, it exerts, as if to compensate for its rarity, an influence which persists unexhausted for a long train of centuries." — GOMPERZ, *Griechishe Denker*, Eng. Transl., v. 2, p. 45. The author goes on to remark on enthusiasm and emotion generally, as tending rather to obscurity than to clearness of mental vision. Compare, however, the following, from J. S. MILL, on *Poetry and its Varieties*: "That capacity of strong feeling which is supposed necessarily to disturb the judgment is also the material out of which all *motives* are made, — the motives, consequently, which lead human beings to the pursuit of truth. The greater the individual's capacity of happiness and misery, the stronger interest has that individual in arriving at truth; and, when once that interest is felt, an impassioned nature is sure to pursue this, as to pursue any other object, with greater ardor: for energy of character is commonly the offspring of strong feeling." The observations above quoted are helpful in the difficult task of separating the Socratic and the Platonic elements intimately fused in the composition of the Dialogues, which, while borrowing the name and voice of him by whose example they were inspired, are at the same time permeated by the genius of the author who conceived and elaborated them. Plato and Socrates were similar in temperament. But we note one significant difference: the Socratic intelligence remained unclouded by obtrusions of the synthetic imagination; the spirit of Plato refused to hover in a single sphere. The mystic background

comparison I am going to make (declares Alcibiades in the *Symposium*) shall be for truth's sake, and no jesting whatever. I say that Socrates is precisely like the Silenus-figures we see in the shops, fashioned in a sitting posture, with flutes or Pan's pipes in their hands. Such is their exterior; but when you open them, images of gods are disclosed within. I compare him also to the satyr Marsyas. That you resemble those beings in form and feature, Socrates, you would not yourself venture to deny; and that the likeness holds good in all respects, listen while I explain. To begin with, you are one of the wantons — What, no? — confess, or I produce my witnesses. A musician too. Ay, a performer more wonderful than Marsyas

of the soul was, indeed, all-important to Socrates. There were fixed the roots of his deep religious sentiment; there dwelt and thence spoke his *Daemon*, the admonitory Voice. But for him there was no blurring of the boundary line between the Conscious and the Unconscious; his mental vision was disturbed by no confusion of fantasy and reason. With Plato it was far otherwise. To the universal forms so vividly conceived through the Socratic process of abstraction and generalization — to these *ideas* Plato, turning his back on the particulars from which they flow, saw fit to attribute *reality*, denying to them their source and origin, and translating them to an alien region. Though he consecrated his life to Philosophy with sincerest devotion, Plato was still incapable of deserting the Muses. Socrates, as it appears, felt certain compunctions on this score, and was moved, at the eleventh hour, to absolve himself, by a pair of humble creative efforts, thus offering some atonement to the Genius of Poesy. Many times during his life a Dream had visited him — the same Dream under divers shapes, but addressing him always in the same words: *ὦ Σώκρατες, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου*. Until the time came for him to die he had taken it for granted that this 'music' meant philosophy — that the purpose of the Dream had been only to encourage and strengthen him in the good work he was actually doing. But now, in the prison cell, on the eve of his departure, he felt bound to guard against the consequences of a possible misunderstanding of the divine injunction. There is a profound suggestiveness in this tale. Socrates, perhaps, did well to absolve himself. It is not the Socratic, but the Platonic, philosophy that could be fairly thought of as *μεγίστη μουσική*. — *Phaed.* 61.

by far! It was with the instrument into which he breathed that *he* enchanted all hearers, as all are enchanted now who hear his tunes. The tunes of Olympus, learnt from Marsyas, are the only spells in the world that really bind. Whether the player who performs them be of the best or of the poorest, they are sure to work their will, and by the divinity that is in them reveal the divine needs and religious cravings of the hearer's soul. In only one way do you differ from Marsyas, Socrates, in that with no instrument, but by your bare words, you produce the same effect. When we hear any other speaker, be he never so eloquent, or other words than yours, nobody cares at all, so to say, for that; but when one hears *you*, or your words spoken by another, though it be a sorry spokesman, let the listener be man, woman, or child, we stand smitten and spellbound. For my own part, gentlemen, if you were not sure to think this wine had completely got the better of me, I would declare to you on oath, how I have been affected by his words, and how they affect me even now. When I hear them, the heart within me bounds more wildly than do the frenzied worshipers of the Great Goddess; tears burst from my eyes at the words he utters. And very many besides myself are affected in the same manner. While listening to Pericles, or to harangues delivered by other eloquent men, I thought they spoke well, to be sure, but they never moved me in *this* way: there was no tumult in my soul; it did not cry out upon me that I was no better than a slave. But this Marsyas here has made me feel, over and over again, that, being such as I am, it were better not to live. You will not deny the truth, Socrates, of what I say. And I am well aware, to this very day, that if I would lend my ears I could not withstand the spell, but I should have the same experience over again. He compels me to confess, that with all these shortcomings of my own I yet neglect myself to attend to the affairs

of Athens. Therefore perforce I stop my ears and flee away as it were from the Sirens' song, that I may not stay right here and grow old seated at the feet of Socrates. He is the only man before whom I have felt, what no one would expect to find in me, the sense of *shame*. Before him and him alone I do feel it. For I am conscious that I cannot rebut his proofs of my evil-doing, and yet that, when I am away from him, I am powerless to resist the promptings of ambition. Hence it is that I fly from him and shun him, and when I do see him am ashamed of the admissions I have made. Oftentimes I think I would gladly see him no longer among the living; yet again, if that were to happen, I know it would distress me far more — so that I am at a loss what to do with such a man.[1]

An appreciable part of the dramatic power of the Dialogues is furnished by their scenery. The scene of a Socratic conversation may either be adapted merely in a general way to the haunts and habits of the philosopher, as when a gymnasium is chosen, or a grove by the Ilissus, or a friend's house in the

[1] Plat. *Symp.* 215, 216. As we read Alcibiades' confession of his pricks of conscience and remorse, the allusion to Pericles recalls a line of Eupolis touching the eloquence of that statesman, which might be applied with singular fitness to Socrates himself. Of all the speakers (the comic poet said) Pericles was the only one who always left the *sting* behind (bee-like) in his listeners: —

—— μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων
τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις.

Socrates' power over souls would inevitably take on a sinister aspect in the popular mind, and could not fail to enhance the belief that he was a "corrupter of youth." Cp. Ar. *Av.* 1553 *λίμνη τις ἔστ' ἄλυτος οὗ | ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης.* — If it were true that I had harmed the young men (the Defendant says), then their fathers and elder brothers, here present at the trial, ought to be testifying against me, and not in my favor as they all do. Here, for example, is the brother of Theodotus. Theodotus himself is dead, so that he, at any rate, cannot have *begged his brother off*. *Apol.* 33 E.

Piraeus; or it may be historical, suggested by some memorable occasion in his career. Scenes of the latter sort are those laid in the prison, where Socrates was confined after he had been condemned to death, awaiting the return of the Sacred Galley from Delos, the signal for his execution; and that of the *Apology*, which transports us to the court-room, into the presence of the accused with his little group of friends, of the three accusers and the five hundred Athenian judges. It must not be supposed, however, that because the scene of a dialogue has been derived from a real event the conversation itself can be taken as a transcript of actual utterances, nor even that the words attributed to the master may not serve to convey views and doctrines peculiar to the disciple. Plato was no recorder of mere facts. The transcendent truth of ideality pervades his writings. They require, in order to distinguish and hear aright the mingled voices, the judgment of sympathetic insight, a certain faculty of divination on the reader's part. Thus, in the *Crito*, a prison scene, the tender to the prisoner of some means of effecting an escape and his firm refusal to avail himself of the opportunity, are to be noted as facts; and the one all-sufficient argument of consistency advanced in support of the refusal, as well as the principles of right conduct sketched in dialectic form, we promptly recognize as Socratic: we are compelled to judge otherwise of the famous personification of the Laws of Athens, their special plea and grievance, a noble piece of rhetoric, which Plato has seen fit to introduce, to perfect the design of the Dialogue as a whole. The *Phaedo*, again, depicting, with infinite pathos, the last moments in the life of Socrates and his death by the draught of hemlock, forms, thus far, an historical record of inestimable value: but his discourses on the nature and destiny of the soul, the poetic mysticism and the myth-making, with all their artistic appropriateness to such

a scene and such an hour, betray their immediate source in the speculative Platonic imagination. These dramatic fictions justify themselves by the laws of art. Yet another sort of combination is met with in the *Apology* or Defense of Socrates before his Judges. That Dialogue, — for the tone and even the form of dialogue are assumed as far as the fiction of a judicial argument would permit,[1] — although its scene is historical, does not record the discourse that was pronounced on the occasion to which it is adapted; nevertheless, in vindicating his master to the world at large, while presenting under the lineaments of Socrates a picture of the *ideal* sage in its simple unity and integrity, Plato would be moved by feelings of piety, no less than by the sense of artistic fitness, to exclude every feature not essentially characteristic, every line or shade of color not genuine and true to the life.

The Platonic Apology would indeed have seemed most inadequate, whether viewed as vindication or as portrait, had it been made to include no more than the Defendant's plain rejoinder to the indictment considered by the Athenian dicastery, or, composed as it was after the events of the trial were publicly known, had its author omitted to point with scathing force the moral lesson of the verdict rendered, as well

[1] The opening sentences of the Apology are designed (with allusion to the speeches of the prosecution supposed to be just concluded) to present forcibly the contrast of rhetorical methods and the defendant's customary mode of expression — the only mode competent to him — for which he craves the indulgence of the court. The liberty conceded in the Athenian dicasteries to either party in a suit of questioning his opponent enables the Apology to take on at one stage the precise form of dialogue, 24 D. But the familiar conversational *tone* pervades the whole work, even where its eloquence is most solemn and impressive. It is but a short time we have had to converse with one another (the speaker says), ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα 37 A. And, again, 39 E, τοῖς ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος.

as to sound that note of inspired eulogy which no great man is capable of voicing for himself. Socrates in fact pleaded his cause in words the 'truest, the most free, the most just, that were ever heard'[1]—as Xenophon avers, who, though he could not be present at the trial, has put together a rambling and fragmentary report of the defense, as described to him, with his own interpretation of its tone. But the pious task that lay before Plato was a larger one than the accused himself had been called upon to undertake, as it is a worthier and greater thing to redeem and immortalize the memory of a man than merely to defer his death. In the indictment preferred by Meletus there were two counts to which Socrates had to answer: the charge of disbelieving in the deities recognized by the state, and importing new ones; and that of corrupting the morals of Athenian youth by teaching such irreligion. Of these offenses (embraced under the comprehensive term *ἀσέβεια*) a majority of the judges pronounced him guilty. But the author of the Apology widens the field of accusation to include the serious charge of atheism, as well as that of "making the worse appear the better reason," involved in the deep-seated popular misunderstanding, the inveterate prejudice and odium, which had grown up around the name and person of Socrates, and in which Plato finds the remote and principal cause of his condemnation. The rebuttal and denial of such erroneous opinions would be sharp and brief. But while the false view was dispelled, a vision of the truth, sublime and ineffaceable — of the

[1] Xen. *Mem.* 4. 8. 1 *τὴν δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιότατα εἰπών.* Cp. his *Apologia Socratis.* Xenophon can find no worthier explanation of Socrates' lofty contempt of death than the readiness to be spared the failings and infirmities of extreme old age; and to the Oracle, which in Plato is so finely applied to the Socratic *wisdom*, Xenophon gives a different turn: *ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον.*

real Socrates and his heavenly commission — must come to replace it for all time.[1]

When, in obedience to the divine mandate, I examine men's minds (the Defendant says) and show them that they think they know that whereof they know nothing, or when the youths who imitate me confute in like manner those who fancy themselves wise, the anger they feel is not for themselves and their own ignorance, but is visited on *me*, and they proceed to talk about 'one Socrates, a pestilent fellow, who makes young people bad.' When asked what he does or what he teaches, to deserve this reproach, they are at a loss for a reply, but to hide their embarrassment fall back upon the current charges indiscriminately urged against all philosophers, of studying what is in the heavens and what is beneath the earth, and of making the worse appear the better reason. Naturally they would not choose to state the truth, that they are exposed in their pretense of knowing what they do not know.[2] — But it was not merely motives of wounded vanity, of petty jealousy and malice, that formed the basis of such misrepresentation. Under the circumstances of the time a perverted conception of the character of Socrates was inevitable on the part of a numerous class of steady-going persons of conventional habit and stereotyped

[1] SCHANZ, *Einleitung*, p. 91, observes that the 'centre of gravity' of the *Apology* lies, not on the negative or defensive, but on the positive or expository, side. The substance of the indictment is thus reported in Xen. *Mem.* I. 1. 1: *ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.* Cp. Plat. *Apol.* 24 B *Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά.* SCHANZ, *Einleitung*, p. 16, conjecturally restores the official form as follows: *Μέλητος τοῦ δεῖνος Πιτθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθεν ἀσεβείας· τίμημα θάνατος. Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων, καὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα τοὺς νέους διδάσκων.*

[2] Plat. *Apol.* 23 C D.

modes of thought, who were instinctively opposed to the innovations in education, art, and religion that the awakened spirit of intellectual inquiry threatened to effect, and who neither cared nor were competent to discriminate between the individuals whom they identified with the new movement as a whole. The Old Attic Comedy regularly made itself the champion of things as they have been, are, and always should be. For his *Clouds*, a play designed to cast ridicule upon the entire family of philosophers, Aristophanes found a convenient typical protagonist in the familiar and striking personality of Socrates — an opportunity of effectively presenting a medley of absurdities under a single role. All imaginable reputed crimes of free-thinkers, scientist or sophist, *τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα*, are inculcated with object-lessons and glorified by the Socrates of this Comedy, which is still extant in a form sufficiently near to that of its first representation to enable us to judge fairly of its effects. The impression left upon the popular imagination by such a caricature, drawn with the comic poet's unscrupulous art, would form a nucleus round which vague floating opinions could gather, becoming in course of time indistinguishable from an actual knowledge of the man. Upon the prejudice due to such causes the Accusers of Socrates, as Plato affirms, could confidently rely, to enforce their contention, when the circumstances of the Athenian state finally prompted the attack.[1]

We shall not attempt to lay before readers of the Apology in advance a detailed summary of its contents or argument. Its threefold division, into defense proper, consideration of penalty after the verdict, and concluding talk with the judges, requires no lengthy explanation; while the composition of the first and

[1] Plat. *Apol.* 19 B *ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολή, ἣν δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.* Mention of the *Clouds*, 19 C.

most comprehensive of the three parts is of a nature that does not readily lend itself to formal analysis. Throughout the work, in the presentation of its subject on the positive side, each essential trait is revealed with unobtrusive art, the whole character is gradually brought to view, the clear light of the simple Socratic philosophy shines over all, its inherent irony too true and genuine to seem to suffer from Plato's added strain of caustic satire. The evidence of conspicuous illustrative events is incidentally recorded: the protest and steadfast refusal of Socrates as Chairman of the Prytanes to put an illegal motion to the vote of the stormy Assembly on the Pnyx; his quiet disregard of an unjust command imposed by the Thirty Tyrants; and casually as it were, the brief mention of military campaigns wherein he had served the city as a soldier in the phalanx.[1] But matters of fact are everywhere subordinated to the ideal portraiture. Not even the characteristic doctrinal features are permitted, as such, to disturb the true ethical proportions, to mar the moral perspective of this incomparable picture — unfolding as it does the vision of a soul at once so simple and so great, that each several aspect only helps reveal the unity in which it quickly becomes merged and lost. The eloquence of the Apology, of a sort alike unfamiliar to court or ecclesia, to advocate or rhetor, is borne in upon us as the voice of a *martyr* — bearing witness not to the truth of a belief, but to the belief in truth itself. In the presence of Socrates before his Judges the adherents of all creeds and speculative dogmas can stand together for a brief moment on the *terra firma* of that wisdom which perfectly comprehends the limitations of human knowledge. It is the sure and unassailable ground of the Agnostic. The singular beauty and impressiveness of the con-

[1] See, in the Index, the articles *ναυμαχία*, *Λέων*, *Ἀμφίπολις*, *Δήλιον*, *Ποτείδαια*.

cluding words, when the sage comes to speak of his impending doom, we note as largely attributable to his clear pointing of the boundary line between the unknown and the known. — *Ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. — Ἀλλὰ χρὴ εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἓν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι.*

The ingenuous reader will do well to hesitate before committing himself to the judgment prompted by the feelings that first arise on contemplating the treatment of Socrates by his native city. What Athens really did was to offer him the choice between a residence elsewhere and a painless death. Protagoras and Anaxagoras, the aliens, facing the same alternatives, could choose the former one; Socrates, the Athenian, who knew himself and had defined to his own mind with precision the evil and the good, was bound to choose the latter. "To be great is to be misunderstood"; and the city gave fresh proof of her incapacity to understand the greatest of her citizens, when she expected him to avoid presenting himself at court in answer to the indictment, or, once there, to propose for himself what would ordinarily be regarded as the lesser penalty. But while she failed to comprehend his essential attributes, there were accessory traits of character and accidental circumstances in the career of the Philosopher that had been noted with grave suspicion by the jealous guardians of civic integrity. Not only had he stood aloof from public life, so far as any voluntary participation in the business of the city was concerned, but he had been wont to criticise various details of a form of polity which he could not thoroughly admire; and men who had worked irreparable damage to the state had been marked as his disciples — notably Critias[1] and Alcibiades, not to mention the

[1] Years after the trial the orator Aeschines said to the people in the Ecclesia, You put to death the sophist Socrates, because it was made clear that he

renegade, philo-Laconian Xenophon. Political and religious heterodoxy would be felt to have united their baneful influences in depraving the minds of these and other youthful followers who had turned out badly. — The Athenians do not greatly trouble themselves (we read in the *Euthyphro*) about any cleverness they fancy a man to possess, provided he keep it to himself and refrain from *teaching* his accomplishment to others; if he does that, it provokes their ire.[1] — Figuratively speaking, the ancient Grecian commonwealths stood in daily terror of their lives. Over and above the danger from external foes, the spirit of faction within the walls never remitted its secret activity, watching for opportunities of open force, while the shadow of the *tyrannis* was always hovering near. Athens at the close of the fifth century B.C., the Restored Democracy, or, in Aristophanic phrase, the venerable *Demus of Pnyx*, set on his feet again, — this worthy patriarch, enfeebled by a long and painful illness, with more than one dangerous outbreak of domestic strife attending it, and just escaped from assassination at the hands of a parcel of malcontents, — impatient and mistrustful of his own celebrated tolerance of eccentric deportment on the part of his progeny, has still not lost his native magnanimity, though ready to adopt now and then a drastic measure, retroactive or precautionary, deemed by the family council indispensable to his future security and peace of mind. The same Athens that in 399 B.C. suppresses the voice of Socrates, had, four years earlier, under the lead of Thrasybulus, set an example of purely political clemency up to that time without a parallel in history.

had educated Critias, one of those who subverted the Constitution. *Σωκράτην τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκώς, ἕνα τῶν τὸν δῆμον καταλυσάντων.* Aeschin. *Timarch.* 173.

[1] Plat. *Euthyphr.* 3 C.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

B.C.

469. Birth of Socrates.
456. Death of Aeschylus. Completion of the Long Walls of Athens.
455. First tragedy of Euripides.
450. Withdrawal of Anaxagoras from Athens.
449. Birth of Alcibiades?
440. The *Antigone* of Sophocles. Revolt and surrender of Samos. Sophocles a colleague of Pericles as general before Samos.
438. The *Alcestis* of Euripides. Completion of the Parthenon.
432. Prosecution of Phidias and Aspasia for ἀσέβεια.
431. Beginning of the Peloponnesian War. First Invasion of Attica. Funeral Oration of Pericles. Birth of Xenophon. The *Medea* of Euripides.
430. Second Invasion of Attica. The Plague at Athens.
429. Birth of Plato. Death of Pericles. Surrender of Potidaea.
428. Third Invasion of Attica.
427. Visit of Gorgias to Athens as envoy of Leontini. Fourth Invasion of Attica.
424. Defeat of Athenians by Thebans at Delium.
423. The *Clouds* of Aristophanes.
422. Battle of Amphipolis.
415. Sailing of the Sicilian Expedition under Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades. Alcibiades accused of profaning the Mysteries, and condemned to death in his absence.
413. Destruction of the Athenian fleet at Syracuse.

B.C.

407. Return of Alcibades to Athens.

406. Death of Euripides. Battle of the Arginussae Islands. Execution of six generals.

405. Death of Sophocles. The *Frogs* of Aristophanes. Battle of Aegospotami.

404. Surrender of Athens to Lysander. Tyranny of the Thirty; suppressed in the eighth month. Death of Alcibiades.

403. Restoration of the Democracy of Athens. Thrasybulus and the Amnesty.

401. Expedition of Cyrus the Younger (described in the *Anabasis* of Xenophon).

399. Death of Socrates.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

17 A Ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐ-
5 δὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον, ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος
B λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνω-
10 μαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντό-

17 A–18 A.

The defendant professes himself bewildered by the persuasive eloquence of his accusers, yet amazed at their extremity of falsehood — above all at their effrontery in warning the judges against HIM *as a clever speaker. Can it be they recognize a sort of eloquence quite unlike their own — the eloquence of truth? Its language is not ornate and studied, but spontaneous and simple — even such as becomes the defendant's years. Therefore he begs his judges to suffer him to speak in his accustomed way, and not in the manner of the courts of law, to which he is a stranger. He deems it fair that they should grant this boon; for the question is, indeed, not one of oratory, but of truth and justice.*

2. **Ἐγὼ δ' οὖν . . . ἐπελαθόμην**: 'as for *me*, they almost made me forget who I was.' For **ὑπ' αὐτῶν** see Index, **πάσχειν**.

5. **αὐτῶν**: *i.e.* **τῶν κατηγόρων**, gen. of possession, with **ἕν**. So below, B, with **τοῦτο**.

τατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, C οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι 10 ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου 15 ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασιν, καὶ

1. **δεινὸν . . . λέγειν**: the phrase is amplified and emphasized by placing *καλοῦσιν οὗτοι* within it. The arrangement thus gives clear efficiency to the irony of *δεινὸν λέγειν* here, which the speaker ventures to suggest as an equivalent of *τἀληθῆ λέγοντα*. Index, δεινός.

2. **εἰ . . . τοῦτο λέγουσιν**: 'if that is what they mean.' What they really meant was Socrates' skill in the dialectic method, popularly regarded as an instrument of sophistry, *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν*.

3. **οὐ κατὰ τούτους**: 'tho' not after *their* manner.' *οὐ* belongs not to the sentence, but to the phrase, which is parenthetical in tone. Unabbreviated, *ὁμολογοίην ἂν εἶναι ῥήτωρ, οὐ μὲν κατὰ τούτους, ἀλλ' ὅμως*.

4. **ἤ τι ἢ οὐδέν**: Index, τὶς.

12. **εἰς ὑμᾶς**: Index, εἰσελθεῖν.

14. **δι' ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν**: cp. *ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ* κτλ. 27 B. The conversational tone is meant, tending to the form of dialogue, as 20 A, B, and elsewhere.

16. **ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν**: *i.e.* at the counters of the money-changers, "on 'change."

ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα.
D ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον
ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν
4 ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ
18 A ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὤν, ξυνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι,
εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ
ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον,
ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐᾶν (ἴσως μὲν
γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη), αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκο-
10 πεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή·
δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

3. **ἔτη . . . ἑβδομήκοντα**: Index, **Σωκράτης**.

4. **τῷ ὄντι ξένος**: *i.e.* **ξένος** in the proper sense of the word, not figuratively as **ξένως** above. A foreigner or alien might be unable to address the court even in the Attic dialect (**φωνή**).

7. **καὶ . . . τοῦτο . . . δέομαι | δίκαιον ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ**: divide thus in reading, likewise in translating. **δίκαιον**, while rhetorically emphatic (first word in the group), is grammatically a predicate-adjective. See the following note.

11. **αὕτη ἀρετή**: sc. **ἐστιν**. The subject **αὕτη**, by assimilation of gender; for **τοῦτο**, *i.e.* **τὸ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ σκοπεῖν κτλ.** There is no ambiguity in the assimilated form of expression; **ἀρετή** must be predicative, otherwise the article would be required, with **οὗτος**, **ὅδε**, **ἐκεῖνος**, in prose.

18 A–E

Two sets of accusations there are, he affirms, and two companies of accusers, the old and the new — not merely the formidable Anytus and his friends, but the far more formidable ORIGINAL ACCUSERS. *These have had the ear of the Athenian public, of the men who now sit in judgment, from childhood up. Many in number, intangible and nameless (barring a comic poet or two), impossible to bring to book, they, whether in jealousy and malice, or themselves believing what they said, have described "one Socrates, a wise man, given to meteoric and subterranean enquiries, a perverter of right reason." They have classed the*

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες οἱ δεινοί εἰσίν μου κατήγοροι. οἱ

defendant with those philosophers who are thought to disbelieve in gods. He asks the judges, then, to concede the twofold scheme; and he claims the right, in pleading his cause, to deal first with the charges that were first preferred.

4. **πολλοί** and **πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες** are attributives of *κατήγοροι*, connected by *καί*. Not so in English. 'Many have there been to bring accusation, and these many years has the slandering gone on.' Grammatically different below C, where *πολλοί* and *πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες* and *λέγοντες* are predicative in the Greek.

5. **πρὸς ὑμᾶς**: with *κατήγοροι*, not with *γεγόνασι*. The verb alone forms the predicate.

7. **καίπερ . . . δεινούς**: not without irony; the *ὕστεροι* might feel themselves slighted, were they not distinctly recognized as *δεινοί*. This recognition, however, is virtually retracted below C, *οὗτοι . . . οἱ δεινοί εἰσί μου κατήγοροι*.

9. **ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν**: 'pressed unceasingly their criminations.' For the charges which follow, see the Index, *σοφός*, *σοφιστής*, *Ἀναξαγόρας*, *λόγος*.

13. **οἱ δεινοὶ κτλ.**: forms the predicate. Regularly the subject is distinguished from the predicate by the presence of the article with the former, but sometimes, as here, the article is essential to

γὰρ ἀκούσαντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα D οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμῳδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὤν· ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολο-

the meaning of the predicate-noun independently of grammatical structure. They 'are the (truly) formidable accusers with whom I have to deal.' The thought is that all other charges are of comparatively little moment beside that of atheism (below οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν), here indirectly made.

2. ἔπειτα κτλ.: reverting to the two main points, πολλοί and πάλαι. A consequence of the second point is the depth of the impression made upon the minds of the present judges, who were children or mere boys when they first listened to misrepresentations of Socrates. The Athenian δικαστής must be at least thirty years of age: it was now twenty-four years since the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, in which Socrates was caricatured, had been presented to the public (423 B.C.); and he must have been at that time already well known and much talked of.

6. ἐρήμην κτλ.: Index, δίκη.

9. ὅσοι . . . ἀνέπειθον: contrasted with the κωμῳδοποιοί, who were neither unknown nor animated by jealousy and malice.

10. οἱ δὲ ('others') . . . ἄλλους ('more') πείθοντες: enlarges and corrects the main statement. Cp. ἔνιοι δὲ . . . μειράκια, above C.

13. σκιαμαχεῖν: a fanciful counterpart of the proceedings at a δίκη ἐρήμη. Here it is the defendant who presents himself at court, but he is bound to lose his case,

Ε γούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἑτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον.

Εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δή, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχει-
19 Α ρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ
10 χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί μ ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον,
15 τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ᾗ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων
Β Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν·

because the accusers do not make their appearance, to be confuted by him. Index, ἀτεχνῶς. The whole expression, σκιαμαχεῖν . . . ἀποκρινομένου, is made to include ἐλέγχειν and ἀποκρίνεσθαι as characteristic features of the Socratic method.

19 A

He proceeds to his defense. How difficult the task, in one short hour to relieve men's minds of a prejudice of long years' standing — that he knows full well. But the law calls for a defense; the issue may be left to God.

11. **Καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί**: but especially for *them*. Cp. 30 D, where he says, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι . . . ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, κτλ.

12. **πλέον . . . ποιῆσαι**: Index, ποιεῖν.

19 B–D

He formulates the ancient calumny, after the model of a real indictment: — "Guilty of overmuch infernal and supernal in-

τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστιν· μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας

vestigation, sophistry, teaching of the same to other men." The judges have seen it all with their own eyes, represented in a play now famous — one "Socrates" suspended in mid-air, prating of aerial matters whereof the real Socrates knows nothing — without offense to anybody who does understand them, be it said. Many of his judges have listened to his conversations. If any have heard him utter a word upon subjects of this nature at any time, let them become witnesses to their fellows. — They are silent! He points at the inference to be drawn from this reticent demeanor.

8. Περιφερόμενον: ἐπὶ κρεμάθρας (hanging basket) Ar. *Clouds* 218, ἀπὸ ταρροῦ (crate, basket), *ib.* 226.

8. ἀεροβατεῖν: ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον Ar. *Clouds* 225.

11. περὶ τῶν τοιούτων: *i.e.* τῶν τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐρανίων. Below 26 E, where the tone is not exactly the same as the irony of the present passage, astronomical views of Anaxagoras are spoken of as ἄτοπα.

12. μή πως . . . φύγοιμι: he prays fervently not to be called to account on so grave a charge as that — for offending in some way the philosophers of the day; even as the poets, politicians, etc., feeling themselves aggrieved have employed Meletus to call him to account. Index, φεύγειν.

12. δίκας: the plural here, to avoid too specific an application of the meaning of the word. Generalizing Plural.

φύγοιμι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
D οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτῶν ὑμῶν πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν,
5 ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τἆλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν, οὐδέ γ' εἴ τινος ἀκη-
10 κόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρή-
E ματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ

2. **μάρτυρας**: Predicate-substantive.

3. **διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν**: cp. ἔπειθον τε καὶ κατηγόρουν 18 B. Other similar couplets 20 A, 28 E, 29 C, D, E.

5. **οἱ τοιοῦτοι**: *i.e.* οἱ ἀκηκοότες μου διαλεγομένου. In English we should be apt to invert the subject and predicate of the Greek sentence, 'Many of you are of the number.'

7. **ἐκ τούτου**: *i.e.* from the fact that not one of the judges speaks up to cite a case of such talk on the part of Socrates. An effective dramatic touch.

7. **τοιαῦτα**: *i.e.* in like manner not to be substantiated by explicit evidence. The frequent occurrence of τοιοῦτος here marks the informal conversational manner.

8. **τἆλλα κτλ.**: covers the vague popular reproach τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν 18 B, 19 B.

19 D–20 C

Likewise the allegation that he undertakes to educate men and receives pay therefor, this also he declares untrue — again no offense to any distinguish educator who may be competent to convey the art of a successful life to grateful and enthusiastic youth. The possessor of such skill (with its emoluments) the defendant pronounces happy. Socrates would feel proud if he himself possessed it.

9. **Οὐδέ γε**: 'no indeed, nor.' For οὐδέ following οὔτε see the Index.

11. **ἐπεί**: 'for'. ἐπεί attaches to something like καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω κτλ. 19 C, to be mentally supplied. The tone of the

μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων, τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βού-
20 A λωνται, — τούτους πείθουσιν τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας, σφίσιν ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστιν ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην, ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε, Ὦ Καλλία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μέν σου τὼ υἱέε πώλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι,

two passages is the same. Compare καὶ τοῦτό γε with τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην; εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη with εἴ τις . . . σοφός ἐστιν.

1. εἰ . . . εἴη: see note on *Crit.* 46 B.

4. τοὺς νέους κτλ.: '(taking) the young men, etc. The speaker had in mind some such thought as παιδεύειν δύναται when he began the sentence and had got as far as τοὺς νέους, but he is diverted therefrom by a new consideration that intervenes (οἷς ἔξεστι κτλ.), growing out of his mention of the *itinerant* character of the sophist's profession (ἕκαστος . . . εἰς ἑκάστην).

6. τούτους πείθουσιν:' 'they prevail upon the young men (I say).'

7. σφίσιν: 'with *them*,' the sophists. Emphasized by the contrast with ἐκείνων, τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν.

8. ἐπεί: elliptical, as above 19 E. Gorgias and Hippias need not fancy themselves the only wise men in the world, 'for,' etc.

8. ἐνθάδε: in Athens.

9. ἐγώ: 'I myself.'

9. ἔτυχον κτλ.: differently in the *Protagoras* Socrates, in company with a young friend Hippocrates, goes to the house of Callias *on purpose* to see and hear the great sophist Protagoras, who was stopping there at the time.

12. ἦν δ ἐγώ: Index, ἦν.

ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῷ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ποιήσειν τὴν προσ-
B ήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἢ
τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ', ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστόν, τίνα
αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης
5 ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων
ἐστίν; οἶμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν.
ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ'
ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὔηνος, ἔφη, ὦ
Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν. — καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον
10 ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ
C οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκοι. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνό-
μην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ'
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

Τπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες,

1. **ὃς ἔμελλεν . . . ποιήσειν**: assimilation of **ὃς ποιήσει** (Final Relative clause of Purpose) to the past form of the sentence. This is regularly done as here by means of the periphrastic future with *μέλλειν*. Index, *μέλλειν*. With *ἀνθρωπίνη τε καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή* compare Aristotle's *ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν* ('social') *ζῷον Pol.* 1. 2. 9.

8. **Εὔηνος . . . Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν**: thus it appears, from the business-like reply of Callias, that a Parian variety of *ἀρετὴ πολιτική* could be had for about $85.50.

10. **ἔχοι . . . διδάσκοι**: the past phase of **ἔχει . . . διδάσκει**. Objective Conditional clause.

11. **οὕτως ἐμμελῶς**: with irony, 'so perfectly in tune'; *i.e.* so cheaply.

20 C–21 A

He will explain (and if the explanation seem an extraordinary one, his hearers must bear with him, for there is somewhat more than the mere word of the defendant to vouch for its truth) how the name and blame of "wise man" have indeed come of a certain sort of wisdom after all — not that arrogated by the sophists, but a kind of wisdom really attainable by man. Herein, the God of Delphi had declared that no man was wiser than Socrates.

τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί σοι αὗται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου, σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου, ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν· λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. — ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια
D λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ

1. **Τὸ σὸν . . . πρᾶγμα**: τὸ σόν is emphasized in the question, conceding a distinction between the activity of Socrates and that of the philosophers in general and of the sophists, with all of whom he affirms that he has nothing in common.

2. **οὐ γὰρ δήπου . . . γέγονεν**: 'all this talk has not arisen, of course, without any gratuitous proceeding on your part.' The Greek sentence, by its order, is more forcible than the English paraphrase, and it is more pointed than it would have been if a conditional form of statement had been chosen. σοῦ . . . πραγματευομένου is put as a fact (οὐδέν, not μηδέν): incompatible therewith (*thereon*, ἔπειτα) is the admitted fact, τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν.

2. **περιττότερον**: Socrates might not be a sophist or a philosopher of the ordinary stamp, nevertheless there was an unmistakable odor of *superfluity* about him as compared with men in general.

8. **ἀκούετε δή**: note (here and in what follows) the deliberateness, the tact and caution, the apparent hesitation, — in other words, the dramatic skill so characteristic of Plato's *Apology*, with which the great paradox of the Socratic wisdom is introduced, expounded step by step, and set forth finally in all its solemn significance.

11. **ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην**: the accusative case, under the influence of διά above. That σοφίαν is predicative is shown by the absence of the article. See the note on αὕτη ἀρετή 18 A. An expanded ποία δὴ σοφία αὕτη

ἐ στὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, Ε μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' 5 ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ οἵα, μάρτυρα 10 ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα 21 Α γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμὸς ἑταῖρός τε ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ

δι' ἣν ἔσχηκα would be far from idiomatic. The Greek attains to this forcible succinctness of expression thro' the facility and clearness with which it can distinguish predicate-noun from subject or object, in all cases and constructions. Cp. below Ε, *οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν . . . τὸν λόγον*, and again *εἰς ἀξιόχρεων . . . τὸν λέγοντα*. Also *ἱκανὸν . . . λέγω* 31 C, and the note.

1. **κινδυνεύω**: see the Index.

6. **καί μοι κτλ.**: he resumes his cautious exposition. What immediately precedes, *οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν κτλ.*, was a momentary digression, designed not merely as a thrust at the sophists, but to help in deprecating any seeming arrogance on the part of Socrates regarding the *σοφία* which he attributes to himself. Later he says, *ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός* 23 A.

9. **τῆς . . . ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν σοφία**: cp. Dem. 18. 20 *ἡ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἴτε χρὴ κακιάν εἴτ' ἄγνοιαν εἴτε καὶ ἀμφότερα ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν*. This may be regarded, grammatically, as an attraction of the substantive into the subordinate clause, with the necessary adaptation of the case construction. Rhetorically, in both examples, the irregularity is produced by a desire to avoid the plain speaking that might give offense (*μεγαληγορία*, on the part of Socrates).

10. **Χαιρεφῶντα . . ., ἴστε**: Index, *εἰδέναι*.

11. **ἐμὸς ἑταῖρός τε ἦν . . . καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ξυνέφυγε κτλ.**: Index, *φυγή, κατελθεῖν*. The remark made (note *τὲ . . . καί*) as if in

ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὅ τι ὁρμήσειε. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι (καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μή θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες)· ἤρετο γὰρ δή, εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

B Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ

the remembrance of Chaerephon there were a link of sympathy between the accused and his judges. — In Chaerephon both sides really had something in common. Thus, as Socrates could pardon the extravagant zeal of his lifelong friend, so the court, representative of the youthful and rather self-conscious Restored Democracy, would be led to reflect that Chaerephon the Socratic had his redeeming features. The speaker would need his utmost tact at this highly critical stage of the exposition. Captatio benevolentiae. See the Index, Χαιρεφῶν.

21 B–E

How, then, out of that oracular response the calumnies and all this odium have grown, the defendant bids his judges mark. He would solve the divine riddle, and with much misgiving he devised a way. Conscious of no wisdom in himself, he would go out and show forth the wisdom of other men, thus putting the oracle to the test, even as it were to prove it untrue. But lo! — his visits, one by one, to those reputed great and wise, revealed the fact that they knew not their own ignorance, while Socrates knew well that he knew nothing. In so far was he indeed wiser than they. — But of each man thus exposed he made an enemy; likewise, of many a one that had witnessed the exposure.

9. Σκέψασθε κτλ.: he reminds them of the judicial motive of his recital, ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν 20 D.

ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὑτωσί· Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει, φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέ-
5 μις αὐτῷ.— καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει, ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπί τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς C ἐνταῦθα, εἴπερ που, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι Οὑτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ
10 ἔφησθα.— διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον — ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι — ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ,
15 εἶναι δ' οὔ· κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἴοιτο D μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὔ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην, ὅτι Τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ

1. **οὑτωσί**: *i.e.* as in the self-questioning that follows. Characteristic of Socrates is the dialogue with himself; cp. *πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐλογιζόμην* below D.

2. **οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν**: with *σοφός*. As above, *ταύτην σοφός, σοφίαν σοφοί* 20 D.

3. **λέγει φάσκων**: Index, *λέγειν*.

7. **ἦλθον**: Explanatory Asyndeton (*i.e.* omission of the usual *γάρ*), referring to *τοιαύτην τινά*. In the same way below, **ἔδοξέ μοι** 21 C, referring to *τοιοῦτόν τι*; and again, *οἱ μὲν . . . εὐδοκιμοῦντες κτλ.* 22 A. Also 22 D.

11. **πρὸς ὃν . . . ἔπαθον**: for *πρός* in this connection see Index, *πάσχειν*.

13. **ἔδοξέ μοι**: 'I came to believe.' The same Ingressive Aorist below, *ταὐτὰ . . . ἔδοξε* D; 22 A and D. Cp. *ἀπηχθόμην* 21 E.

18. **τούτου μέν**: cp. *τούτου γε* below. The emphasis with *μέν* consists in marking *τούτου* as the

σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι. ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. — ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καί μοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμενος μέν, καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς, ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι· ἰτέον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ

first person in a series; others are to be examined later. The second step in the series is marked by ἐντεῦθεν (ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα).

2. **οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθόν**: Index, καλός. — As far as positive knowledge was concerned, what either Socrates or the candidate had to show was nothing great. But negatively, in self-criticism, without which no man can lay claim to the possession of σοφία; and in freedom from conceit of knowledge, and hence from error, Socrates was the superior.

4. **σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος**: 'a trifle wiser just *here*,' wiser by σμικρόν τι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, viz. ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα κτλ.

5. **οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι**: cp. above, οὐδὲ οἴομαι. See Index, οὐδέ.

21 E–22 C

Painful was the task thus divinely indicated; but, once begun, the toil must go on — and, as he wandered, it proved (the defendant solemnly affirms) a more than Herculean labor to shake the oracle's irrefutable truth. The greater men's repute for wisdom, the less of the real wisdom were they found to have. Even as the public men, so the poets wrought not with reasoned knowledge; while, because as poets they were accomplished and great in their unconscious art, they deemed themselves all-wise. Thus again were they less wise than Socrates.

10. **Ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην**: with αἰσθανόμενος.

11. **περὶ πλείστου**: 'of supreme

ἅπαντας τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὦ
22 A ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθῆ λέγειν· ἦ
μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκι-
μοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς
5 εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλό-
τεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν.
δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὥσπερ πόνους
τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μή μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία
γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς
10 τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ
B τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος
ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν
αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγμα-
τεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτούς, τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα

importance'; of higher moment than anything else, especially higher than his own comfort or safety (*καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς*).

1. **νὴ τὸν κύνα**: such oaths afforded a convenient way of avoiding the too frequent mention of the deity. Similar devices in modern speech are familiar enough. They often convey a tone of irony, as here.

6. **τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν**: *i.e.* the conscious intellectual state and critical exercise of reason. A noteworthy variation of *τὸ σοφοὺς εἶναι, τὸ εἰδέναι τι*, in the Socratic sense.

7. **δεῖ δὴ κτλ.**: the farther he got in his travels the more laborious became his efforts to avoid failure in the original undertaking (*ὡς ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον* 21 C).

7. **ὥσπερ πόνους τινάς**: 'as it were a round of *labors*.' The phrase is pointed by its suggestion of the familiar tale of Hercules, hence *ὥσπερ* and *τινάς*.

8. **πονοῦντος**: the genitive is adapted to the possessive *τὴν ἐμήν*.

8. **ἵνα μὴ κτλ.**: 'to the end that I might not find the oracular response quite (*καί*) irrefutable.' The purpose of *πόνους πονοῦντος*.

14. **ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ κτλ.**: while showing forth their knowledge he would also acquire somewhat of it for himself ("kill two birds

τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τἀληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν, ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ
C τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ
6 ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες·
10 καὶ ἅμα ἠσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τἆλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ᾧπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ᾖα. ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ

with one stone"). A Socratic trait is here noted, yet not without the usual irony.

1. **αὐτῶν**: '*than* they'; with **βέλτιον**. **αὐτῶν** by its position within the phrase **ὀλίγου ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες** escapes emphasis, while the phrase itself gains in prominence. See the note on **δεινὸν . . . λέγειν** 17 B.

10. **τὴν ποίησιν**: not their poetry, but the *making* of poetry, their poetic faculty. — To Plato, poetic inspiration was as far as possible removed from **τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν**; for, so long as the poet was inspired, reason was absent. And here the Platonic Socrates is farther led to note that poets are by no means assured by their peculiar gift against a false conceit.

22 C–E

Finally, he found that those versed in special arts were indeed thereby wiser than himself, each with his peculiar knowledge, whereof the defendant possessed no sort; yet, since they would extend their claim to wisdom far beyond their sphere of skill, that which they really had was thus outweighed and clouded. — So, when he asked himself whether, in order to win their learning, he would assume their folly, he was forced to answer, No!

14. With the **χειροτέχναι** the

D ξυνῄδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἤδη ὅτι εὑρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην, καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', 5 ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταὐτόν μοι ἐδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὖτη E ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν· ὥστ' ἐμὲ 10 ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτω ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν

first question is not of εἰδέναι, but of ἐπίστασθαι, *to know how*. Their ἐπιστήμη, the understanding of certain definite rules and principles consciously and rationally applied to the practice of some particular τέχνη, is conceded to be a positive σοφία. Accordingly, of the three classes into which the Athenian community is roughly divided, the artisans are ranked highest in the scale of knowledge. Of those previously examined the first class, the πολιτικοί, had not got beyond sheer empiricism; while the power of the ποιηταί, the second class, was inborn and unreasoned: both were devoid even of positive σοφία.

5. **ταύτῃ**: 'in this way,' *i.e.* on the positive side.

8. **τὰ μέγιστα**: especially τὰ ἀνθρώπινά τε καὶ πολιτικά, cp. 20 B. It was because matters pertaining to the well-being of the community at large were popularly regarded as the most important subjects of knowledge that Socrates in his tour of examination went first to the πολιτικοί, who were believed to be versed therein above other men.

8. **αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια κτλ.**: the absence of the negative, or peculiarly Socratic, σοφία is equivalent to downright ἀμαθία. It is a 'false note,' destructive of harmony in the entire man, and against it a trifle of technical knowledge could avail him nothing. Socrates is thus forced to give the preference to his own mental condition, which involves nothing false or discordant. — The opposite of πλημμελεια is ἐμμέλεια, cp. ἐμμελῶς, 20 C.

ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα
ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ
τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.
4 Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
23 A πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασιν καὶ οἷαι χαλεπώ-
ταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν
γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγομαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται
γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν,
ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ

23 A, B

Precisely here, in this array of questioning, he reminds his judges, lies the source, not merely of the deep-seated enmity and its attendant calumnies, but also of the name of "wise." Men suppose the examiner to possess that knowledge wherein the examined are found wanting — forgetting that God only KNOWS; *wherefore the oracle, employing the name of Socrates, would indicate the true and proper attitude of man toward wisdom. — So, not concerns of city or of household, but the probing and testing of men's minds — this thing still claims his whole devotion, as servant of the divine will.*

5. **Οἷαι . . . βαρύταται**: οἷος with the superlative, like ὡς or ὅτι. 'The gravest possible.'

7. **ὄνομα . . . τοῦτο λέγομαι**: *i.e.* τοῦτο ὀνομάζομαι (ὄνομα λέγομαι). 'I am thus designated.'

7. **οἴονται κτλ.**: if, for example, in attempting to frame a definition of ἀρετή or of δικαιοσύνη, a man was confuted and reduced to silence through his own replies to the questions put to him, the bystanders, who had no conception of the purely negative attitude assumed by Socrates, concluded that he could himself give a complete account of ἀρετή or of δικαιοσύνη, if he chose to do so.

9. **τὸ δέ**: 'in fact, however.' Cp. τὸ μίγιστον 41 B, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου 34 D. These phrases are adverbial in character, serving as it were to *announce* what follows in explanation of them.

9. **τῷ ὄντι**: 'really.' — Here, finally, Plato reverts to the usual and proper meaning of σοφός, a word of essentially positive signification, and interprets the great paradox in clear and most impressive language.

ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι, ὅτι Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

2. **ὀλίγου τινὸς . . . καὶ οὐδενός**: Index, *τὶς*.

3. **τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη**: *τοῦτο*, viz. *σοφὸν εἶναι*. The Double Accusative with *λέγειν*. Cp. above, *τοῦτο λέγομαι*, where the accusative of the person is represented by the subject of the passive verb. — It is now seen (*φαίνεται*), the speaker says, that the oracle does not mean to assert literally of Socrates that he is *σοφός* (*τῷ ὄντι γὰρ ὁ θεὸς σοφός ἐστιν*), but employs the name of Socrates merely for the sake of illustrating the *negative* principle enunciated.

10. **τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν**: cp. above, *ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ* 22 E; below, *τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν* 23 C; *τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν* 30 A.

23 C–24 A

He has had his followers and imitators — in young men of leisure, nowise displeased to try their hand at examining people. And those examined visit the anger to which their own folly provokes them upon Socrates; calling him a corrupter of youth and alleging that he teaches what other wise ones are supposed to teach, atheism and sophistry. No feeble spirits they, nor few in number! Their aspersions, through all the years, have borne fruit in the present indictment — with a prosecutor

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἑπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι, χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κἄπειτα, οἶμαι, εὑρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ D ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὑτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαρώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι E τι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ξυντεταμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα

severally to avenge the grievances of each class in the community. — Here is the truth and the whole truth, the defendant declares, about the calumnies. Let the judges who have heard it thus plainly spoken look into their own hearts for its confirmation.

1. **Ἑπακολουθοῦντες . . . αὐτόματοι**: *i.e.* their following was not in consequence of any professions or inducements offered by Socrates. Herein he contrasts himself with the sophists. See 19 E, τούτους πείθουσιν κτλ.

3. **χαίρουσιν . . . ἐξετάζειν**: cp. οἱ μειρακίσκοι, . . . μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας, αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες κτλ. *Rep.* 7. 539 B.

4. **εἶτα**: 'so.' Their imitating consists, or rather *issues* (εἶτα), in their essaying to examine people.

8. **Σωκράτης τις**: cp. 18 B.

καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μελητὸς μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος
24 A δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἷός τ' εἴην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τἀληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ'
10 ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἴτια

1. **ἐκ τούτων κτλ.**: the *outcome* of all this is the present systematic attack, in judicial form. Cp. ἡ . . . διαβολή, ᾗ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μελητος κτλ. 19 B.

4. **τῶν ῥητόρων**: *i.e.* τῶν πολιτικῶν. — The fiction of allowing the prosecutors to stand severally as representatives of the three classes into which, for purposes of exposition, the Athenian community has been divided, serves admirably to afford an easy transition from the "original" to the real accusers, and is otherwise highly effective. See the names in the Index.

5. **ὅπερ . . . ἔλεγον**: see 19 A.

7. **ταῦτα . . . τἀληθῆ**: 'here you have the truth' as promised above, ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν 17 B. The remark applies to all that precedes in the defendant's plea.

8. **ὑμᾶς οὔτε . . . μικρόν**: Double Accusative with ἀποκρυψάμενος and ὑποστειλάμενος. For the position of ἐγὼ λέγω, see the note on δεινὸν . . . λέγειν 17 B; also that on αὐτῶν 22 B.

10. **τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις**: 'for this very reason'; τούτοις, *i.e.* τῷ μηδὲν ἀποκρύψασθαι μηδὲ ὑποστειλασθαι.

11. **ὅ**: τὸ ἀπεχθάνεσθαι ὑμῖν.

11. **τεκμήριον κτλ.**: the judges can verify Socrates' account by the feelings which it has stirred within them as they listened.

12. **αὕτη**: 'even as I have described it.' αὕτη and ταῦτα are predicative. Note the chiastic arrangement, αὕτη . . . ἡ διαβολή >< τὰ αἴτια ταῦτα. The main

B ταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν ἐάν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. C τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἓν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους

emphasis is upon the pronoun, but the emphasis is shifted to τὰ αἴτια, which comes forward as a direct suggestion from ἡ διαβολή. '*Such* the calumny, its *causes* such.'

24 B, C

Enough for the misrepresentations of the past. Now for these latter-day accusers, with their high-minded spokesman, — whose indictment reads, "A corrupter of the youth of Athens, a denier of her gods."— First, then, it is against the charge of corrupting the youth that he must defend his life — a charge preferred thus lightly by Meletus, who (as shall be shown forth) never laid to heart its meaning.

7. Ὥσπερ . . . κατηγόρων: cp. above 19 B, ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων . . . αὐτῶν. Here, the words ἑτέρων κατηγόρων are predicative: 'just as if Meletus and Co. (τούτων) were really a *second* set of prosecutors.' The speaker will not suffer his telling fiction of the πρῶτοι κατήγοροι to be forgotten for a moment.

7. λάβωμεν αὖ: see 19 B, ἀναλάβωμεν κτλ.

8. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε: the exact words of the indictment are not reproduced (πως). Similarly Xen. *Mem.* 1. 1. 1, ἡ γραφὴ τοιάδε τις ἦν. In substance, Xenophon's statement is the same as Plato's. See the Introduction, p. 35, note. — Below 26 B, the highly significant word διδάσκειν is apparently attributed to the indictment.

12. φησί: 'he asserts.'

ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι.

1. **ἐγὼ δέ γε . . . φημί**: 'and *I* assert.' Note the repetition also of **ἀδικεῖν**.

2. **σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται**: this is a very serious kind of pleasantry, says the defendant, little short of an indictable offense (**ἀδικεῖν φημι**) in itself — lightly putting men on trial for their lives, while naming as subjects of accusation matters of which the accuser can give no rational account. Plato is about to *show up* Meletus, **προσποιούμενον μὲν εἰδέναι τι, εἰδότα δὲ οὐδέν**. His blundering is ironically termed **χαριεντίζεσθαι**; and, with satirical humor, playing upon the prosecutor's name, Plato charges him with not *caring*, instead of not *knowing*, what he is talking about (**τὴν Μελήτου ἀμέλειαν**).

5. **τούτῳ**: not **αὐτῷ**. In legal parlance "the other party" is constantly designated as present in court — pointed at with the finger as it were (**οὗτος, οὑτοσί**, — thus the judges themselves are **οὗτοι**). Cp. above B, **τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν**, not **αὐτῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν**. Differently 19 B (**τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν . . . αὐτῶν**) of the **πρῶτοι κατήγοροι**, who could not, in the nature of things, be personally in evidence.

6. **καὶ ὑμῖν**: *i.e.* he will try to make the fact as clear to the judges as it is to the speaker's own mind (**καί**).

In the scene that follows, the counterpart of many a real Socratic **ἐξέτασις**, Meletus represents the candidate for honors in **σοφία**, while the judges and the spectators in the court-room stand for the **παρόντες** (22 B, 23 A). Or again, to go one step farther, the candidate may be said to represent, not any particular class in any particular community, but the *whole* community of the world of fools; the **παρόντες**, the readers of Plato, thro' all the generations.

For the dialogue here introduced by Plato into the *Apology*, see the Index, **δίκη** (**ἐρώτησις**).

23 C–25 C

Q. *Is it desirable that the youth be led to become good men?*

Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; Ἔγωγε. Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῄς, ἐμέ, εἰσάγεις εἰς τουτουσὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστιν. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾷς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὠγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδεν, τοὺς

A. *Ay.* Q. *Who, then, corrupts them not, but makes them better? — Speak.* A. *The laws.* Q. *Nay, not what? but* WHO? A. *The judges.* Q. *What, the* JUDGES! A. *Ay, verily, every one of them.* Q. *And the councilors, likewise, and the voters of Athens, do they make better men of the youth?* A. *Ay, all of them, everybody except Socrates.* Q. *But is the same thing true of animals? Is an animal improved in the handling of it by everybody, except only one person who spoils it? — What, no answer? Well, no indeed, of course not. Only the young* MEN *of Athens can claim that happiness.*

3. **Τούτοις**: τοῖς δικασταῖς. So below, εἰς τουτουσί. See the note on τούτῳ 24 C.

4. **μέλον γέ σοι**: 'what you *care* so much about.' Assuming that you are interested in this subject, the defendant says to his prosecutor, and have studied it with sufficient care to have discovered that in truth I am the one who corrupts the youth of Athens, then you surely must know something about those who do not corrupt, but improve them.

10. **οἱ νόμοι**: by this reply Meletus attempts to evade the question, which he is so reluctant to answer at all, as he foresees that οἱ ἀμείνους ποιοῦντες τοὺς νέους must be made to include a very large portion of the community, if he is to justify his attack upon Socrates in particular as διαφθείροντα αὐτούς.

12. **ὅστις κτλ.**: *i.e.* one who

νόμους. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἵδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσιν καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὔ; Ἅπαντες. Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων. τί δὲ δή; οἵδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὔ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ
25 A οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. Ἀλλ' ἆρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κἀκεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες;
10 Κἀκεῖνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλήν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ
B ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες
15 αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τοὐναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἷς μέν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός τε ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἱππικοί· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων
20 ζῴων; πάντως δήπου, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε

makes young men better would naturally be a *νόμιμος ἄνθρωπος* to begin with.

1. **οὗτοι . . . οἱ δικασταί**: Meletus, who cannot of course answer the question by naming a new individual, seizes upon the nearest set of persons at hand for his reply, guided partly by the suggestion in *τοὺς νόμους*. For Plato, this is an opportunity to score the worthy judges in passing (*πῶς λέγεις, εὖ γε, πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν*).

20. **ἐὰν . . . οὐ φῆτε**: Index, *φάναι*. The play upon the name (*Μέλητε, ἀμέλειαν, μεμέληκεν*) has already occurred above 24 C D (twice), and is repeated below 26 B. Not merely this word-play, but also the very frequent *ὦ Μέλητε*, and especially the famil-

ἐάν τε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἄν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς
νέους, εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι
C ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι
ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀπο-
5 φαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκε
περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερόν ἐστιν
οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τάν,
ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν
10 πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺ, ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν
ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν
D ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου, ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κε-
λεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι;
15 Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δή, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς δια-
φθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα
ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα; Ἑκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε;

iar and the intensified vocative phrases (ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, ὦ τάν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν) help to sustain the tone of irony and satire.

4. **ἐφρόντισας**: a highly significant variation of ἐμέλησέ σοι. Index, φροντίζειν, φρόνησις.

25 C–26 A

Q. *Is it true that we are harmed by bad neighbors, and helped by good ones?* A. *Ay.* Q. *Is there any man who had rather be harmed than helped?* A. *Nay.* Q. *Do you accuse Socrates of making the young men bad willingly, or unwillingly?* A. *Willingly.* Q. *Is Socrates, then, so ignorant as not to know that if he makes a bad man of his neighbor he is likely to be harmed by him? — hence, can* MEAN *to do this mischief? — Nay, such ignorance is inconceivable on his part. Therefore, if he corrupts the youth, he corrupts them without meaning to do so; and should be taught better, not prosecuted at law.*

τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ, τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὤν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ
E ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω,
5 ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῂς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μελητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ
9 ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω ἢ δια-
26 A φθείρω ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι οὗ γε

1. **Τηλικούτου . . . τηλικόσδε**: contrasting the ages of the two men, supposed to be seen together in the court-room.

5. **μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω**: *i.e.* διαφθείρω (διαφθεῖραι); cp. above D, *πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα*.

6. **κακὸν . . . λαβεῖν**: *i.e.* κακῶς παθεῖν, hence ὑπό. Cp. 17 A, *ὑπ' αὐτῶν . . . ἐπελαθόμην*.

7. **ὥστε . . . ἑκὼν ποιῶ**: as result of ἀγνοεῖν.

8. **ταῦτα**: 'herein'; Cognate Accusative.

9. **ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ . . . ἢ . . . ἄκων**: excluding a third term ἑκὼν διαφθείρω, because ignorance on the part of Socrates that he would be likely to suffer harm at the hands of one corrupted by him is inconceivable. — Here the validity of another characteristic doctrine of Socrates is assumed — a paradox only second in importance to that of the Socratic wisdom itself, viz. the identity of virtue and knowledge. Plato was bound to introduce it, not merely for the sake of rendering his picture of the master complete and consistent, but also to afford the connecting link between the intellectual and the moral side of the *Apology*.

10. **κατ' ἀμφότερα**: *i.e.* in *either* case. To be impaled upon one horn of a dilemma is to be at the mercy of both horns.

11. **τοιούτων**: *i.e.* ἀκουσίων.

11. **ἁμαρτημάτων**: Genitive of the Charge. Index, εἰσάγειν.

12. **νόμος . . . ἐστίν**: see the Index.

ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἳ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

'Αλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἤδη
Β ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε

3. **κολάσεως . . . οὐ μαθήσεως**: although the notions of *διδάσκειν, νουθετεῖν, κολάζειν* had not in the time of Plato, and have not even at the present day, come to be practically and universally recognized as all alike essential to the idea of punishment, this fact nowise invalidates the profound truth underlying the doctrine, *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει*. — The true criminal, willing to do a thing known to be *κακόν*, who will, for example, deliberately lead the young into ways of crime — such a man, deficient in that sense which enables better men instinctively to feel that what is bad for others is bad for themselves also, stands so low in the scale of intelligence as to need *κόλασις*. He cannot be set aright by mere instruction, but he must be taught better by forcible means (to the extent even of cutting short, if need be, his existence as an individual), for the protection and improvement of humanity as a whole, as well as to check the folly of the offender himself. Very different is the case of those who know enough to avoid doing what is bad, but might not always be sure whether what they are doing is bad or good. They can be set aright through *μάθησις*. Socrates is one of the latter sort. If his conversation with young men is harmful to them in any way, he is unaware of it. Show him how it is harmful, and he will refrain from such conversation. Meletus asserts that Socrates is a criminal, making young men bad on purpose, as Meletus himself would not do. That is to say, Socrates is more ignorant than Meletus!

26 B–27 A

Q. How *does Socrates corrupt the youth of Athens? Is it by teaching them to regard other deities than those regarded by the community?* A. *Most assuredly it is.* Q. *Pray define your position clearly. Do you mean to say that Socrates inculcates a belief in the existence of gods, only they are not the same gods as those in which the community believes? — or do you*

μικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῂς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι, κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπὲ ἔτι C σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεούς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὔσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ'

assert that he is a DISBELIEVER *himself and teaches other men to disbelieve in gods?* A. *I mean to say that he does not believe in gods at all.* Q. *What, are not even the sun and moon gods to Socrates?* A. *No, indeed, he declares that the one is fire, and the other is earth.* Q *Ah! Is, then, this court held to be so illiterate as to accept the published doctrines of Anaxagoras as imputations against Socrates? Verily, young people learn from Socrates absurdities which they can promptly expose as plagiarized by him. But, for Heaven's sake, do you imagine that in* THIS *way he believes in no god at all?* A. *In none at all, none at all!* Q. *Now see, there you are, eating your own words — making sport of serious matters, by coming into court just for the fun of finding out whether your wise man Socrates is clever enough to catch you when you contradict yourself.*

1. **Ὅμως δὲ κτλ.**: altho' it is clear, the defendant says, that we are dealing with an accuser who has not qualified himself to give a reasoned account of the subject of accusation, nevertheless the defense must go on.

3. **διδάσκοντα**: sc. *φῂς με διαφθείρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους.*

5. **ταῦτα**: with διδάσκων.

7. **ὧν**: Objective Genitive with ὁ λόγος, nearly the same in meaning as *περὶ ὧν.*

9. **πότερον**: followed by ἤ 'or (whether),' p. 73, l. 1.

12. **οὐ μέντοι**: sc. *νομίζω.* The same ellipse occurs with *ὅτι ἑτέρους* below.

ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους · ἢ παντάπασί με φῂς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεούς.
4 Ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις ; οὐδὲ ἥλιον
D οὐδὲ σελήνην ἆρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι ; Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Σωκράτους οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι,

1. **παντάπασι**: with **οὔτε . . . νομίζειν**. Cp. **τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος** above. For **οὔτε . . . τε**, see the Index.

3. **ταῦτα λέγω κτλ.**: Socrates was indicted and executed for *ἀσέβεια*. The charge of atheism was not contained in the indictment headed by Meletus. This charge, however, had been insinuated often enough by the **πρῶτοι κατήγοροι**: it formed a part of the popular misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Socrates; see 18 C and 19 D, where it is indirectly rebutted. In order to throw his refutation of the popular charge of atheism into the characteristic form of dialectic, Plato has introduced it into the *Apology* at this point; representing Meletus as cleverly inveigled by his questioner into the indiscretion of overstepping the strict limits of the writing for which he stands.

4. **ἵνα τί**: see the Index.

6. **ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί**: beguiled by another leading question, Meletus turns with a triumphant air to the judges. The design of Plato in the question (**οὐδὲ ἥλιον κτλ.**) is to emphasize once more the difference between Socrates and the cosmical philosophers (see 19 C, D), in connection with the mention of Anaxagoras, and at the same time to involve the accuser more deeply than ever in the inconsistency and self-contradiction presently to be exposed. For the form of address, see note on 40 A.

7. **Σωκράτους . . . Ἀναξαγόρου κτλ.**: you fancy, says the defendant to his prosecutor, that you are accusing Socrates — that the judges take your word for it when you attribute these irreligious doctrines to *Socrates*; as if they were so unlearned and illiterate as not to be aware that you are really accusing *Anaxagoras*. This is a sort of contempt of court.

ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων· καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὐτωσί σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί' οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. Ἀπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ οὑτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικεν γὰρ ὥσπερ αἰνίγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ, Ἆρα γνώσεται

2. καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ.: strongly ironical. The works of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae may not be on sale at every shop in Athens; but the highest price a copy of his Περὶ Φύσεως will bring is yet low enough to estop Socrates from appropriating its lore — supposing that were not too absurd to be worth pirating.

4. ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας: see the Index.

6. ἄτοπα: Socrates averred, according to Xenophon's report, *Mem.* 4. 7. 7, that Anaxagoras had gone crazy (*παρεφρόνησεν*) in his views of the sun and the moon. In general, he declared that the cosmical philosophers stultified themselves in their speculations, *ib.* 1. 1. 11 ff.

6. οὑτωσί: with *νομίζειν*. 'In *this* way'; *i.e.* even as Anaxagoras disbelieves. This amounts, however, to saying, 'so completely,' 'utterly.'

8. καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι: 'and that, too.'

12. νεότητι: *i.e.* in a spirit of recklessness. Index, Μέλητος.

12. ἔοικεν . . . ξυντιθέντι | διαπειρωμένῳ ἆρα γνώσεται κτλ.: divide thus in reading. Cp. τοῦτο . . . δέομαι | δίκαιον ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ 18 A.

13. ξυντιθέντι: Supplementary Participle. For the dative, which results from the essential meaning of ἐοικέναι, cp. the construction with ξυνειδέναι 22 D. There the participle is in agreement with ἐμαυτῷ; here it is itself substantive.

13. διαπειρωμένῳ: 'to test the

Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντί' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι· 5 Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ᾗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ

question.' Attempt implies purpose; hence usually the imperfect stem πειρώμενος, not the future. Cp. below 27 E, ἀποπειρώμενος.

1. ἐμοῦ: the genitive with γνῶναι follows the analogy of αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀκούειν, etc.

1. χαριεντιζομένου κτλ.: see above 24 C and the note.

5. ἀδικεῖ κτλ.: the self-contradiction presently to be exposed by dialectic means is anticipated in a formula of concise and explicit statement.

27 A–E

Q. *Does any man believe in the existence of things human, yet not in that of human beings? — or in things musical, yet not in musicians? — and so on? What, no answer? Well, of course not. Now, is there any man who believes in the existence of things daemoniac, yet not in that of daemons?* A. *There is not.* Q. *Thank you. How obliging you are, to answer when you cannot help it. Then, since you accuse Socrates of regarding and teaching things daemoniac, he must, according to your own account, regard daemons also. But, farther, are the daemons held to be either the offspring of gods or themselves gods? Yes, or No?* A. *Yes.* Q. *Well now, if Socrates, as you concede, believes in daemons, then, whether the daemons be gods themselves or only the offspring of gods, in either case he must believe in gods, and you must be pronounced guilty of tomfoolery. That is to say, you either wanted to bring Socrates up here for the purpose of trying his common sense, or you were determined he should be brought up here at any rate, and, since you could find no true charge against him, you set down a blundering lie.*

7. Ταῦτα: *i.e.* τὰ ἐναντία αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ.

B κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρῃτησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, 5 ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω· ἔστ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγώ 9 σοι λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ C γε ἀπόκριναι· ἔστ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὤνησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῂς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμονιά γε νομίζω 15 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν με ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. D τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν 20 παῖδας; φῂς ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῄς, εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαί-

1. **κατ' ἀρχάς**: above 17 C.

1. **μέμνησθε κτλ.**: this formal reminder serves to render the scene more lifelike.

5. **μὴ . . . θορυβείτω**: Meletus manifests his impatience at the questioning process, in view of its inevitable outcome.

9. **τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε**: 'the *next* question.'

13. **δαιμόνια**: used as a substantive in the indictment; here, with *πράγματα*, as an adjective; below, more as a substantive. The shift does not vitiate the reasoning.

19. **τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας . . . ἡγούμεθα κτλ.**: the popular belief is appealed to in an argument directed against one who stands forth as a champion of popular beliefs.

μονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων Ε μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο καὶ ὄνων τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα

1. **αἰνίττεσθαι**: see above A, *αἴνιγμα ξυντιθέντι*.

2. **θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον . . . θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν**: *αὖ πάλιν* emphasizes the contradiction; cp. below E, *καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεούς*. We should be apt to say, *at the same time*.

4. **παῖδες . . . νόθοι**: finds its analogue in *ἡμιόνους* below.

7. **ἵππων μὲν παῖδας . . . καὶ ὄνων**: predicative; '*as* offspring, etc.'

8. **τοὺς ἡμιόνους**: the article, not merely for grammatical clearness (see the note on *ποίαν δὴ κτλ.* 20 D), but as adapted to *τοὺς δαίμονας* above C, *οἱ δαίμονες* D (twice). The analogy here introduced constitutes a pointed feature of the sarcasm of the passage.

11. **ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι κτλ.**: these words present the serious view of Meletus' case.

12. **ὅπως δὲ κτλ.**: at the close, as at the outset (27 A), of the scene the self-contradiction is summed up in concise and explicit terms.

12. **τινὰ . . . ἀνθρώπων**: the phrase is strongly put, with so many words intervening. The force of the expression can be rightly appreciated only thro' fluent enunciation by the living voice. Such effects cannot be estimated by the *eye*, nor can any translation adequately reproduce them to the ear and mind.

ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεούς, οὐδεμία
28 A μηχανή ἐστιν.

Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι
5 ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.
10 ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἥρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ.

1. **οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν**: 'there is no way of contriving,' *i.e.* it is impossible to imagine.

28 A

However, but few words are needed, the defendant avers, to dispose of Meletus and his little charge. Enough for it. Not to this prosecutor or that prosecutor will Socrates owe his conviction, if conviction come; but to the spiteful throng, which has claimed many a victim in the past, and will yet claim many more.

5. **Ἀπολογίας**: Predicate-genitive with **εἶναι**, in meaning nearly the same as if **ἔργον** were expressed; 'to need no lengthy argument.' The subject of **δοκεῖ** is the clause, **ὡς . . . οὐκ ἀδικῶ**.

5. **ταῦτα**: 24 B–27 E.

5. **ὃ δὲ . . . ἔλεγον κτλ.**: by reverting to the subject of the **πρῶτοι κατήγοροι** the writer throws the comparatively trivial matter of the formal indictment into the background, and relegates it to a position of inferiority.

8. **αἱρήσει . . . αἱρῇ . . . ἥρηκεν . . . αἱρήσειν**: Index, **αἱρεῖν**. The repetition of the word marks the tone of caustic satire—directed against a civil polity that enabled the irresponsible masses to vent their spite upon great men under the form of law. The present passage is one of many in the *Apology* which acquired much of their power and solemnity by being written after the sentence of this famous court had been pronounced and executed.

11. **οὐδὲν . . . δεινόν**; Index, **δεινός**.

11. **ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ**: 'come to a

B Ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· Εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν 5 κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε C σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, 10 οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· Ὦ παῖ,

standstill in *my* case'; *i.e.* the case of Socrates is not likely to be the last one of the sort.

28 B–D

Ay, his course has been a perilous one, he acknowledges; but here is a question, not of danger, but of duty. Where would be the great names, where the heroic spirits of history and song, had they seen fit to hesitate when the question of DUTY *arose? The man who is good for anything at all, stands firm at his post, from a sense of honor, taking no account of life and death.*

1. **Ἴσως δ' ἂν . . . εἴποι τις κτλ.**: cp. 20 C, **ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις κτλ.** Here, as there, the supposed interrogatory affords an easy transition from negative to positive, from defense (**ἀπολογία**) to exposition (**διήγησις**).

6. **ἐκεῖνο**: *illud, i.e.* the memorable thing that follows. Differently (more lightly) above 18 A, **τοῦτο σκοπεῖν.**

13. **θεὸς οὖσα**: hence the event predicted is inevitable.

13. **οὑτωσί πως**: cp. **ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε** 24 B.

13. **ὡς . . . οἶμαι**: 'I believe'; as I *remember* it, we should be apt to say. In fact, Homer is partly quoted, partly paraphrased here. Thetis says, **ὠκύμορος δή μοι τέκος ἔσσεαι, οἷ' ἀγορεύεις· | αὐτίκα γάρ τοι ἔπειτα μετ' Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος.** To which Achilles

εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος· ὃ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, Αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

responds, αὐτίκα τεθναίην, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλον ἑταίρῳ | κτεινομένῳ ἐπαμῦναι . . . | ἀλλ' ἦμαι παρὰ νηυσὶν ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης, | κτλ. Σ 95–104. Index, Θέτις, Πάτροκλος.

1. **εἰ τιμωρήσεις . . . καὶ . . . ἀποκτενεῖς**: note the admonitory tone of the Real Condition of the Future.

6. **αὐτίκα**: the response is pointedly adapted to the warning by the repetition of this word.

8. **μὴ . . . οἴει**: 'do you imagine?' Index, *μή*.

13. **πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ**: cp. above C, *παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι*. 'Before' and 'beside.'

death the station divinely assigned to him, the station of a philosophic life, THEN *would he indeed render himself liable to the charge of impiety and unbelief. Then would he be guilty of the folly of pretending to know what one knows not — in fearing that thing which may perchance be not one of man's ills, but his greatest blessing. Be death what it may; disobedience to authority, human or divine, he knows to be a bad thing, and a wrong. The known evil he will fear and flee; the unknown, never. Even tho' his judges would release him, on his promise to obey them and abstain from philosophy and search, such an offer on the part of his fellow-citizens he assures them he would*

28 E–30 B

Were the defendant, accordingly, to abandon thro' fear of

Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
Ε ναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς
εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφίπολει
καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὔ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ
5 καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ

decline — promising rather to obey GOD, *and never to cease philosophizing and laboring with his fellows, to make them wiser and better men, to the end that above all possessions they should prize the welfare of their souls. So then, let them acquit or condemn, his own course is clear, tho' the penalty were many deaths.*

1. **Ἐγὼ . . . εἰργασμένος**: 'accordingly, I should myself be guilty, etc.' The emphatic ἐγώ introduces a specific illustration of the general truth stated above, **οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ** κτλ.

2. **εἰ . . . τότε μὲν . . . ἔμενον . . . ἐνταῦθα δὲ . . . λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν**: 'if, after remaining at my post on those occasions there, I were to desert it here.' The 'shocking thing' (**δεινόν**) would consist in the discrepancy — abandoning his divinely appointed mission, when in affairs human he had evinced a clear sense of duty and the courage that supports it, — as if the command of God were less strenuous than the command of man! Periods of this form usually, as here, involve an argument from the less to the greater, the **μέν** member presenting a supposition of conceded fact, to which the hypothesis of the **δέ** member must *a fortiori* adapt itself.

2. **ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε**: it was not unusual in Athenian trials to address the **δικασταί** as representatives of the political community. Cp. 30 A, **τοῖς δικασταῖς . . . ἐστέ**; 32 B, **ὑμεῖς, ὑμῶν κελευόντων**; 21 A, **ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει, μεθ' ὑμῶν**.

3. **ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ** κτλ.: there is pathos in this indirect mention of the sturdy military services of Socrates in behalf of his country. See the names in the Index.

5. **τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος . . . ἐνταῦθα δέ**: the second **δέ** is merely a repetition (reminder) of the former one. Note that **μέν** is likewise repeated above, in the first member of the compound period: **ὅτε μὲν . . . τότε μέν**. In general, either **μέν** or **δέ**, or, as here, both particles, may be repeated to secure distinctness in the line of thought, especially in passages of considerable length or complexity. Cp. the frequent repetition of **ἄν**, as below 31 A.

τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπ. ἐλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά
με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους,
29 A ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα
λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινόν τἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ'
5 ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω
θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ
οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέ-
ναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι
μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε
10 μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασιν δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες
B ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμα-
θία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ
οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω
15 τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός του
φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν
Ἅιδου, οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν

4. **δεινόν τοι κτλ.**: it is here seen that δεινά, δεινόν is said mildly instead of the more specific ἀσεβῆ, ἀσεβές, or even (as the passage forcibly suggests) ἄθεον.

4. **ὡς ἀληθῶς**: 'in very truth,' *Crit.* 46 D, 48 C. ὡς, as in ὡς τάχιστα, ὡς βέλτιστος, etc.

6. **ἀπειθῶν . . . καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον κτλ.**: God commands me through his oracle (the speaker has just said) ἐξετάζειν ἐμαυτόν. I might well be charged with impiety, or even atheism, were I to disobey such a command and act as if I knew death to be a bad thing for me, before examining myself to make sure whether it is not a good thing.

12. **ἀμαθία . . . ἡ ἐπονείδιστος**: 'unwisdom of the reprehensible sort that has been noted (αὕτη).'

14. **καὶ ἐνταῦθα**: 'right here,' even herein.

16. **τούτῳ ἄν**: sc. φαίην εἶναι.

18. **ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι**: this is the species of ἀδικεῖν now under consideration.

καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με C νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν, ἤ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς, ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει, πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται — εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· Ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πειθόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, D ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ

1. **πρὸ . . . τῶν κακῶν**: cp. *πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ* 28 D.

3. **οὐδ' εἰ με νῦν . . . ἀφίετε**: 'not even if you are ready to release me now.' Cp. below, *ἀφίεμέν σε*, 'we release you,' *i.e.* we are ready to do so. The conclusion to be expected here, *οὐδ' οὕτως ὑμῖν πείσομαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ*, is displaced and modified by the meanderings of the sentence. In its altered form it occurs below D, *εἴποιμ' ἄν*.

5. **εἰσελθεῖν**: equivalent in sense to the passive of *εἰσαγαγεῖν*. Anytus had said: Either Socrates ought not to have been prosecuted to begin with, or, once prosecuted, he must not be suffered to escape the death penalty. To acquit him, Anytus urged, would be to set the stamp of approval upon his doings, and so make a bad matter worse.

7. **εἰ διαφευξοίμην**: the words of Anytus were, *εἰ διαφεύξεται*, admonitory. Cp. *εἰ τιμωρήσεις κτλ.* above 28 C, and the note.

10. **οὐ πειθόμεθα**: 'we are not disposed to comply.'

13. **εἰ . . . με . . . ἀφίοιτε**: 'supposing you, then, as I say, to be ready to release me on this condition.' Supposition of the Ideal, adapted in form to *εἰ . . . εἴποιτε* above, instead of repeating the original *εἰ . . . ἀφίετε*.

15. **ἀσπάζομαι μέν**: Index, *μέν*.

ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι Ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι Ε ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, 30 Α καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ

1. **οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι**: for the double negative, see Index, *οὐ*.

2. **παρακελευόμενος**: this first mention of *exhortation* may be said to mark the point in the *Apology* where (without the least abruptness of transition) the intellectual comes to be merged in the moral view — identity of knowledge and virtue. A preparatory note was sounded 25 C–26 A.

7. **φρονήσεως**: the words that occur here, in passing from *φρόνησις* to *ἀρετή*, are instructive — *ἀλήθεια*, *ἡ ψυχή*, *βελτίστη*, *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, *φροντίζειν*, *ἐρωτᾶν*, *ἐξετάζειν*, *ἐλέγχειν*.

19. **τὴν . . . ὑπηρεσίαν**: cp. *τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν* 23 C.

20. **πείθων**: 'trying to prevail upon'; variation of *παρακελευόμενος*.

νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
B μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς
ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων· Οὐκ ἐκ χρημά-
των ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἆλλα
5 ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν
εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα,
οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἂν ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μή, ὡς ἐμοῦ
10 οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις
C τεθνάναι.

2. **πρότερον**: cp. *πρό* 28 D, 29 B.

2. **μηδέ**: connects **οὕτω σφόδρα** to (*μή*) *πρότερον*. Index, **οὐδέ**.

3. **οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ . . . ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα**: *χρήματα*, to point the contrast rhetorically. The spirit of the remark is made clear by what follows, *καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ . . . ἅπαντα κτλ.* Note, too, that *ἀρετή* is of intellectual as well as of moral excellence.

6. **ταῦτα λέγων . . . ταῦτ' ἄν**: *ταῦτα*, twice strongly emphasized. In the third instance, *ἄλλα . . . ἢ ταῦτα*, the word has receded to an unemphatic position.

6. **ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά**: '*that* can pass for harmful.'

8. **οὐδὲν λέγει**: Index, **λέγειν**.

8. **πρὸς ταῦτα . . . ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, κτλ.**: the words *φαίην ἂν ὦ ἄ. Ἀ.* are parenthetical. *πρὸς ταῦτα* ('so then') with the sentence. For the tone conveyed by this phrase see the following note, and cp. the words of Prometheus, *πρὸς ταῦτα ῥιπτέσθω μὲν αἰθαλοῦσσα φλόξ, . . . γνάμψει γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶνδέ με*, Aesch. *Prom.* 992.

9. **ὡς . . . οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαντος ἄλλα**: 'resting assured that I am one *incapable* of doing differently.' The participial and the potential form (also *φαίην ἄν*, at the beginning) lend urbanity to a determined and, indeed, defiant utterance. The sentence loses not a whit of its solemnity and power by being gently put.

10. **πολλάκις τεθνάναι**: cp. 41 A, and see Index, *θνήσκειν*.

30 C–31 C

Once more he prays his judges to hear with patience; and, tho' he

Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν

speak such words as might provoke an outcry, for their own sake to refrain. Knowing, as now they do, what sort of a man the defendant is, let them be sure that in putting him to death they will chiefly harm themselves. It is not possible for the worse man to harm the better, as these poor prosecutors vainly strive. To bear their threatened penalty of death, or exile, or disfranchisement, were no great evil; the evil thing is the MIND *to give over a righteous man to death. Therefore, in truth, not for himself does the defendant plead, but for his judges, to save them from a grievous error. Heaven has granted them one monitor, he declares, to rouse and spur them on to a higher life; another they will hardly find. How truly this one is divinely, not humanly, impelled, his strange devotion proves. Poverty has been his portion. For, thro' a long life, no self-interest, but the spiritual welfare of others, has claimed all his care.*

1. **Μὴ θορυβεῖτε κτλ.**: the profound silence immediately following such an utterance as the last would speedily be broken by lively manifestations of displeasure.

2. **ἐδεήθην**: above 17 D, 20 E.

4. **ἄττα . . . καὶ ἄλλα**: 'one or two things more.' For **ἄττα**, see Index, **τὶς**.

5. **βοήσεσθε**: **βοᾶν**, more than merely **θορυβεῖν**. The specific word is stronger than the generic.

5. **μηδαμῶς κτλ.**: the request is made here for the last time. The fiction of a judicial plea of defense, so framed as to involve a counter-accusation of those who sit in judgment, couched in terms of paradox and satire, could go no farther than it is carried in what here follows. After the verdict, 35 E, on the other hand, when their revenge is certain, the court can easily be imagined as tolerant of further caustic utterances on the part of the condemned man.

7. **ἐμὲ . . . Ἄνυτος**: 'no Meletus or Anytus can do *me* any harm.'

7. **οὐδὲ . . . ἂν δύναιτο**: 'his

ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν
δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ
D ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μεντἂν ἴσως ἢ
ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως
5 οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα
ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτιννύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι,
ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε
10 περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι.
E ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον
εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκεί-
μενον τῇ πόλει, ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ,

ability to do so were inconceivable.'

2. **οὐ . . . θεμιτὸν κτλ.**: for Socrates, a man does not experience *κακά*, so long as he is not himself *κακός*. According to the doctrine here briefly enunciated, but consistently supported in word and act by Socrates thro' the *Apology* and elsewhere, the *χείρων ἀνήρ* cannot harm *τὸν ἀμείμονα*, because he cannot *make* him bad.

3. **ἀποκτείνειε μέντοι ἄν κτλ**: 'he might, to be sure, very likely cause him (me) to be put to death, or banished, or deprived of civic privileges.'

4. **οὗτος μὲν ἴσως**: 'tho' *he* (Meletus) probably.'

5. **καὶ ἄλλος τίς που**: 'and many another, doubtless.'

6. **ποιεῖν ἃ . . . ποιεῖ, κτλ.**: what Meletus does is *κακόν* for him, because he is himself *κακός* in doing it.

7. **νῦν οὖν, κτλ.**: it is readily seen what the defendant means when he warns his judges that he is pleading *their* cause. As we look back upon the martyrdom of Socrates and the ignominy of Athens, we require no arguments to convince us of the truth of Plato's contention.

8. **ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν**: cp. *εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί* 19 A.

12. **εἰ καὶ . . . εἰπεῖν**: 'tho' it be a somewhat ludicrous comparison.'

13. **μέν**: see the Index.

ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι
ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος· οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ
πόλει προστεθεικέναι, τοιοῦτόν τινα ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων
31 A καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον, οὐδὲν παύομαι
5 τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος
οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν
ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν
ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαν-
τες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε,
10 εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ μή
τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι
δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὢν τοιοῦτος οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει
B δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ
ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἁπάντων ἠμεληκέναι καὶ
15 ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη,

2. **ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος**: 'by some sort of spur.' But the *rider* is mainly thought of. It is to the rider, who applies the stimulus, that Socrates is made to compare himself.

2. **οἷον δή**: 'even as'; conjunctional phrase. Even *so*, we should say.

3. **προστεθεικέναι**: adapted to *προσκείμενον* above, *προσκεῖσθαι* being precisely the passive of *προστεθεικέναι*.

3. **ἐγείρων**: adapted to *ἐγείρεσθαι* above. With the participles that follow, the figurative language gives way to the proper usage.

4. **ἕνα ἕκαστον**: not under the influence of *ὀνειδίζων*, which requires the dative case, but in distributive apposition to *ὑμᾶς*.

7. **τάχ' ἂν . . . ἀποκτείναιτε**: the repeated *ἄν* serves to mark off with distinctness the several preliminary stages of the event (*τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι*); indicated here, as so often, in participial form.

9. **πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ**: reminiscence of 29 C.

13. **οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε**: cp. *ἔοικεν . . . αἰνίγμα ξυντιθέντι* 27 A.

14. **τὸ ἐμὲ . . . ἀρετῆς**: the article comprehends all that follows it as subject of the sentence.

15. **τῶν . . . ἐμαυτοῦ . . . ἠμε-**

τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τἆλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ᾔτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

ληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι . . . ἀμελουμένων: one and the same idea is here presented from different points of view. Not only the active and the passive side of the matter, but also the final fact as such (perfect, *ἠμέληκα*) and the prolonged strain (imperfect, *ἀνέχομαι*) are contrasted. *τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ* and *τὰ οἰκεῖα* are not, in meaning, contrasted expressions.

4. **εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον**: sc. *παρακελευόμενος*. Index, *λόγος*. He virtually says here, *That* would seem human-like, not *τοιοῦτον οἷον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δεδόσθαι*.

7. **παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα**: explanatory of *τοῦτο . . . ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι*. Cp. *ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος*, *Crit.* 53 C. Note that here both infinitive and participle are aorists. 'They could not compass *that* shamelessness — of furnishing a witness, etc.' Such a witness would necessarily have been suborned, and would have been confronted with the very substantial voucher produced by the defendant in his own person.

9. **ἱκανὸν . . . λέγω**: 'sufficient, I fancy, is the witness that *I* furnish of the truth of my words.' See the note on *ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην* 20 D.

31 C–E

Tho' to his hearers it may sound strange, his mission, he affirms, was bound to be fulfilled in private life. His divine monitor (that mystic warning voice whereof he has often made mention) forbade him to choose the public way. Intuition is confirmed by reflection. Had he tried to work thro' politics, his beneficent labors had long since been closed. No righteous man,

Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶν, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ
5 ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι
D μοί θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ'

he tells them plainly, can stand up firm and consistent against the Athenian or any other throng, and LIVE.

2. **ξυμβουλεύω**: the word is adapted to ξυμβουλεύειν (τῇ πόλει) below. Except for this point, παρακελεύομαι would have been said with ἰδίᾳ.

2. **πολυπραγμονῶν**: cp. above B, τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ . . . ἠμεληκέναι . . . τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί. That was πολυπραγμοσύνη, as ordinarily understood, the meddling with other people's affairs, instead of minding one's own (ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν). Here, πολυπραγμονῶν is said from the point of view of some supposed objector (ὅτι δή). Below 33 A we find the defendant from his own point of view using the words λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ('attending to my business' — of looking after that of other people). Index, πολυπραγμονεῖν.

3. **ἀναβαίνων**: see Index, ἐκκλησία.

7. **ἐπικωμῳδῶν**: a most instructive word. When in his play of the *Clouds* Aristophanes caricatured Socrates (*e.g.* making him deny the gods, 365 ff., cp. Δῖνος βασιλεύει, τὸν Δί' ἐξελήλακώς, 828) the poet was animated by no ill will toward the philosopher in person, treating him no more hardly than he felt at liberty to deal with the god Dionysus himself (*Frogs*, passim). That was ἐπικωμῳδεῖν in the proper sense of the word. But when the prosecutors of Socrates had framed an indictment demanding for him the penalty of death, on the ground that his familiar warning spirit was a new deity imported into the state (and a majority of the unhappy judges at the trial had allowed themselves to sanction this writing), the blundering malice of it all was too crude and contemptible to be honored with serious consideration on the part of Plato, as has been already seen, 27 A–E. Accordingly, with the

ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἥ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν μέλλω, πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε· τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναν-
5 τιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη
Ε καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τἀληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις
10 ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι
32 Α τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχόμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

15 Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων,

finest irony the wretched Meletus is dignified by this comparison to the comic poet. Cp. 18 D, and the note on ὅσοι δέ.

1. ἐμοὶ . . . ἀρξάμενον: 'this I have had, beginning with my childish years.'

1. φωνή τις: 'as it were a voice.' Index, δαιμόνιος (δαιμόνιον).

2. ἀποτρέπει . . . πράττειν: cp. ἐναντιοῦται πράττειν, below.

8. μὴ ἄχθεσθε: the very plain words that follow are of the sort ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε 30 C.

12. καὶ . . . ὀλίγον χρόνον: 'for never so short a time.' Index, μέλλειν.

32 A–D

Yet such a man is the defendant — one whom no fear of bonds or death can deter from standing steadfast on the side of right. The proof thereof may be found in that which speaks louder than words — in his actions: once, when, as presiding officer of the popular Assembly, he braved the stormy threats and denunciation of the multitude, and refused to put an illegal motion to the vote; and, again, when the Thirty Tyrants commanded him in vain to help in arresting one of their guiltless victims.

οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δή μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἅμα κἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, B ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, C μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾤμην μᾶλλόν με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγέ-

2. **Οὐδ . . . ἑνί**: 'to no man living.'

3. **μὴ ὑπείκων δέ**: 'but yielding not.' Index, *μή*.

4. **φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά**: 'what is wearisome enough, to be sure, and savors of the law-courts'; viz. a recital of one's own exploits and merits. The recital is Plato's; but the self-laudation is put into the mouth of Socrates, here, as elsewhere, with consummate tact and dramatic skill. Index, *βουλεύειν*, *βουλή*.

9. **ἀθρόους**: *i.e.* by a single vote (*μιᾷ ψήφῳ*), instead of allowing each man a separate trial, as the law provided. Index, *ναυμαχία*.

12. **ἐνδεικνύναι . . . καὶ ἀπάγειν**: see these verbs in the Index.

13. **τῶν ῥητόρων**: *i.e.* *τῶν πολιτικῶν*, cp. 23 E.

15. **μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι**: 'To side with *you*.' For *ὑμῶν*, here and above B, see the note on *ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε* 28 E.

15. **μὴ κτλ.**: this form of the negative, under the influence of the infinitive construction.

νετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵνα ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ᾤχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

1. **πέμπτον αὐτόν**: *i.e.* with four others.

5. **ἀναπλῆσαι**: 'to implicate.' But in Greek the figure is of *smirching*.

6. **ὅτι . . . οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν**: 'that, for death, I care (were it not too rude a thing to say) *not a whit*.' Such a remark, if the speaker did not strictly mean all that he said, would be a mere piece of vulgar levity. Uncultivated persons habitually use such expressions (**οὐ μέλει μοι οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν**), even regarding solemn matters, with thoughtless irreverence.

7. **τοῦ δὲ . . . τούτου δέ**: see the note on **ἐνταῦθα δέ** 28 E.

11. **οἱ μὲν . . . ᾤχοντο . . . ἐγὼ δὲ ᾠχόμην κτλ.**: note the antithetic arrangement, including the pointed repetition of the verb.

13. **διὰ ταχέων**: 'speedily.' Index, *τρίακοντα*.

32 E–33 B

Nay, in public life, there is truly no man who could have stood forth an uncompromising champion of pure and simple justice, and have attained to the defendant's age. But such has been HIS *course, even in affairs of state, when by chance in contact therewith; and ever in private relations, from first to last — no concession to any man's wrongdoing, while yet every man has*

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἄν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλεί-
4 στου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.
33 A οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἴ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς
10 εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ᾽ ἐγενόμην· εἴ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπι-
B θυμοῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέ-

been free to hear and to follow. If of his hearers or followers any has proved bad, that is not the defendant's fault. Disciples they are falsely termed. He has had no doctrines to impart, no tuition fees to gather. And no one can claim to have derived aught from him wherein all others might not share.

1. **Ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἄν . . . διαγενέσθαι**: 'would I, then, think you, have lived on, etc.?'

7. **οὐδενὶ . . . ξυγχωρήσας . . . παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον**: explanatory of **τοιοῦτος** and **ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος**. The participle is at the same time supplementary to **φανοῦμαι**.

8. **τούτων οὐδενί κτλ.**: here the discourse reverts to the negative or defensive form — to the charge of corrupting the youth, touched upon, but not finally disposed of, in the examination of Meletus, above 25 C–26 A.

9. **οἱ διαβάλλοντες . . . φασίν**: the popular designation of his companions and followers as **μαθηταί**, and of himself as their **διδάσκαλος**, was repudiated by Socrates, because it implied, first, that he talked for pay, as the professional sophists did; and, again, that he had positive doctrines to impart, when in fact he was establishing truth in a negative way.

13. **οὐδὲ . . . οὔ**: 'nor is it true, that I converse if I receive pay, but otherwise do not converse.'

γομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τίς φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

2. ἐρωτᾶν: 'to be questioned,' we should say. The English idiom requires the passive voice.

2. καὶ ἐάν τις . . . ἀκούειν κτλ.: instead of bluntly saying, "or to be the questioner," he puts it gently: 'or if any hearer prefers to do the answering (I put the questions myself).' Thus the final discomfiture of the respondent would not be due to any aggressive movement on the part of Socrates at the outset.

3. τούτων: 'as for these persons.' The genitive, with τὶς.

3. ἐγώ: placed in juxtaposition with τούτων to emphasize the contrast.

4. εἴτε τις . . . εἴτε μή: whether one or another of them turns out well or ill. γίγνεται, Historical Present. See the Introduction, p. 38.

5. ὧν . . . μηδενὶ μηδὲν . . . ἐδίδαξα: 'when to no man of them all have I at any time either promised or given instruction of any sort whatever.' τούτων, the antecedent of ὧν, is wholly indefinite in its reference; the relative clause itself, a conditional one. Observe the accumulation of negative words.

33 C–34 B

What attracts these followers he has explained before — it is indeed attractive to hear the conversations, to witness the humbling of vain pretenders to knowledge. For the defendant himself, however, the motive is no merely human strain, but the impulsion of a mighty divine command. If the influence exerted upon the youth who follow him be a harmful one, there is abundant opportunity to test the matter. Here at the trial now are many of them present, and with them their fathers or their older brothers. How comes it, that not only the youths who have been corrupted, but likewise the uncorrupted elderly men, their

Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν
C χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς,
5 οὖσι δ' οὔ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν.
9 ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν καὶ εὐέ-
D λεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρε-

relatives, are present not to denounce, but to support him who is charged with being the doer of this harm?

2. **Ἀκηκόατε**: above 23 C, χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

3. **ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν**: the participle is emphasized, because it contains the answer to διὰ τί in the question asked above.

4. **ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις κτλ.**: the dative, with χαίρουσιν. The genitive which appears in the passage above quoted from 23 C is under the influence of ἀκούοντες.

6. **καὶ ἐκ μαντείων . . . καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπερ κτλ.**: thus we see that the story of the oracular response granted to Chaerephon (20 E) was merely *illustrative* of the inner conviction and irresistible impulse that held Socrates, as one inspired, to his memorable life work.

8. **μοῖρα**: 'dispensation.'

9. **ταῦτα . . . εὐέλεγκτα**: Socrates' own course he *must* pursue; on the other hand, it was inevitable that this philosophizing would attract numerous followers and win the devotion of some of them. Since, however, it was carried on in public places, while its adherents were well known and many of them easily accessible, the means of testing its moral soundness would not be far to seek.

11. **χρῆν δήπου**: 'then, of course.' In translating, χρῆν may well be deferred till νυνὶ κτλ. is reached: 'they ought to be coming up here *now* themselves, etc.'

11. **εἴτε**: the speaker begins as

σβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτέ τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνῆσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ, οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὑτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔτι δ' Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὑτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ· ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου — καὶ ὁ μὲν Θέοδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη — , καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὑτοσὶ Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν,

if he were going to say something like εἴτε αὐτῶν τινες . . . εἴτε τῶν οἰκείων ἔγνωσαν κτλ. But εἴτε is forgotten, and εἰ δέ enters below, as if εἰ μέν had preceded.

6. νῦν μεμνῆσθαι: the infinitive depends on χρῆν.

7. πάντως: 'in fact.'

11. τοίνυν: 'again'; passing from the mention of fathers to that of brothers of young men who have been his followers.

14. ἐκεῖνός γε: whatever might be surmised as to the influence exerted by the living youths upon their respective fathers or brothers, to prevail upon them to refrain from bearing witness against the deluder of their souls, here is a case at any rate where τὸ καταδεηθῆναι is impossible.

17. οὑτοσὶ Πλάτων: evidence that the writer of the *Apology* was present at the trial of Socrates. Similarly from the *Phaedo* (59 B) we learn that Plato was unable to be with the master on the occasion of his death.

ὧν τινὰ ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἑτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασι Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. B αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

Εἶεν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι,

1. **μάλιστα μέν**: see the Index.

3. **παραχωρῶ**: 'I yield the floor,' as we say.

7. **τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν**: because they might be as it were bewitched by the defendant. For **λόγον ἔχειν**, see Index, **λόγος**.

10. **ἀλλ' ἢ**: Index, **ἀλλά**.

34 C–35 B

As to the pleading of his cause, enough — there is hardly need to add more words. — And now the moment has arrived, when, were the defendant to follow the example of many (perchance even of one or another of the very men who sit in judgment here), he would be seen to weep and supplicate his judges, causing his little ones to be brought into court, to excite pity and earn votes of acquittal by such means. Yet 't is assured beforehand, that SOCRATES *will do nothing of the kind — not because he stands in the world alone, nor, again, because he feels himself better than his hearers in any way, but for the reason that was made clear when he spoke of death. — And what will the world think of Athens, he asks, if, in her courts of law, men deemed great or wise or brave, are to beg with womanish entreaty for a little prolongation of that life which must in nature end so soon? Nay, let the vote of "guilty" be cast the more surely against him who thus demeans himself.*

12. **Εἶεν δή**: marks the conclusion of the defense proper. What follows (34 C–35 E) is a sort of afterpiece. Cp. **εἶεν** 19 A, mark-

C σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ' ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὃ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, 5 παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρός με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς 10 τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δή τις ὑμῶν D οὕτως ἔχει, — οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπι-

ing the end of the introductory remarks, and the beginning of the defense proper.

2. **ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ**: *i.e.* calling to mind some trial in which he had himself been defendant. The Athenian δικαστής, like the modern juryman, was but an ordinary citizen; on one day it was his lot to try his neighbor, on another to be tried himself.

2. **εἰ ὃ μὲν . . . ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε . . . ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν· . . . τούτων ποιήσω**: one or another of the judges, noting that Socrates is apparently not about to make the piteous scene that he can remember to have himself made on some similar occasion, might be piqued at the contrast — feeling his own inferiority thus brought home to him. — For the form of the period, see 28 E.

2. **καὶ ἐλάττω . . . ἀγωνιζόμενος**: *i.e.* even when not on trial for his life as Socrates is now.

7. **ἄρα**: it can be inferred with tolerable certainty, from what the defendant has already said, that he will not beg for mercy.

8. **ταῦτα ἐννοήσας κτλ.**: the consequence of such a reflection might be a fit of stubborn pride on the part of the juror, strong enough to overcome his native sense of justice. Note the comparative αὐθαδέστερον, and the aorist σχοίη.

9. **αὐτοῖς τούτοις**: 'at just that'; when, but for that, he would perhaps vote the other way.

11. **οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν . . . εἰ δ' οὖν**: 'I do not expect it of you, to be sure; if, however,' — as I say — (this be true of any of you).

εικῇ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν, λέγων ὅτι Ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μέν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοί εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδι-

The case imagined above c is assumed as real (εἰ . . . οὕτως ἔχει) merely for the sake of the argument, while the broken form of the sentence mitigates the harshness of the whole suggestion. — It is noticeable that Plato's criticism of the judicial abuse here considered is milder and more conciliatory in tone than most of the other strictures upon the Athenian courts attributed to the defense of Socrates. At his trial there could have been no opportunity for this familiar evil to manifest itself; and it is only by means of an ingenious fiction that any consideration of it could be introduced into the *Apology*. The consistent attitude of the sage, however, — never so great in what he did as in what he would *not* do, —is pictured here with powerful effect. And unquestionably, at the real trial, his unshrinking, independent demeanor, as well as his freedom of utterance, must have prompted many a wavering juror to unfavorable decision.

2. **ἔστιν μέν**: the correlative to *μέν* appears in *ἀλλ' ὅμως*, below.

2. **καὶ οἰκεῖοι**: *i.e.* he does not stand alone by himself; there are *also* (*καί*) kindred souls at home, So *καί* again below, after *ὥστε*.

3. **τοῦτο . . . Ὁμήρου**: 'even as Homer hath it.' See the note on *τὸ δέ* 23 A. The quotation is from the *Odyssey*, where Penelope requests the disguised Odysseus to reveal his origin, adding: *οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσσι παλαιφάτου, οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης*, τ 163.

5. **καὶ υἱεῖς**: 'even sons.' Index, Σωκράτης.

8. **οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος . . . οὐδ' ἀτιμάζων**: the defendant must make clear to his judges, what men in general are slow enough to comprehend or believe of anybody, that the motives which animate him are not *personal*, but rational (moral). It is no spirit of self-will or offishness, he says, nor

E ζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ'
— εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος
λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ
πόλει οὔ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν
5 καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν
ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τὸ
35 A Σωκράτῃ διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν
ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφίᾳ εἴτε ἀνδρείᾳ εἴτε
ἄλλῃ ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη·
10 οἷουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνωνται,
δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς
δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ
ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε·

any disposition to slight his hearers (if the court would really feel flattered by being appealed to with prayers and tears) that leads him to refrain from supplicating them, but considerations of a higher nature.

1. **ἀλλά κτλ.**: the discourse would regularly have been continued in participial form. Since, however, the prime motive (*τὸ θαρραλέως ἔχειν πρὸς θάνατον*) has been discussed elsewhere (*ἄλλος λόγος*), the waiving of this gives a new turn to the structure of the sentence.

3. **δόξαν**: cp. *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, below. Here is a matter, he says, which concerns, to begin with, the *good name* of Athens, and of every citizen of Athens.

5. **τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα**: *σοφὸν εἶναι.*

7. **εἰ . . . τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται**: the Real Condition of the Future has an admonitory effect here, cp. 28 C. Below, in *εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται*, its effect is of apprehension, dread.

8. **οἱ δοκοῦντες**: adapted to *δεδογμένον*, above. If things are to go on in this way, urges Plato, —if men who are believed to be superior to their fellows cannot live up to the reputation (*δόξα*) which they enjoy, it looks very badly indeed.

11. **ὡς . . . οἰομένους**: 'apparently imagining, etc.'

12. **ὥσπερ κτλ.**: 'just as if they would be exempt from death, provided *you* do not inflict it.'

13. **ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων**: not

οἳ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἄν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες
B Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν
5 οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὁπηοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέ-
10 λαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος.

Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ
C εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν,

ἐσομένους. With the new view introduced by ὥσπερ the grammatical connection becomes loosened ("absolute").

1. οἵ: an initial relative pronoun lends gravity and force to the sentence. It is usually to be translated by an emphasized personal pronoun ('*they*').

1. αἰσχύνην: adapted to αἰσχρόν, above.

4. γυναικῶν: cp. γυναικομίμοις ὑπτιάσμασιν χερῶν Aesch. *Prom.* 1005.

8. μᾶλλον: *i.e.* will condemn rather than acquit.

35 C, D

Furthermore, 't is WRONG *to appeal to the feelings of the court rather than to their reason and the sense of justice. The juror is sworn to cast his ballot, not by favor, but according to the law. To beg for his favor is to prompt him to perjury and impiety. The defendant is charged with impiety — shall he, then, while on his defense, do that which would substantiate the accusation? Shall he put himself on a level with his accusers, and seem to cherish no worthier a belief in God than theirs?*

11. Οὐδὲ δίκαιον: 'not right *either*,' as we colloquially say. Index, οὐδέ. The speaker might have said here, ὥσπερ δ' ἐστὶν αἰσχρόν, οὕτω καὶ ἄδικον κτλ.

12. οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν: we should hardly repeat the negative, which in the Greek still belongs to δίκαιον. '*And* try to get off by begging.'

ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὀμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν ἃ ἡγοῦμαι μήτε καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε D ὅσια, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νὴ Δία καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουί. ὀφθῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὀμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δέω οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

4. **δοκῇ**: sc. *χαρίζεσθαι*.

7. **δεῖν**: repeats the notion of *ἄξιον* contained in *ἀξιοῦτε*.

8. **μήτε καλὰ . . . μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια**: the climax neatly brings to view the skillful transition to the thought of *ἀσεβές* and *ἄθεον* with which the defense closes.

9. **ἄλλως τε κτλ.**: 'most especially, by Heaven, when I am standing on my defense against a charge of impiety preferred by Meletus here!'

10. **εἰ πείθοιμι**: not *πείθειν* in the proper sense, but *δεόμενον πείθειν* is meant; following the thought of *δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν*, above C. The meaning is made doubly clear by *τῷ δεῖσθαι* in the latter part of the phrase.

11. **θεοὺς . . . εἶναι**: for the arrangement, see the note on *δεινοὺς . . . λέγειν* 17 B.

12. **ἀτεχνῶς**: see the Index.

15. **ὡς οὐδείς**: in our idiom, '*more* truly *than* any.'—To the Platonic Socrates, the religious instinct and the instinct of right-doing were one and the same thing.

E Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ
36 A τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ
ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς
τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων
5 τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ᾤμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ'
ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ
τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν.

36 A

Such an issue of the trial, the vote that has been announced, the verdict of GUILTY, — *many are the reasons, the condemned man avers, why it disturbs him not at all. Surely a larger majority for condemnation might have been expected. As it is, had only thirty votes changed sides, he would at this moment actually be free. Three accusers it has required, working together, to accomplish this result! Where would the little man who filed the indictment be now, if the other two had not given him their support?*

1. **Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν**: 'that I should not be repining.' The grammatical connection of the phrase with what follows is very loose. Cp. **τὸ δέ** 23 A, and the note. The correlative of **μέν** occurs below 36 B, **τιμᾶται δ' οὖν**. — Before passing to the business in hand (the **ἀντιτίμησις**), Plato presents, in a brief preliminary paragraph, a picture of the unmoved demeanor of the sage at this critical moment, after the hostile verdict has been rendered. The sketch is made to include further contemptuous satire at the expense of the prosecutors, as well as certain historical features of the event.

2. **ἄλλα τε . . . καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον**: of the numerous circumstances contributing to his calm reception of the result of the ballot, the speaker is concerned to mention now merely the fact that an unfavorable issue was expected by him. For **ἄλλα τε καί**, see Index, **ἄλλος**.

5. **τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν**: 'the result of the count,' we should say.

5. **οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον**: 'by so small a majority.'

6. **εἰ τριάκοντα . . . μετέπεσον . . . ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν**: 'had only thirty of the ballots changed sides, I should stand acquitted.' Note the meaning of the pluperfect tense here. For the numerical statement, see Index, **δικαστής**.

Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες
B ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὤφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπ-
5 τον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσωμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας

1. **Μέλητον μέν**: 'so far as *Meletus* is concerned.'

4. **κἂν ὤφλε χιλίας δραχμάς κτλ.**: Index, γραφή. The suggestion that of the 280 votes against Socrates each of the accusers had earned only his third, so that any one of the men alone would have secured less than 100, is of course not serious, but satirical. It makes Meletus appear rather small, while Anytus and Lyco do not loom up very large.

36 B–E

Well then, for the death penalty proposed he must name a counter-penalty, that his judges may make their choice between the two. What, indeed, is a fair valuation (some requital to be borne in body or in money paid) of that offense whereof he has been deemed guilty? — he who would not attend to his concerns, the common concerns of money-making, office-holding, ambition, faction, — for what true man would be suffered to help his fellows in SUCH *ways? — but in the way of private life brought his benefactions home to all — exhorting each and every one to care less for the body than for the soul, less for the show than for the reality. What, he asks, is a fair reward for such a benefactor, who is poor withal and needs leisure to carry on his good work? — Even the same reward as victors in the chariot-race receive, less deserving as they are than he, and nowise needy, — to eat at the public table in the Prytaneum.*

6. **Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν κτλ.**: 'now then, he sets the value of my offense at death'; *i.e.* proposes for it the death penalty. Index, τιμᾶν, δίκη.

9. **ὅ τι μαθὼν κτλ.**: 'for that I would not, etc.' For τί (ὅ τι) μαθών, 'wherefore,' see Index, μανθάνειν.

ὥνπερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σῴζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα, οἷ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον

1. **ὥνπερ οἱ πολλοί**: *ἐπιμελοῦνται*, the opposite of *ἀμελήσας*, must be mentally supplied here.

4. **ἐπιεικέστερον . . . ἢ ὥστε . . . σῴζεσθαι**: 'too fair a man to go into that sort of thing and still live.' Cp. 31 E.

5. **ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα**: adapted to *εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα*. Altho' the sentence at this point acquires the form of a finite verb (passing from the participial form), yet the thought is still negative (resumptive of *ἀμελήσας* κτλ.) as far as *μέν* extends its force. The positive thought, required by *ἀλλά*, after *οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον*, enters with the *δέ* clause, coming to view decisively in *ἐνταῦθα ἦα*.

5. **οἷ ἐλθὼν . . . ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι**: cp. *ὃς . . . ἔμελλεν . . . ποιήσειν* 20 A, and the note. Here also the relative clause denotes finality (hence *μή, μήτε*): 'whither going I were sure to be of no use.' Index, *μέλλειν*.

8. **ἐπιχειρῶν** κτλ.: explanatory of *τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν*, and a reminiscence and brief review of what he has already said 29 D.

9. **τῶν ἑαυτοῦ**: *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*, opposed to *ἑαυτοῦ*; as, just below, *τὰ τῆς πόλεως* and *αὐτὴ ἡ πόλις* are opposed to each other. In the earlier passage (29 D–30 B), *σώματα, χρήματα, δόξα, τιμή* answer to *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ* here; *φρόνησις, ἀλήθεια, ἀρετή, ἡ ψυχή* answer to *ἑαυτοῦ*.

12. **τῶν . . . ἄλλων . . . κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον**: *i.e.* in all things setting reality above appearance, the essential above the unessential, the spiritual above the material.

D ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὤν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτα ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον ὅ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, 5 δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμ- 9 πίασιν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, E ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὃ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶ- 37 A σθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

1. **τί οὖν . . . τοιοῦτος ὤν**: the question that ushered in this noteworthy paragraph is repeated (hence **οὖν**) at its close.

2. **εἰ δεῖ γε κτλ.**: 'if I am indeed to set my reward at its true value'; referring to **ἦ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας**, above B.

4. **εὐεργέτῃ**: this word, prepared for by **εὐεργετεῖν, εὐεργεσίαν**, has almost the force of a *title*. Index, **πρυτανεῖον**.

10. **τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται**: only the wealthy could afford to compete in the hippodrome. Cp. the designation of the horse by Aeschylus as **ἄγαλμα τῆς ὑπερπλούτου χλιδῆς**, *Prom.* 466. The winner in the horse-race had evinced no personal prowess; he need not have been present even at the contest.

37 A–D

Again, no contumacy is here, but the condemned man is one (tho' in so brief a space as Athens grants to questions of life and death the thing cannot be made clear to minds clouded by prejudice) — he is one whose convictions render it impossible for him deliberately to wrong a human being. To propose a counter-penalty now were to wrong HIMSELF, *by pronouncing guilty one who is innocent. And what motive might there be for so doing? Surely no fear of death, which is to be feared not at all — while the substitutes therefor, imprisonment, for non-payment of fine or otherwise, and exile, are evils truly to be dreaded. Imprisonment: slavery to a fickle magis-*

D μου οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβάς, ἀλλ' ὑμῶν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥᾳδίως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη, ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτους E ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὖ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

Ἴσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι· Σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τοῦτο δή ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαί τινας ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρω-

ber of the period assumes the form of a question with ironical tone (ἄρα, 'forsooth'). For the form of the period, cp. 28 E, 34 C.

5. καλὸς . . . ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη: 'a fine life indeed would be mine'; defined by ἐξελθόντι . . . ζῆν.

37 E–38 B

Ay, the same misunderstanding in exile as at home. For his conversations cannot cease; the divine command must be obeyed; the questioning of souls shall continue, while life lasts, because the life unquestioned (he avers) is valueless. Nor, once more, is he capable of thus harming himself, by proposing exile. The payment of a fine, however, if it COULD *be paid, were no harm — and here are friends who bid him name a goodly sum of money, on their word and bond.*

12. Σιγῶν δὲ . . . ζῆν: 'but by keeping still and minding your business, Socrates, will you not be able, pray, to live in exile?'

13. τοῦτο . . . χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαί τινας ὑμῶν: cp. ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω, above A.

νενομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἧττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτείσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ

1. **ἐάν τ' αὖ κτλ.**: the preceding sentence began somewhat as if the speaker were going to say, *ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν κτλ., ἐάν τε ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν . . . τοῦτο, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι.* But the conclusion *οὐ πείσεσθε* enters independently after the first *ἐάν τε*. Accordingly, to the second *ἐάν τε* is added *αὖ*, giving to the whole period a form similar to *εἰ μέν . . . εἰ δέ*. Cp. *εἴτε . . . εἰ δὲ μή*, 33 D.

5. **ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος . . . ἀνθρώπῳ**: 'while the unexamined life is no life for man to live.'

5. **ταῦτα δὲ . . . λέγοντι**: 'when I say *that*, etc.' In *δέ* there is a virtual repetition of *αὖ* above. Cp. *τοῦ δέ . . . τούτου δέ*, 32 D.

6. **τὰ δέ**: cp. *τὸ δέ* 38 A, 39 C.

7. **καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα κτλ.**: 'and, besides, I am not in the habit, etc.'; recurring to the sentiment expressed 37 B. The remark affords an easy transition to the proposal which follows. He says, in effect: 'Exile is an evil. The suggestion of a fine, however, I put aside just now, in view of the consequences of non-payment, not because I regard a fine as an evil in itself. For, if I had money, I would propose as large an amount as I were likely to pay off.'

8. **εἰ μὲν γὰρ . . . ἐβλάβην**: the *time* implied, throughout the sentence, is present. Note that the conditionals are expressed by the imperfect, the conclusions by the aorist.

9. **νῦν δὲ . . . τιμῆσαι**: ''t is impossible, however, for I have it not — unless, to be sure, I name the sum I *could* pay, and you will fine me in that amount.' — One *μνᾶ* to *θάνατος*!

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεῳ.

C Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δή με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδί-

38 C–39 B

The price to them of relief a trifle sooner gained (thus, tarrying after his sentence, he speaks to those who have confirmed it) — the price paid for cutting short an old man's waning years, shall be eternal reproach to Athens, slayer of the philosopher Socrates. Doubtless they still imagine that he could not find the words to win from them the boon of life — when, in truth, he could not find it in himself to descend to unworthy, slavish demeanor, like one who on the field of battle flings away his arms and begs the pursuing foe for quarter. Death the coward may avoid, but Infamy he may not avoid. Death, the slow runner, has caught the slow and aged Socrates. Infamy, the swift, has overtaken his accusers, those spry men. His sentence is to die; theirs, to live the life of the wicked and unjust. Thus was it bound to be, that each might have his due portion.

9. **Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου**: 'for no long respite's sake'; for the sake of being rid of him but a few years sooner than if they had waited for his natural death (**τὸν αὐτόματον θάνατον**).

10. **ὑπό**: 'at the hands of.' The preceding phrase is passive in sense.

11. **ὡς . . . ἀπεκτόνατε**: 'of having put to death, etc.'

ζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, D ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ 5 καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἑαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾠμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι 10 λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα οἵ' ἂν ὑμῖν ἥδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, E θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι· οἷα 15 δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ᾠήθην δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' 19 ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως 39 A ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται, ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν

7. ἑαλωκέναι | τοιούτων: cp. δέομαι | δίκαιον 18 A, and the note. For the meaning of ἁλίσκεσθαι here, see Index, αἱρεῖν.

9. ἀπορίᾳ μὲν . . . οὐ μέντοι λόγων: 'while my conviction, to be sure, is due to a certain lack, it is nevertheless not a lack of words.'

12. θρηνοῦντός μου: the construction is not absolute, but the genitive is under the influence of ἀκούειν. Cp. below, οἷα . . . εἴθισθε . . . τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν.

20. πᾶν ποιῶν: *i.e.* at any cost. Cp. below, τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. Above 38 D, ἅπαντα ('anything and everything') ποιεῖν.

21. τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις . . . ἀφείς: 'mere *death* can be avoided by throwing away one's arms.'

ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεὶς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων. καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
B χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἑάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλών, οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγώ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μέν που ἴσως οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

4. **μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπόν**: 'maybe this is not the thing that's difficult.' Index, *μή*.

6. **χαλεπώτερον**: death outruns a man in the end, of course; but infamy is apt to overtake him *first*. The keenest satire is concealed in the rhetorical flavor of this whole passage. Note the alliteration, *θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ*.

8. **δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς**: 'clever and speedy.'

10. **ὀφλών . . . ὠφληκότες**: note the aorist and the perfect: 'sentenced' and 'under sentence.' So the respective penalties were *ἀποθανεῖν* and *μοχθηροὺς καὶ ἀδίκους εἶναι*.

12. **ταῦτα μέν που κτλ.** The sentence is transitional. *ταῦτα μέν*, resumptive of the proceedings of the trial, as contrasted with its sequel, *τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο*, at the beginning of the following paragraph. 'Thus far, doubtless, it was quite inevitable that the issue should be what it is, and I believe the apportionment is about fair.'

13. **μετρίως**: as measured out by even-handed Justice. Note *σχεῖν* and *ἔχειν*.

39 C, D

It is at the hour of approaching death that the spirit of prophecy awakes. To those who by the fatal ballot have sought to avenge themselves upon their victim he will foretell the vengeance that shall yet be wreaked on them in turn—

Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμῳδῆσαι, ὦ
C καταψηφισάμενοί μου. καὶ γάρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα ἐν
ᾧ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν
ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε,
5 τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἥξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ
χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δία ἢ οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ
τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι μὲν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδό-
ναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβή-
9 σεται, ὡς ἐγώ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγξον-
D τες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἠσθάνεσθε· καὶ
χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλ-
λον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώ-
πους ἐπισχήσεω τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς
ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλ-
15 λαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ
καλλίστη καὶ ῥᾴστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ'
ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα

more questioners and censors, and more alert than he, probing deeper and more painfully. For (he adds) accountability for wrong living is not to be evaded by cutting off him who calls for the account. The life itself must be looked to and made good.

1. **Τὸ . . . μετὰ τοῦτο**: 'that which is to come hereafter.'

2. **ἐνταῦθα . . . ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι**: the *Iliad* furnishes the earliest examples. The dying Patroclus prophesies the death of his slayer Hector, Π 851; and Hector, at the moment of fulfillment of that prophecy, foretells the fate of Achilles, X 358.

5. **τιμωρίαν . . . πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν . . . ἢ οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε**: 'a vengeance . . . far sterner, by Heaven, than such as ye have claimed by slaying me.'

6. **οἵαν**: sc. *τιμωρίαν*, Cognate Accusative.

9. **οἱ ἐλέγξοντες**: above all, Plato himself. Witness the *Apology*.

17. **ταῦτα μὲν κτλ.**: resumptive and transitional, as at the close of the preceding paragraph, B.

μὲν οὖν ὑμῶν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνί μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν

39 E–40 C

Turning now to his friends, to those who would not by their votes fasten guilt upon the innocent man — to them, the only judges rightly so named, ministers of right, he would fain address a word or two, in the few moments yet to spare. His way, forth from his house at daybreak, up to the court-room, from hence presently to the prison — it was, as now appears, the way to DEATH. *But lo! the divine monitor, ever prompt heretofore, during a long life, to check the slightest movement toward evil, has to-day from first to last been silent. How, therefore, he asks, can it be other than a good thing that impends?*

3. **Ὑπὲρ τοῦ . . . πράγματος**: 'about the thing that has here occurred'; viz. the being sentenced to death. So below, vague general terms are mostly employed to designate the event.

4. **ἐν ᾧ . . . ἄγουσι**: 'while the officials (the Eleven) are busy'; viz. with the formalities preliminary to conducting the condemned man to prison. A few remarks were doubtless often permitted during this interval — very likely to Socrates himself. At any rate, Plato finds here an adequate motive for the impressive sentences which conclude the *Apology*.

6. **ἀλλά μοι κτλ.**: 'nay, I pray you, gentlemen, tarry by me thus long.' Note the pathos in **ἀλλά μοι**; also the informal word **διαμυθολογῆσαι**. Index, **ἀλλά**.

9. **τί ποτε νοεῖ**: 'as to its possible significance.' The interrogation takes **ποτέ**, because the inquiry must be purely speculative.

10. **ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί**: this, the

καλοίην), θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κωδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν·

form of address proper to an Athenian court, occurs here for the first time in the *Apology*, as said by Socrates. It is attributed to Meletus 26 D. Socrates is represented as conceding the title of 'dicast' (δίκη, δικάζειν) to those judges solely who had voted for his acquittal. By means of this device (which could have been conceived only after the result of the trial was known) Plato effects more than merely to add a new stroke of satire to his writing. He gains, by avoiding the specific judicial phrase, a term of wider application (ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι), in fuller accord with these clear tones spoken out to the world at large and to posterity.

1. ἡ . . . μαντική: already designated as φωνή τις 31 D; below B, as τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον; in general, τὸ δαιμόνιον. The prophetic character attributed to the sign comes naturally by virtue of its *negative* function — here thro' its silence.

2. ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν κτλ.: μέν, 'although.' While the formal antithesis enters with νυνὶ δέ, the substantial contrast is conveyed rather by ἐμοὶ δὲ κτλ., B.

9. ἐπέσχεν: 'checked.'

οὐγὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μή τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ' αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδε-

1. **οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως** κτλ.: 'for it cannot be that the usual sign would have failed to oppose me, were it not some good thing that I am going to experience.' **πράττειν**, 'fare,' often approaches closely to **πάσχειν** in meaning. Cp. **ὀρθῶς πράξειν** above A; **ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν** B; and see the Index.

40 C–41 C

And when we reflect upon the matter, he goes on to say, strong is the hope that the end of this being is something beneficent and good. The end of life, the sleep that knows no waking — either it is sleep unbroken by a dream (thus the counterpart of those moments which alone during human existence are all-painless and unwearying); or, as the poets teach, it is the dream itself (for the just man, a vision of the just), in that region where he who has lived aright shall dwell forever among his fellows. THERE *are no judges forsworn; only the true and the righteous; men who have died at the hands of injustice; all the great and good, women and men. There, be the penalty for philosophizing what it may, it certainly is not death. For there, if the tale be true, death and dissolution are known no more.*

3. **Καὶ τῇδε**: '*this* way, too'; viz. as follows — by the way of speculation, guided by intuition. Cp. 31 D, where he approves the voice which had forbidden him to enter public life (**παγκάλως**).

4. **αὐτό**: 'it'; the event (**τὸ ξυμβεβηκός**). Cp. **αὐτά**, 'them,' 39 B, end.

4. **τὸ τεθνάναι**: not **ἀποθανεῖν**. Not the *passage* (aorist), but the ensuing *state* (perfect).

5. **ἢ γὰρ οἷον . . . τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ . . . εἰς ἄλλον τόπον**: the alternatives are stated briefly and succinctly in advance. ''T is either to be as nothing and to have no perception of anything at all when you are dead, or, as we are told, there is perchance a change of some sort, and the soul goes from hence to dwell in another place.' Stated in hypothetical form, the first alternative would stand, **οἷον εἰ μηδὲν εἴη μηδ' αἴσθησιν . . . ἔχοι ὁ τεθνεώς.**

νὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή
τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνθένδε εἰς
ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ'
D οἷον ὕπνος, ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ,
5 θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι,
εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ᾗ οὕτω
κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας
τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα
ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἄμεινον
10 καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίω-
κεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ
E τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας
πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ
θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν
15 πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ.
εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς
ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ

3. **καὶ εἴτε κτλ.**: consideration of the first alternative. This extends as far as *μία νύξ* E.

6. **εἴ τινα . . . δέοι κτλ.**: 'supposing one were to select, etc.' In translating, the specific meaning of **δέοι** ('*had* to select') hardly needs to be reproduced here or when repeated below.

8. **καὶ . . . ἀντιπαραθέντα . . . δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν**: 'and, comparing (offsetting), etc. . . . were to consider the matter, and state.'

11. **οἶμαι**: 'I believe'; repetition of **ἐγὼ . . . οἶμαι**, above.

11. **μὴ ὅτι**: Index, *μή*.

12. **τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα . . . αὐτόν**: 'the Great King himself.' Even he, popularly regarded as the happiest of mortals, would find a large balance in favor of **μηδὲν εἶναι** over **εἶναι**.

14. **κέρδος . . . λέγω**: 'I, for one, account it a *gain*.'

15. **οὕτω δή**: 'under *these* conditions.'

16. **εἰ δ' αὖ κτλ.**: consideration of the second alternative.

16. **ἀποδημῆσαι**: adapted to *μετοίκησις*, above C.

εἰσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη
ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἅιδου,
41 A ἀπαλλαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικά-
5 ζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ, ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις
10 ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ
B αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν· ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς

2. **εἰ . . . εὑρήσει**: lively realization (more imaginative than ἐὰν εὕρω) of the supposed future event.

4. **τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς**: it is not in their functional capacity as judges that Minos and company are to be encountered in the other world; they are named as foremost among the δίκαιοι, or righteous, generally.

7. **ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη**: cp. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν . . . εἶεν 28 B. Here the tone of the question demands the contrary of φαύλη as reply. 'It would be *great!*' Cp. θαυμαστὴ . . . ἡ διατριβή, below.

8. **ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις . . . ὑμῶν**: 'how much, pray, would one of you give for *that?*' Index, δέχεσθαι.

10. **ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ . . . ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι κτλ.**: 'for *me* most especially . . . what time I might fall in with Palamedes, etc.' See the names in the Index. For ἐπεί here, cp. 19 E, 20 A.

13. **ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι κτλ.**: comparing his own experiences with those of his fellow-martyrs, he fancies, would be far from uninteresting. Both the asyndeton (omission of γάρ) and the participle (instead of the infinitive ἀντιπαραβάλλειν) are due to the *explanatory* character of the sentence. The dative (ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι), while not unsuited to ἀηδές, is primarily adapted to ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ, above.

ἐγῷμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα, διάγειν, τίς ἄρ' αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἴεται μέν, ἔστιν δ' οὔ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δὴ ἄν τις, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστιν.

1. **καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον**: 'and verily the greatest thing of all!' The ellipse of the verb is effective here where the jubilant tone of the passage culminates.

6. **Ὀδυσσέα . . . Σίσυφον**: illustrious examples of *σοφία*, but not exactly of the Socratic sort.

8. **ἀμήχανον . . . εὐδαιμονίας**: 'no end of happiness!' Cp. *οὐδεμία μηχανή* ('inconceivable') 27 E.

9. **πάντως οὐ δήπου κτλ.**: 'at all events they don't of course put men to death there for doing this thing.' Whatever may be the way of suppressing philosophers in Heaven, he says, it must at any rate be different from the way they have at Athens. The irony of the passage loses nothing by its pleasantry and charm. For the dreamless sleep of the first alternative, the second offers a sleep filled with a delightful dream. The absence of all sinister features in this poetic view consists with the sublime confidence of the sage, in his unswerving conviction, *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι.*

41 D–End

Ay, so should ALL *the righteous abide firm in the conviction, that, living or dying, for the* GOOD *man there can be naught but good. Under a divine care and guidance the action of such a man is ever for the best;—as now, the mystic monitor has not once diverted him from his course, because, as he clearly sees, 't was time at last to be free from labor and at rest. Thus the accusers and the*

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας
εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἕν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι
D ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε
ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ
5 τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου
γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι
καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο
καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς
καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ
10 χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό
E μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο δ'
αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι·
τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες,
ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν
15 ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμε-

authors of the fatal ballot (nowise to their praise) were the unwilling instruments of a beneficent design. Let them go on retaliating for the vexation of being roused from their sleep of ignorance, till full justice shall have been done. Even as Socrates has vexed them, so let them vex the sons of Socrates (should they prove unworthy), thro' exhortation and reproach and awakening to a better life.

1. **Καὶ ὑμᾶς**: *i.e.* not himself only.

1. **εὐέλπιδας**: cp. **πολλὴ ἐλπὶς κτλ.** 40 C, where he had his own case chiefly in view.

2. **καὶ ἕν τι . . . ἀληθές**: 'and bear this one thing in mind as just a piece of truth.'

5. **ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου**: *i.e.* without a beneficent design.

7. **ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων**: 'to be rid of trouble,' or, as we say, to be at *rest*.

13. **τιμωρήσασθε . . . λυποῦντες**: said with the keenest irony, for **εὐεργετήσατε . . . ἐγείροντες** (**παρακελευόμενοι**). 'Take your satisfaction of them, gentlemen, by wearying them even in the same way as I was wont to weary you.' **τιμωρήσασθαι** implies a selfish motive on the part of the subject, never present in the mind of Socrates.

λεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἰονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν
42 A ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν,
5 αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν εἰ τῷ θεῷ.

4. **δίκαια πεπονθὼς . . . αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς**: 'I shall have earned retribution at your hands — I and my sons.' The phrasing is equivocal and profoundly suggestive. — When Athens comes to direct her actions according to the principles of Socrates, then and not till then will she have atoned for the wrong done to him and his.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

Τί τηνικάδε ἀφῖξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῴ ἐστιν;

ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;

ΚΡ. Ὄρθρος βαθύς.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι.

ΚΡ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἧκεις ἢ πάλαι;

ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

B ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθησαι;

43 A–D

Socrates, awaking at an early hour, finds his friend Crito seated by his bedside in the prison.— Crito, after explaining why he had refrained from disturbing the placid sleep of the prisoner, announces that the sacred galley has been sighted off Cape Sunium, on its return voyage from Delos. Hence, apparently, the execution of Socrates is close at hand.

5. Ἠθέλησε: 'came to be willing.' Ingressive aorist; cp. ἔδοξέ μοι *Apol.* 21 C, and the note.

7. ἤδη: 'by this time.'

8. καὶ . . . εὐεργέτηται: a mild way of indicating where a part of the money had been placed which Crito was ready to expend to secure the escape of Socrates. Cp. οὐδὲ πολὺ τἀργύριον κτλ. 45 A.

11. πῶς: 'how comes it,' that you did not awaken me at once?

ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἥδιστα διάγῃς. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δή σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστώσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πράως φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

C ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἁλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρῳ ἀφῖξαι;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

1. **οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία κτλ.**: with strong feeling Crito asseverates that he has done by Socrates as he would himself be done by under similar circumstances — where *ἀγρυπνία* were neither more nor less than *λύπη*. But with *ἀλλὰ καί* he hastens to correct the implied suggestion that Socrates can be affected as an ordinary man would be affected in his situation.

2. **σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω**: 'I have been admiring *you* all the time.'

10. **ἤδη**: 'finally.' Cp. *Apol.* 41 D.

13. **τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν**: Index, *μή*.

15. **οὐ σοί**: sc. *χαλεπήν*.

18. **ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα**: much like *πάντων βαρύτατα*. Superlatives are idiomatically modified by prefixing *ἐν τοῖς*. The formula does not change with the gender of the adjective. Cp. *ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγώ* 52 A, *ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται δὴ νῆες* Thuc. 3. 17.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην ; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφῖκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ
D δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με ;

ΚΡ. Οὔτοι δὴ ἀφῖκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν μέν μοι ἥξει τήμερον, ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου
5 καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ
10 τήμερον.

44 A ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ᾗ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἥξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου, ὃ

1. **τίνα ταύτην**: sc. *φέρων ἥκεις*. *τίνα*, predicate; *ταύτην*, object. See the note on *ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην Apol.* 20 D.

1. **τὸ πλοῖον**: see the Index, Δῆλος, and the passage there quoted from the *Phaedo*.

2. **τεθνάναι**: 'to be a dead man.' The expression *ἀποθανεῖν*, 'to be *put* to death,' is here avoided. Index, *θνήσκειν* and *ἀποθνήσκειν*.

3. **δοκεῖν μέν μοι**: 'I *think*.' For the Absolute Infinitive, cp. *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* ('so to speak') *Apol.* 17 A, 22 B, D, *ὀλίγου δεῖν* 22 A, *ἐκὼν εἶναι* 37 A.

43 D–44 B

From a dream he has just had Socrates infers that the vessel will arrive at Athens not on the ensuing day, but on the next day thereafter. In THREE *days, as Achilles promised himself, Socrates can expect to be at home.*

8. **Ἀλλὰ . . . τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ**: 'well, may it be for the best' (quod bene vertat). The formula is of frequent occurrence.

14. **οἱ . . . κύριοι**: the Eleven. See *Apol.* 37 C.

15. **τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας**: equivalent here to *τήμερον*, the time of

ἑώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με.

ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩ. Εὐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ
B εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοιο.

ΚΡ. Ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες,
10 ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ καὶ σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορὰ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ

speaking being felt as *night* (ὄρθρος βαθύς 43 A). So, τῆς ἑτέρας is equivalent to αὔριον.

2. ἐν καιρῷ τινι: Index, κινδυνεύειν.

5. ὦ Σώκρατες κτλ.: reminiscence from the *Iliad*. Achilles threatens to set sail for home on the morrow, adding: εἰ δέ κεν εὐπλοίην δώῃ κλυτὸς ἐννοσίγαιος, | ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοίμην. I 363.

8. ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν: 'say rather, *manifest*.'

9. λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν: 'its meaning is only too clear, apparently.' To Socrates the thought of 'going home' has been uppermost here; to Crito the thought of the predicted death, as such. — With the words ὡς ἔοικεν Crito dismisses the subject of the dream, to come to the matter in hand.

44 B–D

Crito now urges the true purpose of his errand: to gain, even at the eleventh hour, Socrates' consent to make good his escape and save his life by the means which his friends have provided. His refusal so to act will be neither believed nor comprehended. Popular opinion will hold Crito to have been too stingy to rescue Socrates. — The philosopher rejoins that the popular opinion is of little account in the matter. Sensible people will view the event in its true light. Popular bodies, the vulgar masses, are, to be sure, agents of mischief often enough, as chance may dictate; but their views are of no value, for ABILITY *or* CAPACITY *of working either good or evil they have not.*

9. Ὦ δαιμόνιε: here said in a

ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μή ποτε εὑρήσω, ἔτι δὴ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ
C μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἷός τε ὢν σε σῴζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων
5 εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοί, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον
10 ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπρᾶχθαι, ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ.

D ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν
15 κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἷοί τ' εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τ' ἦσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ

tone of serious remonstrance. See the Index.

1. **οὐδένα μή**: Index, *οὐ*.

3. **ὡς οἷός τ' ὢν κτλ.**: 'as one who could have saved you, had I been willing to spend money, but did not care to do it.' **οἷός τ' ὤν**, *i.e. although* able. **ὡς**, prefixed to these words, makes clear that they express part of the view of outsiders and strangers (**πολλοῖς δόξω . . . ἀμελῆσαι**).

5. **ταύτης**: sc. **τῆς δόξης**; explained by **ἢ δοκεῖν κτλ.**

13. **τὰ παρόντα νυνί**: *i.e.* the present plight of Socrates, a prisoner awaiting his execution, condemned to death by a popular dicastery. These facts are said to be **αὐτὰ . . . δῆλα**, to contain *in themselves* the evidence, **ὅτι κτλ.**

16. **ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος**: the *Apology* affords ample commentary on this expression, 19 B and elsewhere (**διαβολή, διέβαλλον, οἱ διαβάλλοντες**, etc.).

18. **ἵνα . . . ἦσαν**: 'that they might be able' (as in fact they

τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν· νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι.

E ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, 5 εἰπέ μοι· ἆρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν;

are not, νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε). Index, ἵνα. — There is a pointed significance here in οἷοί τε and δυνατοί. Socrates denies these predicates to persons whose actions are the result of mere chance and circumstance (ποιοῦσι . . . ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι), not governed by sound reflection and reasoned principle.

2. **οὔτε . . . φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα . . . ποιῆσαι**: 'they cannot make a man wise or foolish'; *i.e.* they cannot make one good or bad, are unable (of themselves) to do good or evil to any one. See the note on **οὐ . . . θεμιτόν** *Apol.* 30 D.

44 E–45 C

To Crito's inquiry, whether the attitude of Socrates is due to solicitude for his friends, in view of the pecuniary loss and the danger they are likely to incur in consequence of helping the prisoner to escape, the sage replies that he is moved by considerations of this sort and by a great many others also. But Crito urges that he is himself quite able to afford the outlay needed, including the expense of keeping the informers quiet; and that, even were his own ample means inadequate, other friends of Socrates, not citizens of Athens, are ready to supply the funds. He begs Socrates, accordingly, to dismiss such considerations; likewise to give himself no trouble about his remarks at the trial, as to the helpless condition in which he would be placed as an exile; Crito has friends in Thessaly, for example, who will make the fugitive perfectly safe and comfortable.

5. **Ἆρά γε μή**: for the interrogative phrase, see Index, μή at end.

6. **οἱ συκοφάνται**: See the Index, Κρίτων, and the passage there cited from Xenophon's *Memorabilia.*

45 A εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δέῃ ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τἀργύριόν ἐστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς B πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τἀμά, ξένοι ἐνθάδε ἕτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν· εἷς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἕτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φο-

1. **ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν**: 'bid farewell to it.'

1. **ἡμεῖς . . . δίκαιοί ἐσμεν κτλ.**: 'for our part, it is but *right* that we should save you and incur this risk, or, if need be, an even greater risk than this.'. For the personal construction of the adjective, cp. δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι *Apol.* 18 A, and above D δῆλα τὰ παρόντα . . . ὅτι.

5. **προμηθοῦμαι**: adapted to προμηθεῖ above 44 E.

5. **καὶ ἄλλα πολλά**: these words are added by Socrates with far wider significance than is apprehended by Crito.

7. **μήτε**: before its correlative occurs the first μήτε is itself repeated, below B (after ὅπερ λέγω).

11. **σοὶ δὲ . . . τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα**: 'but as regards you, to begin with (μέν) my property is at your disposal.' For the verb, cp. ὑπάρξει ὑμῖν ἡ ἐμὴ πόλις Xen. *Anab.* 5. 6. 23.

12. **ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἱκανά**: cp. δίκαιον, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, *Apol.* 18 A.

12. **ἔπειτα**: 'then again'; correlative to μέν.

16. **ὅπερ λέγω**: 'as I say'; introducing the repeated μήτε . . . φοβοῦ A.

βούμενος ἀποκάμῃς σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὅ τι χρῷο σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ C ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ 5 εἰς Θετταλίαν ἰέναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἵ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται, ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι· καὶ 10 τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι

1. (μὴ) ἀποκάμῃς: 'spare no effort.'

1. ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ: see *Apol.* 37 D. Socrates must not allow himself to be disturbed by any little inconsistency that might be noted between his words at the trial and his actions now.

2. ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις κτλ.: 'that you would be at a loss, as an exile, what to do with yourself.'

45 C–46 A

Continuing his plea, Crito ventures to express the opinion that Socrates even does wrong, in helping to consummate the machinations of his enemies by abandoning himself unnecessarily to death; by abandoning likewise his sons, gratuitously, to the sorry chances of orphanhood. Parents have duties toward their children, but Socrates, apparently, after all his lifelong professions of virtue, chooses the easy way, not the brave way, in regard to his own. Crito is ashamed of the whole history. People will attribute to the philosopher and his friends a lack of courage from first to last—from the preliminary scenes of the needless trial, down to the concluding farce in the prison. Therefore, if trouble is not to be crowned with disgrace, let Socrates wisely avail himself of this last opportunity for deliberation.

8. Οὐδὲ δίκαιον: cp. *Apol.* 35 C, and the note.

9. σαυτὸν προδοῦναι: cp. what Socrates declares in the *Apology*, πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήτειν 37 B.

βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ
D ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ
ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅ τι
ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός,
5 τοιούτων οἵάπερ εἴωθεν γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις
περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας,
ἢ ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ
δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι· χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ
ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἕλοιτο, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι,
10 φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖ-
σθαι· ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν
E ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ
σὲ ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος
τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελ-
15 θεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ

1. **πρὸς δὲ τούτοις**: *i.e.* besides playing into the hands of his enemies by sacrificing himself.

3. **τὸ σὸν μέρος**: the phrase is nearly equivalent to *σοῦ γε ἕνεκα* ('for aught you do to hinder'). So 50 B, 54 C.

3. **ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι**: sc. *πράξαντες*. Cp. 44 D end. *ὅ τι* is thus in the same construction as its antecedent *τοῦτο* (Cognate Accusative). Note the order of the clauses. 'Mere chance will determine what is to be their fate.' Index, *πράττειν*.

4. **τεύξονται . . . τοιούτων κτλ.**: carries on the idea expressed in what immediately precedes, *τεύξονται* being adapted to *τύχωσι*. 'And their fate will in all probability be such as usually befalls.'

13. **ἀνανδρίᾳ τινί**: following the thought of *ἀνὴρ . . . ἀνδρεῖος* above. Crito feels that he is using rather severe language, hence *τινί*. So below, *κακίᾳ τινί*, 'a kind of cowardice.'

13. **καὶ . . . καὶ . . . καί**: the correlatives mark the three stages of the *πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σέ*.

14. **ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν**: it seems to be implied here that a private settlement with the prosecutors might have been arrived at, to prevent the case from being brought into court at all, if Soc-

τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως, κακίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι
46 A ἡμᾶς δοκῇ, οἵτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἷόν τε ὂν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος
5 ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ᾖ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεῦσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ πεπρᾶχθαι. εἰ δ' ἔτι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι
10 οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

rates would have consented to such a thing. For εἰσελθεῖν, cp. *Apol.* 29 C, and the note.

2. κακίᾳ . . . καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ: the repetition (see above ἀνανδρίᾳ τινί) is due to the length of the period. The thought of δόξῃ also reappears under the form δοκῇ, as the speaker dwells on the final matter (τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί) about which he is so indignant. For διαπεφευγέναι, see the Index.

4. ὄφελος: cp. *Apol.* 28 B.

6. ἀλλά: 'nay.'

6. μᾶλλον δέ: 'or rather.'

7. βεβουλεῦσθαι: 'to have done with deliberation.' Here, as often, the perfect infinitive, by its idea of completion, affords a pointed and forcible mode of expression. So πεπρᾶχθαι, just below. Cp. *Apol.* 41 D.

9. εἰ . . . περιμενοῦμεν: see the note on εἰ τιμωρήσεις *Apol.* 28 C.

46 B–47 A

What value is to be set upon Crito's zeal, that (says Socrates) is a question of RIGHT *and* WRONG. *It behooves the two friends, then, to consider by the light of reason (the only light by which the sage can allow himself to be guided) whether one ought, or ought not, to act as Crito here advises. Arguments which Socrates has formerly advanced he cannot now repudiate because death threatens him. Unless those arguments can be refuted, they must stand. A fair starting point for the present consideration would be Crito's remark about the opinions of men — to consider whether in former conversations it was rightly affirmed, that some of those opinions*

B ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων, τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδή μοι ἥδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ C σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονταί μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὔσπερ καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μή σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλά-

are to be heeded, and others not. Was that said in earnest? And does Crito, whose judgment there is no impending calamity to warp, still concede that it was rightly said? — He does. — The opinions of the wise must be heeded; those of the foolish, not? — Yes.

1. **Πολλοῦ ἀξία**: sc. **ἐστίν**.

2. **εἰ . . . εἴη**: 'supposing it to consist with some degree of right.' For the non-committal form of the condition, cp. **δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη** (supposing one to be able, si quis possit) **παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους**, *Apol.* 19 E.

5. **τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενί**: 'nothing that is in me.' **τὰ ἐμά**, the collective **ἐγώ**.

6. **λογιζομένῳ**: adapted to **τῷ λόγῳ**.

8. **ἐπειδή**: temporal, and explanatory of **νῦν**.

9. **σχεδόν τι**: see the Index.

11. **οὐ μή**: Index, **οὐ**.

12. **ἂν πλείω . . . . ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται**: 'tho' there be still more bugbears than are in evidence now whereby the power of the many may scare us, childlike.' **πλείω**, Cognate Accusative with **μορμολύττηται**.

βοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἑκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσ-
D έχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀπο-
θνῄσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο,
5 ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυα-
ρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγωγ' ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ
Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται,
ἐπειδὴ ᾧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πει-
σόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἑκάστοτε
10 ᾧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ
ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσιν, δέοι
E τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς
θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ,
14 ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν
47 A αὖριον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν σε παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμφορά·

1. **ὃν σὺ λέγεις**: above 44 C, D, 45 E.

2. **ἑκάστοτε**: *i.e.* on the various occasions when Crito had heard the subject discussed by Socrates.

4. **κατάδηλος . . . ὅτι . . . ἐλέγετο**: sc. ὁ λόγος, in both clauses. ἄρα marks the ironical tone of the question. For ἄλλως, see the Index.

7. **ἀλλοιότερος**: the comparative degree is due to a feeling that the word (ἀλλοῖος, ἄλλος, opposed to ὁ αὐτός) is inadequate to the thought. 'More different,' *i.e.* less convincing.

8. **ἐπειδή**: 'now that'; cp. above B.

8. **ἐάσομεν χαίρειν**: cp. ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν 45 A.

10. **ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν**: 'by those who fancied they spoke to some purpose.' λέγειν τι, the opposite of οὐδὲν λέγειν. Here in contrast with ἄλλως, ἕνεκα λόγου, above. Index, λέγειν.

14. **ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια**: 'at least in all human probability.' There are no circumstances in Crito's own situation to warp his judgment; and surely he cannot allow the impending death of his friend to distort his views, while those of Socrates himself remain unclouded. An appeal at once to Crito's fairness and fortitude.

σκόπει δή· οὐχὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δ' οὔ; τί φῄς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν;

ΚΡ. Ἑνὸς μόνου.

47 B–D

It was further maintained that in matters pertaining to the body the opinion, the praise or blame, and the prescriptions, not of the many, but of the ONE *expert or professional individual must be regarded by him who aims at bodily health and strength? — Yes, and truly so. — And he who disregards the opinion of the skilled adviser, and respects that of the ignorant multitude, will come to grief as to the body? — Assuredly he will. — Similarly, in questions of morals, of right and wrong, the opinion, not of the multitude, but of some* ONE *who possesses understanding, must be regarded by him who will not come to grief in matters pertaining to the soul — and the soul is a serious thing enough? — Indeed it is.*

11. **Αὖ**: marks a new step in the argumentation, still assumed as a reminiscence of former conversations (**ἐλέγετο**).

11. **γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ κτλ.**: the sentence is explanatory of **τὰ τοιαῦτα**. Hence the asyndeton.

12. **τοῦτο πράττων**: 'making a business thereof.'

13. **ἑνὸς μόνου | ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν κτλ.**: thus to be divided in reading, and in translating. Cp. *Apol.* 18 A, 38 D.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή.

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ᾗ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαΐοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ᾗ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

C ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων, ἆρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διολλύει.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διίωμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, πότερον D τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο

6. καὶ ἐδεστέον γε: 'ay, and eat too.' γέ calls attention to a new class of things enumerated.

14. ποῖ τείνει: 'whither does it tend?'

15. τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος: 'what part of him who disobeys?' τὰ τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος, the collective ἀπειθῶν. Cp. τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενί 46 B, τῶν ἡμετέρων 47 E.

καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν, πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, ἆρα Ε βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τι

1. **βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο . . . ἀπώλλυτο**: the past tense, still alluding to former discussions.

47 D–48 B

But with ruined bodily health life is not worth living? — Certainly not. — Then, still less is life worth living, with a ruined moral nature — at least if the soul be more precious than the body? — It is more precious, by far. — Apparently, then, in matters of right and wrong, the words of the ONE *must be followed, the voice of Truth, not the opinions of the many. If, however, it be urged that the many possess the power of putting men to death, the question arises, whether we nevertheless still affirm that not mere living, but living a good life, is the thing of value? — We do still affirm it.*

4. **Φέρε δή**: marks still another step in the argumentation.

6. **μὴ τῇ . . . δόξῃ**: the arrangement is as if **ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν πολλῶν** were to follow. The negative does not affect **πειθόμενοι**. 'By listening to the opinion of the wrong persons.'

13. **ἀλλὰ . . . ἄρα**: 'well then.' An a fortiori argument is implied in the emphatic **μετ' ἐκείνου** and by the tone of the question.

48 A *ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστόν ;*

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. *Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον ;*

ΚΡ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. *Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινύναι.*

6. **οὐκ . . . πάνυ . . . οὕτω**: 'not so very much'; putting it mildly. *οὐ πάνυ*, often said with Attic reserve. Cp. *Apol.* 41 D.

7. **ὁ ἐπαΐων . . . ὁ εἷς . . . αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια**: cp. above 47 D, *εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων (περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων κτλ.)*. Index, *ἐπαΐειν*. In the case of *γυμνάζεσθαι* the "one" could be named (the *ἰατρός* or the *παιδοτρίβης*); likewise in other arts, such as music, orchestics, etc. But in regard to matters of purely moral conduct (where sacred law or bloodguiltiness was not concerned) there could be named at Athens, in the time of Plato and Socrates, no professional or authoritative adviser — as the priest or pastor would be consulted by good people in more modern days. Practically, in the scene here represented, the expert in the case was Socrates himself — a genuine one indeed, with his well-reasoned and consistent principle. *Ἐγὼ . . . ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται* 46 B. The *εἷς* is thus virtually identical with *αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια* personified, in the passage before us. So long as the sage remains true to himself he is sure not to go wrong.

9. **εἰσηγεῖ**: *εἰσηγεῖσθαι*, of establishing the premises for argumentation (*τὰ ὡμολογημένα, τὴν ἀρχήν*).

12. **φαίη γ' ἄν τις**: as Crito urged 44 D.

B ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος, ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέν-C των Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῶμεν. ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περί τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ

2. ὦ θαυμάσιε: marks the strong appeal to Crito's reason, as against his feeling and prepossession.

2. οὗτός τε . . . καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει: 'not merely this argument . . . but, further, here is another assertion of ours for you to consider.' A new step in the way of premising, taken rather informally (τέ . . . καὶ αὖ).

8. τὸ δὲ εὖ κτλ.: the phrase εὖ ζῆν needs defining, to prevent confusion with a popular usage. Here, bene vivere = recte vivere.

48 B–E

The premises, accordingly, have been agreed upon, and the way is clear to reason out the problem, whether it is right or wrong for Socrates to defy the laws of Athens and seek to escape from his prison. Considerations of pecuniary loss, popular criticism, family concerns, life and death, and so on, are not for men who reason, but for the unreasoning multitude. If it be proved wrong to try to escape, the attempt must not be made? — Ay; but what, then, is to be done? — The discussion will show; and, if so conducted as to convince a friend, its issue will be more satisfactory than if the well-meaning friend were to be left unconvinced.

15. Ἃς . . . λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις:

παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥᾳδίως ἀποκτιννύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἷοί τ' ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ' ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἃ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· κἂν φαινώμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέῃ ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτ' εἰ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μέν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καί σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα

usually, when an antecedent is thus "incorporated" into the relative clause the article is omitted.

1. **μὴ . . . ταῦτα . . . σκέμματα ἦ**: Index, *μή*.

2. **καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν**: 'ay, and (who) would bring to life again.'

4. **αἱρεῖ**: 'constrains.'

9. **ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι**: *ἄδικα*, predicative; *αὐτά* ('them'), object.

13. **ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν**: a trace of impatience on Crito's part.

17. **ἤδη**: 'finally.'

19. **πείσας σε**: 'with your approval'; opposed to *ἄκοντος* (sc. *σου*). Index, *πείθειν*.

49 A–E

If in former conversations Crito and Socrates were not jesting, but in earnest, they should be ready to reaffirm now what they

πράττεω, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν
49 A ἀρχήν, ἐάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι
τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα οἴῃ.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ
τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὔ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε
ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ
ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν
ἐκεῖ·αι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις
10 ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα
τηλικοίδε ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι
B ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ
παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν,
εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε

have often affirmed before, without regard to popular sentiment, that ALL *wrong-doing is unhandsome and base? — They do reaffirm it. — And doing wrong is to be defined as doing wrong, harm, or evil to* SOMEBODY? — *It is. — And wrong-doing by way of retaliation, rendering evil for evil, is under no circumstances whatever right, no matter how great may be the provocation? Let Crito be cautious in acknowledging a principle which few men are ready to admit — hence few there be with whom the present discussion were even possible. But this is Socrates' principle. Is it also Crito's? — It is.*

3. **ᾗ ἂν κτλ.**: 'as nearly as possible as you believe.'

5. **Ἑκόντας**: 'if we can help it.' The adjective agrees with the "agent" of the verbal.

9. **ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς . . . ἡμέραις**: viz. since the trial and condemnation of Socrates. Cp. **ἐπειδή μοι ἥδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν**, and the context, 46 B.

10. **ἐκκεχυμέναι**: 'spilled'; *i.e.* wasted, come to naught.

10. **πάλαι . . . ἄρα . . . ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες**: 'were we all the time . . . without knowing it no better than mere children, after all (**ἄρα**)?'

13. **παντὸς μᾶλλον**: 'above all,' 'more truly than ever.'

χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν παντὶ τρόπῳ ; φαμὲν ἢ οὔ ;

ΚΡ. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

C ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὔ ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δή που, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοί φασιν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον ;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὦ D Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολο-

1. **εἴτε καὶ πραότερα**: added rhetorically, to point the contrast. Cp. ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα, *Apol.* 30 B.

1. **τό γε ἀδικεῖν**: γέ marks off the notion τὸ ἀδικεῖν distinctly from the irrelevant circumstances that tend to confuse and obscure it: '*just* doing wrong.'

3. **φαμὲν ἢ οὔ**: Crito has hesitated with his assent (hence the long-drawn-out question of Socrates), foreseeing dimly that by this admission he concedes the whole contention. Cp. the hesitation of Meletus when cross-questioned, *Apol.* 27 B.

10. **κακουργεῖν . . . κακῶς ποιεῖν . . . ἀδικεῖν**: 'wrong-doing' must be defined so explicitly as to leave no room for cavilling or subterfuge on the part of an opponent of the doctrine enunciated.

γῆς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ· σοὶ δὲ εἴ πῃ ἄλλῃ δεδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δ' ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε·

1. ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει: perhaps there were fewer persons in pre-Christian times than now, who were ready to admit a principle and profess a doctrine which they never felt themselves bound to observe in practice; but there were doubtless some such even anciently. Cp. ἐξαπατητέον below E.

2. οἷς οὕτω δέδοκται: '(they) who have adopted this belief.'

11. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: *i.e.* the sequel, the logical outcome of the affirmations premised.

49 E–50 B

If, now, a man is to perform and not to evade that which he acknowledges to be the right thing to do, then does Socrates, in attempting the proposed escape from prison, stand by his acknowledgments, or does he rather wrong somebody? — injuring certain persons, those in fact whom least of all in the world he should injure? — But who, pray, are they? — Well, supposing the LAWS *of Athens were to present themselves in person to Socrates, on the eve of his absconding, and take him to task in view of this fine enterprise? — asking of him an opinion, what were likely to become of a state wherein the judgments of the courts are defied and set at naught by individuals? Conceivably he might reply that in his case the state was in error and the judgment false? — He might indeed so reply.*

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἃ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὓς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὡμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔροιντο· Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ

1. **Μᾶλλον δέ**: 'or rather.'

3. **ἐξαπατητέον**: 'evaded,' we should naturally say. But the Greek word is stronger in its implication of falsehood.

6. **μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν**: cp. *πείσας σε* 48 E.

10. **ἐννοῶ**: 'comprehend.' Crito would like to be explicitly informed who these persons are. Plato's famous and most impressive personification of the Commonwealth (*τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως*) is thus dramatically introduced.

12. **εἴθ' ὅπως . . . τοῦτο**: 'or by whatever name we are to call this thing.' He would gladly find a milder designation than *ἀποδιδράσκειν* for that which Crito asks him to do, if the language afforded a word at once appropriate and reputable. Cp. *πράττεις ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν* 53 D.

13. **ἐπιστάντες**: this word supplies a graphic touch helpful in realizing the imaginary scene. Cp. *προσελθοῦσα* in the account of the dream 44 A.

17. **εἶναι**: 'to stand,' 'exist.'

ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι ἠδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινεν; ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

1. **ἀνατετράφθαι**: *i.e.* ἀνατεταραμμένην ('subverted') εἶναι, 'to be as nothing.'

1. **αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι**: 'the judgments rendered.' More explicitly below, τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας.

2. **ἄκυροι . . . γίγνονται**: 'are foiled.' For γίγνεσθαι in periphrasis with passive sense, see the Index.

4. **ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ**: an allusion to Athenian procedure in the presentation of a formal plea by an advocate (one of the σύνδικοι or συνήγοροι) upon the question of the *abrogation* of a law. A sort of apologetic reference by Plato, in view of the eloquent defense he is himself about to put into the mouth of laws personified.

5. **ἀπολλυμένου**: 'threatened with ruin as it is.' Note the effect of the imperfect stem, and cp. ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι C.

6. **ἢ ἐροῦμεν κτλ.**: Socrates anticipates the objection that would naturally be raised by Crito, thus affording a quick transition to the next step in the argument. For the future indicative in this question, compare the following note on ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι.

50 C–51 C

Standing before him now in his prison the Laws of the Commonwealth propound to Socrates the solemn and startling question, whether in the tacit agreement entered into by every citizen with his country it is really assumed that he will obey her ordinances only when he deems them justly administered, and not unexceptionally and always. This contract implies on the part of the citizen an approval of the regulation of marriage by the state, and involves a surrender of his individual rights to the welfare of the community, whose privileges he has thus by birth, rearing, and education been enabled to enjoy.

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι, Ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον

By the analogy of parentage, or of the relation between master and slave, if, as is admitted by common consent, powers are invested in the father or mother over the child, against which the child may not rebel or retaliate, even so, à fortiori, the citizen may not assert his individual will or judgment in defiance of the STATE, *to which he owes his civil existence, and of which he forms an integral part. Is that the conceded view of the relation existing between the citizen and the city? — It is.*

2. **Ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι**: here the form of the conditional clause (Supposition of the Possible) assumes boldly that the reader (along with the writer) has entered completely into the illusion of the scene depicted. Cp. Arist. *Birds* 1642 (Peithetaerus to Heracles) ἦν γὰρ ἀποθάνῃ ὁ Ζεύς . . . πένης ἔσει σύ: where the comic effect depends upon the form of the condition; hypothecating as possible precisely that which by the hypothesis implied in the word Ζεύς (that of *deathless* beings designated by certain names) is impossible. Anything like εἰ Ζεὺς ἀποθάνοι would be feeble and witless here. The English subjunctive has the same effect as the Greek ('If Zeus *die*,' 'If the Laws *say*'). On the other hand, above 50 A, where the imaginary case is supposed for the first time, we naturally find the ideal form, εἰ οἱ νόμοι ἔροιντο. Cp. Cicero's well-known haec si tecum patria loquatur (εἰ διαλέγοιτο ἡ πατρίς) nonne impetrare debeat *Cat.* 1. 8.

2. **ἦ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο**: 'was this really (*καί*) the agreement?' *ταῦτα, i.e.* that which is implied in the supposed objection, ἠδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις κτλ.

3. **ἐμμένειν**: said significantly, '*to abide by*' (simply and unconditionally).

μέν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; — Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. — Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ᾗ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἦ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; — Καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. — Εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ

1. **ἐγεννήσαμεν**: cp. *ἡμεῖς . . . γεννήσαντες* 51 C, *γενηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν* 51 E. Also *ἔκγονος* (*ἡμέτερος*) 50 E. Figuratively speaking, the citizen owed his being to the commonwealth, inasmuch as the privileges of citizenship accrued to him only thro' the legitimacy assured by the laws regulating marriage. At Athens he must be descended from Athenian citizens both on the father's and the mother's side.

5. **τοῦ γενομένου**: 'of the child, once born'; marking the transition from *γενέσθαι* to *τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι*.

6. **ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι**: 'such of us as pertain (have been assigned) thereto'; *i.e.* to *τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν*.

9. **ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ . . . ἐπαιδεύθης**: again naming *γενέσθαι*, for explicitness of reminder. Cp. 51 C end.

10. **πρῶτον μέν**: 'to begin with,' the citizen *belongs* to the state; in the next place, if that is true (*εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει*), he must demean himself accordingly. There is no formal correlative to *πρῶτον μέν* expressed.

11. **δοῦλος**: cp. *πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην*, below. So far as personal liberty and equality before the law were concerned, Athenian speakers were in the habit of contrasting their own civil government with the condition of those living under Oriental despotism, whom they called δοῦλοι. In another way, however, as here, where matters of *duty* are in question, the analogy of master and slave may be fairly used in emphasizing the strong sense of absorption of the

σοὶ πρόγονοι ; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἆρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἴει
εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅττ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχει-
ρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἴει δίκαιον
εἶναι ; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν
5 τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἴ σοι ὢν ἐτύγχανεν,
ὥστε, ἅπερ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς
51 A ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε
ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ
τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι, ὥστε, ἐὰν σὲ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς
10 ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς
νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις
ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν,
ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος ; ἢ οὕτως εἶ
σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέν σε ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ

individual by the body politic which the ancients felt.

1. ἐξ ἴσου . . . εἶναι . . . τὸ δίκαιον: the meaning is elucidated by what follows in the text. Parents and their children do not stand mutually upon an equal footing in the matter of right and wrong. The father, for example, has a right to chastise his son; but the son may not undertake to chastise his father in turn. If this be conceded, then still less (it is here argued) has the citizen a right to retaliate upon the state. For us, the analogy is less pertinent than it would have seemed to the ancient mind.

4. πρὸς μὲν . . . τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν . . . πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα . . . ἔσται κτλ.: for the form and force of the period, see the note on *Apol.* 37 C, D and compare the other passages there cited. Observe that here ἄρα appears in *both* members of the period.

6. κακῶς ἀκούοντα: Index, ἀκούειν.

10. καὶ σὺ δέ: 'When in like manner *you*.' Index, δέ.

14. μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς . . . τιμιώτερον . . . ἡ πατρὶς . . . καὶ ἁγιώτερον: this forcible utterance, paradoxical as the doctrine inculcated may seem to us, could be addressed to and accepted by no man more consistently and properly than Socrates.

τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἁπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν ἡ πατρὶς
B καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἁγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ
παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ
σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα
5 χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν
κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν
ἄγοντα, ἐάν τε τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε εἰς πόλε-
μον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα,
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀνα-
10 χωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ
C καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ
πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ᾗ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε,

12. ἢ πείθειν αὐτήν: the infinitive construction follows very naturally after the verbal adjectives preceding (ποιητέον = ποιεῖν δεῖ). For πείθειν, cp. above B, below 51 E, διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν *Apol.* 35 C.

12. ᾗ . . . πέφυκε: 'where the right *lies*,' we should say. Here, as often, πέφυκε is hardly more than a weighty synonym of ἐστί. πέφυκα occurs in its strict proper sense *Apol.* 34 D. — If there is any fallacy or special pleading in the present passage, it consists in the assumption that juries representing the power of the state are regularly open to persuasion by truth and reason.

ceded as the true one, it follows that Socrates in considering the plan of escape proposed to him contemplates WRONGING *that author of his civil existence and its privileges which is his Country. That there is nothing harsh or arbitrary (the Laws contend) in their way of enforcing the contract, is witnessed by the fact that every citizen is left free to emigrate and absolve himself from its conditions by taking up his residence elsewhere. In remaining at home he seals the compact by his act, and in breaking it he is guilty of violating a pledge as well as of injuring his benefactors. Nor do they, the Laws of Athens, fail to grant him at the last moment, in case of dispute, an apportunity of proving himself free from error.*

51 C–52 A

Such a view of the relation between state and citizen being con-

βιάζεσθαι δὲ οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἧττον τὴν πατρίδα ; — Τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων ; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὔ ;

ΚΡ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἁπάντων D ὧν οἷοί τε ἦμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδών ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, ἐάν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐάν τε

6. **Εἰ . . . ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν**: 'whether what we here say is true.' The absence of the article shows that *ἀληθῆ* is predicative. See notes on *Apol.* 18 A and 20 D. Cp. also *ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι* above 48 D, and the notes; where, however, the presence or absence of the article is not a factor in the interpretation.

6. **οὐ δίκαια**: bears the same grammatical relation to *ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς* as *ἀληθῆ* above bears to *ταῦτα*, or as *ἄδικα* in the passage quoted bears to *αὐτά*.

10. **τῷ . . . πεποιηκέναι**: the dative expresses the means whereby the proclamation is virtually made.

11. **δοκιμασθῇ**: on the completion of his seventeenth year the Athenian entered upon his full rights as a citizen by being enrolled in his deme. At that time he must undergo a 'scrutiny' (*δοκιμασία*) as to the genuineness of his citizenship by descent.

13. **ἐξεῖναι**: object of *προαγορεύομεν*. *ἔξεστί σοι ἀπιέναι* would be the substance of the proclamation.

16. **εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς**: 'supposing him to be dissatisfied with

μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσε ἐλθών, ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται,
E ἔχοντα τὰ αὑτοῦ. ὃς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὃν
τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τἆλλα τὴν
πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ
5 ἡμῖν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ
πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαμὲν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὔσιν
ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας
ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ
9 καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως
52 A ἐπιτατ τόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυοῖν
θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

us.' Cp. 46 B, the note on εἰ . . . εἴη.

4. ἔργῳ: cp. ἔργῳ ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ 52 D.

6. ὅτι . . . γεννηταῖς οὔσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται . . . ὅτι τροφεῦσι ὅτι ὁμολογήσας κτλ.: he is thrice guilty, 'in that we whom he fails to obey are the authors of his existence, have reared him, and have received from him a promise to obey us — a promise which he does not keep nor yet convince us' (that he is justified in not keeping it in any given case).

9. προτιθέντων ἡμῶν: 'tho' we offer him his choice'; sc. ἢ πείθεσθαι ἢ πείθειν. *I.e.* he has the resource of a trial before his peers. ἀγρίως ἐπιτάττειν, on the other hand, would be characteristic, not of a πολιτεία, but of a τυραννίς.

10. ἐφιέντων . . . οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ: the foregoing thought is here repeated in chiastic order (A B *B A*), to enforce strongly the notion of insubordination and bad faith.

52 A–53 A

The Laws warn their prisoner, that by carrying into effect the contemplated design he will render himself liable in a surpassing degree to those charges which culminate in the reproach of breaking a solemn compact. His home-staying habit, his apparent preference for Athens over other cities, evinced by an extraordinary indisposition to sojourn elsewhere, renders SOCRATES' *subscription to the civil contract unusually solemn and emphatical. Moreover, he has seen fit to rear children in Athens, that their lot may be in common with his own. Finally, of all men*

Ταύταις δή φαμεν καὶ σὲ ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. — Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴποιμι, Διὰ τί δή ; ἴσως ἄν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιντο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὡμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίεν γὰρ ἄν ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μή σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκεν, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ᾔροῦ, καὶ ὡμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσεσθαι, τά

Socrates could with the least grace evade by illegal means the execution of judgment, after deliberately and with an air of pride declining at the trial to allow the death penalty to be replaced by exile. Either then or at some earlier time in his long life might he have betaken himself elsewhere, perchance to one of those Dorian states which he has so often lauded. But now, in absconding, he will cover himself with disgrace and ridicule.

1. **Καὶ σέ**: a specific instance of the general truth above stated. Cp. **ἐγὼ οὖν** *Apol.* 28 D.

3. **ἐν τοῖς**: cp. 43 C, and the note.

8. **τῶν ἄλλων . . . διαφερόντως**: the adverb governs the genitive as the verb **διαφέρειν** would. — For the habit here noted, see Index, **Σωκράτης**.

14. **εἰδέναι**: Epexegetical Infinitive. Cp. non illum . . . devocavit . . . nobilitas urbis *ad cognitionem* Cic. *de Imp. Cn. Pompei* 14.

16. **τά τε ἄλλα . . . καὶ . . . ἐποιήσω**: 'particularly in that you had children in Athens.' The sons would be born to Athenian citizenship, enjoy the same privi-

τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἑκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ᾑροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν D τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὡμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

leges, and incur the same liabilities as their father. — Socrates, in fact, as we are amply informed by Xenophon and Plato, found much to criticise in the political constitution of his native city. It remains true, however, that the circumstances of Athenian life enabled him to work out his mission far more effectively then he could have done elsewhere in Hellas.

1. ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ κτλ.: 'at the trial itself,' finally. The argument of consistency here advanced is in the highest degree pertinent and cogent. It alone constrains the modern reader to commend unhesitatingly the decision of Socrates in the *Crito*, however strained some of the other pleading may appear. His utterances and his demeanor before the court, as attested alike by Xenophon and Plato, bound Socrates, above all men, to spurn the suggestion of an attempt to escape execution of the judgment. Crito's concession of this point we do not feel as a device of the Platonic dialogue.

2. ἐξῆν . . . τιμήσασθαι: see *Apol.* 36 B–38 B.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαῖεν ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς
Ε ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγ-
κης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ
ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα,
5 ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ
δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε
Λακεδαίμονα προῃροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε
φῂς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων
53 A πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς
10 ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνά-
πηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων
ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι. νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ
ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὡμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὦ

1. **ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαῖεν κτλ.**: the position of *ἄν* shows how closely *φαῖεν ἄν* is amalgamated with the sentence while still independent of its grammatical construction. Differently above 51 C, *Apol.* 30 B.

7. **Λακεδαίμονα . . . Κρήτην . . . εὐνομεῖσθαι**: see the names in the Index.

53 A–54 B

Let Socrates reflect that by such a transgression, besides exposing his friends to peril, he will render himself an object of suspicion and distrust on the part of the law-abiding citizens of any reputable state in which he may take refuge; nor will there longer be room for doubting that the judgment of the Athenian court was sound. Further discourses by Socrates abroad, upon his favorite themes, will be unseemly enough! Better, doubtless, resort to such a community as would relish the tale of an aged convict's flight and would applaud its author — provided he could so conduct himself as to offend no man by independent speech or thought. As for his sons, if they are to enjoy the privilege of growing to man's estate in Athens, they still could not have the benefit of their father's presence. In his absence, his friends must provide for the children; and whether he be alive or dead they are incapable of neglecting them.

Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.

Σκόπει γὰρ δή, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσί γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε, — εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεραι — τολέμιος ἥξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοιπερ κήδονται τῶν αὑτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονταί σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύς ἐστι, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἆρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος — τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὔσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἰέσθαί γε χρή. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων

5. **Κινδυνεύσουσί γε . . . φεύγειν . . . ἢ ἀπολέσαι**: 'will incur the *risk* at any rate of exile and banishment or of confiscation of their goods.'

8. **πρῶτον μέν**: answered by ἀλλά below D.

13. **τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν**: Index, δόξα. By his act he will confirm the popular belief that the Athenian judges were right in finding Socrates guilty.

23. **οἰέσθαί γε χρή**: see the Index.

τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευήν τέ τινα περι-
5 θέμενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ σμικροῦ χρόνου
E τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παρα-
10 βάς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μή τινα λυπῇς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετ-
14 ταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς
54 A ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δέ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον

2. **ἐκεῖ . . . ἀκολασία**: Index, **Θετταλία**.

3. **ἴσως**: 'perhaps not.'

11. **ἀκούσει . . . ἀνάξια**; Index, **ἀκούειν**.

15. **ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται**: 'where, pray, will *they* be?' The answer to *ποῦ*, with similar tone, would be *οὐδαμοῦ*: they will be *nowhere*. *ἡμῖν*, Ethical Dative ('the less we hear about them the better').

15. **ἀλλὰ δή**: so *ἀλλά*, above 53 D. Cp. *Apol.* 37 C, and see the Index. — The words that follow here contain an unanswerable rejoinder to Crito's reproaches 45 D.

18. **ἵνα . . . ἀπολαύσωσιν**: 'that they may have this, too, to be thankful for.' *ἀπολαύειν*, ironical.

19. **ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ**: 'or, not *that*, to be sure.'

19. **αὐτοῦ**: in Athens.

19. **σοῦ . . . βέλτιον**: 'any the better because you are living.'

θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς ἐπιμελήσονται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἅιδου ἀποδημήσῃς οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστι, τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἴεσθαί γε χρή.

Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἠδικημένος ἄπει, ἐὰν ἀπίῃς, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων

1. **θρέψονται . . . παιδεύσονται**: future middle as passive.

54 B–End

Wherefore, finally, it behooves Socrates not to be prevailed upon by his friend Crito, but to obey the Laws of his Country, which are to him as father and mother. Not by them, but at the hands of men, has he been wronged. And it were well, in appearing before the Laws of the Other World, to present himself, not as an ingrate and wrong-doer, but clean-handed, with just record and adequate defense.

In voices which thus ring in the ears, drowning all other words and thoughts, there is divine guidance. And if the voice of the Laws be unanswerable, its guidance must be followed.

9. **Τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν**: cp. *Apol.* 41 A.

9. **οὔτε . . . οὔτε**: 'as . . . not, . . . so . . . not.' Thus turn the correlatives. For **οὐδέ** (three times), which is never a correlative word, see the Index.

13. **ἠδικημένος . . . ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων**: truly said, inasmuch as individuals are apt to fail in carrying into effect those principles of right which in their collective capacity they have been enabled to establish and embody in the law. The true philosopher, acting ever consistently, does not care to place himself on a level with defective individuals — as the

C ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε
5 καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε
D πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

10 Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἠχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως
15 μέντοι εἴ τι οἴει πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

E ΣΩ. Ἔα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

prisoner would do were he to try to turn the tables on his unhappy judges.

8. **ἀλλά**: 'nay.'

11. **κορυβαντιῶντες**: see the Index.

13. **ὅσα γε κτλ.**: cp. 46 E.

17. **πράττωμεν ταύτῃ**: cp. *σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή* 46 B. The Dialogue consists in an inquiry as to right and wrong *conduct*.

INDEX

N. B. The Index is not to the notes, but to the *text* of the *Apology* and *Crito*, and supplementary to the notes. All the proper names occurring in these two dialogues are registered, substantive and adjective; but as regards other words the Index is meant to be in no way exhaustive. Terms and phrases pertaining to Athenian law and other antiquities are recorded and briefly explained; likewise certain words characteristic of Plato's mode of expression or of the simple Socratic doctrines enunciated in the dialogues and needing fuller elucidation than there would be room for in the commentary. Finally, the Index has been made to comprise a number of familiar Greek words which have given rise to idioms or of themselves demand close and repeated observation on the learner's part. See, for example, ἀλλά, *γίγνεσθαι*, *δοκεῖν*, *μέλλειν*, *μέν*, *μή*, *οὐδέ*, *πάσχειν*, *ποιεῖν*.

A

ἀγών, -ῶνος, ὁ: *struggle, contest;* as *γυμνικός, ἱππικός, μουσικός*, or of war. Also the *trial* of a case at law, *ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης Crit.* 45 E. *εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστάναι τινάς*, 'to be putting men on trial,' *i.e.* summoning them before the courts, *Apol.* 24 C. *ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι*, 'to be undergoing a trial,' 34 C. See *δίκη*.

Ἀδείμαντος: *Adimantus*, son of Aristo and brother of Plato, present at the trial of Socrates, 34 A.

Ἅιδης: *Hades*, god of the Lower World. *ἐν Ἅιδου, εἰς Ἅιδου*, 'in,' 'into (the realm of) Hades,' 29 B, 40 E, *Crit.* 54 A, B, C.

Αἰακός: *Aeacus*, son of Zeus and Aegīna, after his death one of the judges in the Lower World, 41 A. See Ῥαδάμανθυς. Sons of Aeacus were Telamon and Peleus, the fathers respectively of Ajax and Achilles.

Αἰαντόδωρος: *Aeantodorus*, an Athenian, the brother of Apollodorus, present at the trial of Socrates, 34 A.

Αἴας, -αντος: *Ajax*, 41 B. Ajax the son of Telamon was called *ὁ μείζων*, 'the greater,' to distinguish him from 'the lesser' Ajax, son of Oïleus. Telamonian Ajax is mentioned in the *Apology* as one of the ancients who perished in consequence of an unjust judgment. Thetis had proposed the arms of Achilles as a prize for that one of the Greeks who should be deemed to have done best in the battle over the body of her son on the plain of Troy. The arms were awarded to Ulysses, and the cha-

grin and resentment of Ajax at this decision led to his suicide. See the *Odyssey* λ 543 ff.

αἱρεῖν: *to seize, take.* ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ, 'the argument constrains,' 'convinces,' *Crit.* 48 C. Mid. 'to choose.' Aor. act. and mid., ἑλεῖν, ἑλέσθαι 28 E. The passive, in the meaning *take* (or 'convict'), is expressed by ἁλίσκεσθαι, ἁλῶναι 38 D, 39 B. In the language of the Athenian courts αἱρεῖν is 'to convict,' 28 A. For the figure, cp. διώκειν (*pursue*), 'to prosecute,' ὁ διώκων, 'the plaintiff'; φεύγειν (*flee*), 'to be defendant,' ὁ φεύγων; ἀποφυγεῖν (*escape*), 'to be acquitted,' 38 D. See φεύγειν.

Αἰσχίνης: *Aeschines*, an Athenian, son of Lysanias, present at the trial of Socrates, 33 E. He became a writer of dialogues, and is known as Aeschines "the Socratic," to distinguish him from Aeschines the orator.

ἀκούειν: *to hear*, 17 B, 19 D. εὖ, κακῶς ἀκούειν (equivalent to a passive of εὖ, κακῶς λέγειν), Lat. bene, male audire, 'to be well' or 'ill spoken of,' *Crit.* 51 A. See HA. 820, G. 1241, B. 513. A cognate accusative may take the place of the adverb, ἀκούσει ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ, 53 E.

ἀλλά: *but*, regularly after a negative idea, 17 C. Often, with hortative or imperative constructions, in a tone of appeal or deprecation, 'nay.' See note on *Apol.* 39 E. ἀλλ' ὦ Σώκρατες, 'nay, Socrates,' *Crit.* 54 B; ἀλλὰ βουλεύου 46 A. In setting aside some proposal, as when one after the other of a series of suggestions is dismissed as not feasible, 'well.' ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, 'well, a *fine* then?' (after negativing the proposed penalty of imprisonment); ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς (setting aside the suggestion of a fine) *Apol.* 37 C. Sometimes, in the same usage, 'or.' ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς *Crit.* 53 D. ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα 54 A. ἀλλὰ γάρ, 'but in truth,' 'in fact, however,' 'in fine,' is a condensed phrase leaving some part of the thought to be mentally supplied, *Apol.* 19 C, D, 25 C, 20 A, 28 A. Sometimes the phrase is divided by a word or two, ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ 20 C. ἀλλὰ γάρ is apt to occur when a lengthy discourse or argument is drawing near to its conclusion, 'but (enough) for,' etc. *Apol.* 42. ἀλλ' ἤ, 'except,' 'than,' after a negative idea. τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν . . . δίκαιον 34 B. Cp. μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτι σμικροτάτῳ *Prot.* 334 C. The unaccented ἀλλ' in this phrase is by some referred to ἄλλος (ἄλλο). ἀλλ' οὖν . . . γε, 'well then at any rate,' 'yet at any rate,' after some sort of a conditional statement, 27 C, 34 E.

ἄλλο τι ἤ: see ἄλλος.

ἄλλος, ἄλλη, ἄλλο: *other, else.* ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, 'now some things and now others,' 'first this and then that,' 27 B. οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, 'and *above all* the son of Thetis,' 28 C. ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται καί, 'many things contribute to this result, but *especially* the fact,' etc. 36 A. Cp. *Crit.* 52 C. The phrase is most common in its adverbial form, ἄλλως τε καί, 'especially,' *Apol.* 26 E, 35 D. ἄλλο τι ἤ, interrogative phrase, expecting an affirmative answer. ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, 'do you not

regard it as highly important?' 24 C, *Crit.* 50 A, 52 D.

ἄλλως: *otherwise*, 'inconsiderately,' 'vainly,' *Crit.* 46 D. In the passage cited **ἄλλως** is specifically interpreted by the phrase **ἕνεκα λόγου**, 'mere talk.' For **ἄλλως τε καί**, see **ἄλλος**.

ἀμαθίᾱ (*μανθάνειν*): *ignorance*, 25 E. But as specific opposite of **σοφία** the meaning is 'unwisdom,' 'folly,' 22 E, 29 B. See **σοφία**, **εἰδέναι**, **φρόνησις**.

Ἀμφίπολις, -εως, ἡ: *Amphipolis*, a town in Thrace, on the Strymon, named from its position with the river encompassing it on three sides, 28 E. An important dependency of Athens, Amphipolis fell into the hands of the Lacedaemonian commander Brasidas in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War, 424 B.C. Two years later, in an unsuccessful attempt on the part of Athens to recover the place, both Brasidas and Cleon, the Athenian general, were killed. Thuc. 5. 10. The allusion in the *Apology* indicates that Socrates was present in the ranks at the Battle of Amphipolis.

ἀναβαίνειν: *to go up*. Frequently of ascending to the Pnyx, where the Popular Assembly (**ἐκκλησία**) was held, on the slope of a hill near the Areopagus, 31 C. Also of coming up before a court of justice, **ἐπὶ δικαστήριον** 17 D, 33 D, 36 D, 36 A, 40 B.

ἀναβιβάζεσθαι: the causative of **ἀναβαίνειν**. Of bringing persons into court or into the court-room, **ἀναβιβάσασθαί τινα** 19 D, 34 C.

Ἀναξαγόρᾱς: *Anaxagoras*, Ionic philosopher, 26 D. Born in Clazomenae about 500 B.C., he dwelt many years at Athens, upon terms of intimate friendship with eminent citizens such as Euripides and Pericles. His inquiries into the nature of things, substituting scientific theories in place of the personal agency of divine beings, led to a charge of blasphemy, in consequence of which he was compelled to leave Athens. Anaxagoras taught that **νοῦς**, *mind*, introduces order and symmetry into nature by initiating a rotatory movement, "the grand cosmical rotation." See Grote's *Plato*, vol. I, c. I. Only brief fragments remain of Anaxagoras' treatise *On Nature* (**περὶ φύσεως**).

ἀντιγραφή: see **γραφή**.

ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι: see **τιμᾶν**.

Ἀντιφῶν, -ῶντος: *Antiphon*, of the deme of Cephisia, the father of Epigenes, who was one of the followers of Socrates, present at the trial, 33 E. This Antiphon must be distinguished from Antiphon of the deme of Rhamnus, the celebrated orator.

ἀντωμοσίᾱ: see **γραφή**.

Ἄνυτος: *Anytus*, son of Anthemion, the most influential of the three accusers of Socrates, 18 B, 23 E, 29 C, 30 C, 31 A, 34 A, 36 A. He had been strategus and had held other important offices, and in the time of the Thirty Tyrants he was one of the exiles who returned with Thrasybulus (see **φυγή**), standing high thereafter in the councils of the Restored Democracy. We learn from Plato *Men.* 90 A that the father of Anytus had given his son an excellent education. Side by side with his political activity Anytus car-

ried on the trade of a tanner. Thus in the *Apology* he is represented as acting on behalf of the artisans of the community in the prosecution of Socrates, 23 E. Anytus trained his own son to the tanner's business, but Socrates, who had observed signs of intellectual ambition in the youth, advised the father against such a course. The young man, he averred, would not abide by a slavish pursuit; and the consequence would be his moral ruin — a prediction that was shortly fulfilled. Thus Xen. *Apol.* 29 ff.

ἀξίᾱ: *worth, value,* 36 B, D.

ἄξιος (ἄγειν) 3: *worth, worthy,* 23 A, B; properly of that which is equal to something else in *weight,* hence in value. τὰ πλείστου ἄξια, 'the most precious things,' 29 E. τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν, 'what do I deserve to suffer?' 36 B. ἄξιον, 'worth while,' *Crit.* 53 C.

ἀξιοῦν: *to deem worth* or *worthy,* 38 A; 'to think right,' 'see fit,' 'deign,' 'ask,' 19 D. ἀξιώσατε ('concede,' 'regard' the assumption 'as pertinent' to the case) διττούς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι 18 D. ἕκαστος ἠξίου ('claimed') σοφώτατος εἶναι 22 D. οὐκ ἀξιῶ μέν ἔγἀρ γωγε, 'I do not indeed expect it of you,' 34 D, 35 C.

ἀπάγειν: *to lead away.* In Attic law, 'to bring before the magistrate,' by the process termed ἀπαγωγή, in cases of summary jurisdiction, as when an offender was taken in the act. Hence, 'to arrest and commit to prison,' 32 B. See ἐνδεικνύναι.

ἀποθνῄσκειν: *to die, to be killed* or *put to death;* regularly employed as passive to ἀποκτείνειν 32 C. See HA. 820, G. 1241, B. 513. ἀποθανοῦμαι 29 C, 39 C, ἀπέθανον 32 D. These forms of fut. and aor. always in prose. See θνῄσκειν.

Ἀπολλόδωρος: *Apollodorus,* a follower of Socrates, present at the trial, 34 A. He is named as one of those who were ready to be sureties for Socrates if he would propose a fine as counterpenalty, 38 B. He was known as μανικός ('madman'), thus famous for his enthusiastic partiality for the master, *Symp.* 173 D. At the death scene in the prison by his lamentations he broke down every one present except Socrates himself, *Phaed.* 117 D.

ἀποφεύγειν: *to escape;* θάνατον 39 A. In Attic law, 'to be acquitted,' ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην 38 D, 36 A. δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, 'to try to gain acquittal by entreaty,' 35 C. See φεύγειν, διαφεύγειν.

Ἀριστοφάνης, -ους: *Aristophanes,* chief poet of the Old Comedy, and the only one of whom an entire play has been preserved, 19 C. Eleven comedies of Aristophanes are extant, including the *Clouds,* which is directed against the Sophists, and offers the familiar figure of Socrates as representative of the class. The *Clouds* failed to receive a prize when exhibited 423 B.C., and in its present form shows considerable alterations of the original text, made apparently with a view to a second representation. Aristophanes' attack upon Socrates in this play was not personal but *typical,* and the caricature of the sage is free from malice. Other comedies contain

jesting allusions to the philosopher, *Av.* 1555, *Ran.* 1491. In the *Symposium* of Plato Socrates and Aristophanes appear as friendly interlocutors at the banquet in the house of Agatho, the tragic poet. See especially the conclusion of the Dialogue.

Ἀρίστων, -ωνος: *Aristo*, an Athenian, the father of Adimantus and Plato, 34 A. See Πλάτων.

ἄρχειν: *to be first, to rule*, τινός, 28 E; *to begin* (for others to follow). Mid. ἄρχεσθαι, *to begin* (for oneself to continue), 31 D. ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι, 'to come to hold an office,' 32 B. Idiomatic phrase, ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον (τοῦτο), 'from earliest childhood,' 31 D. Cp. ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι διδάσκουσι *Prot.* 325 C.

ἀτεχνῶς (ἄτεχνος, τέχνη): *simply, wholly, quite, exactly*, 17 D, 18 C. Often in Plato to excuse or soften a figurative expression, especially in conjunction with ὥσπερ or τις (Cicero, quasi quidam). ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον 18 D. ἀτεχνῶς . . . ὕβρει τινί, 'in a sort of downright wantonness,' 26 E, cp. 30 E. ἀτεχνῶς ('literally') ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ 35 D: an oxymoron.

B

βουλεύειν: *to advise*. Mid. βουλεύεσθαι, *to deliberate, take counsel*, 32 C, *Crit.* 46 A, 52 E. At Athens, βουλεύειν, 'to be a member of the βουλή.' See βουλή. βουλεῦσαι = βουλευτὴς γενέσθαι 32 B.

βουλευτής: *councilor, senator*, a member of the Athenian βουλή, 25 A.

βουλή: *counsel, deliberation, Crit.* 46 A. ἡ βουλή, the Athenian "Senate" or "Council of the Five Hundred," ἡ βουλὴ οἱ πεντακόσιοι. Five hundred βουλευταί were chosen annually by lot, from citizens over thirty years of age, fifty from each of the ten tribes (φυλαί). Each section of fifty exercised executive functions during one tenth of the year, the order in which the tribes should succeed each other being determined by lot. The presiding committee of fifty for the time being were termed πρυτάνεις, *prytanes*, the tribe was said πρυτανεύειν (32 B), and the period of thirty-five or thirty-six days of its presidency was called a *prytany*, πρυτανεία. One duty of the Senate was to present measures for consideration to the Popular Assembly (ἐκκλησία), over which the prytanes presided. Each day the prytanes chose by lot from their number an ἐπιστάτης or chairman, and it was he who put questions to the vote (ἐπιψηφίζειν) in the Assembly. Socrates happened to be ἐπιστάτης on the day when the generals concerned in the Battle of the Arginussae Islands were to be tried by the Assembly. The law required each man to be tried separately; hence, when a motion was made to dispose of the generals collectively (by a single ballot), Socrates refused to put the question to vote, *Apol.* 32 B. The circumstance is recorded also by Xenophon: βουλεύσας γάρ ποτε καὶ τὸν βουλευτικὸν ὅρκον ὀμόσας, ἐν ᾧ ἦν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλεύσειν, ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους μιᾷ ψήφῳ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον

καὶ Ἐρασινίδην ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσαι, ὀργιζομένου τοῦ δήμου, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων, ἀλλὰ περὶ πλείονος ἐποιήσατο εὐορκεῖν ἢ χαρίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ φυλάξασθαι τοὺς ἀπειλοῦντας. *Mem.* 1. 1. 18. See ναυμαχία.

Γ

γίγνεσθαι: *to come into being, be born Crit.* 50 D, E, 'arise,' *Apol.* 23 A; *to become*, 'be made,' 23 D. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο (sc. ἡ πόλις), 'after it had come to be an oligarchy,' 32 C. μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι, 'to take sides with you,' 32 C. ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται ('comes') . . . φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἡ ὅταν γένηται κτλ. 31 D. τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, 'this event,' 36 A. τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν 'the number that has resulted,' 36 A. In periphrases γίγνεσθαι is regularly employed as a passive to mid. ποιεῖσθαι; as λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, 'to talk,' passive λόγοι γίγνονται. See ποιεῖν. κατάδηλοι γίγνονται, 'are exposed,' 23 D. αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι, 'the judgments that are pronounced' (αἱ ἂν γένωνται), *Crit.* 50 B. ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροι γίγνονται ('are rendered invalid,' 'set at naught') 50 B.

γιγνώσκειν: *to see with the mind, form judgments, recognise*, 19 D. ἔγνων, 'I came to see,' 'perceived,' 22 B. οὗτος . . . σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις . . . ἔγνωκεν ('has come to see,' 'knows') ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξιός ἐστι . . . πρὸς σοφίαν 23 B. γιγνώσκειν sometimes governs the genitive, following the analogy of αἰσθάνεσθαι, *to perceive*. γνώσεται . . . ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου κτλ. 27 A. See the synonyms, εἰδέναι, ἐπίστασθαι.

Γοργίας: *Gorgias*, of Leontini in Sicily, one of the most distinguished of the Sophists, 19 E. He lived to be more than a hundred years of age, surviving Socrates, whose death occurred 399 B.C. Gorgias made the art of "rhetoric" to include his whole doctrine, called himself ῥήτωρ, and achieved great fame as an orator. His mode of expression caused a profound sensation at Athens, whither he came 427 B.C. as an ambassador from his native city, and gave a strong impulse to the study of eloquence as an art, besides attracting many pupils and winning for him large sums of money in fees for instruction. Xenophon's friend, Proxenus the Boeotian, had put himself under the instruction of Gorgias, *Anab.* 2. 6. 16. The curiously ornate and artificial style of Gorgias is illustrated by the extant specimens of his oratory, an *Encomium of Helen* and a *Defense of Palamedes*. Plato's *Gorgias* deals in a caustic way with the subject of "rhetoric" (ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη) taken in a very wide sense.

γραφή: *a writing*. In Attic law, *a public action, criminal prosecution*, an ἀγὼν δημόσιος as distinguished from an ἀγὼν ἴδιος or δίκη. Thus *Euthyphr.* 2 A Socrates says of the indictment for impiety that has been filed against him, οὗτοιδ' ἡ Ἀθηναῖοί γε δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφήν. γραφὴν γράψασθαι, 'to file an indictment,' *Apol.* 19 B, 26 B, 27 E. Here the mid. voice means 'to get written,' 'have written' for oneself, thro' the γραμματεύς or official

scribe. Cp. 31 D. The term *ἀντιγραφή*, properly the writing put in by the defendant, is used of the writing filed by the accuser 27 C. Similarly, *ἀντωμοσία* comes to denote the bill and affidavit of either party. Cp. 19 B, 24 B. In public causes, if the accuser failed to receive at least one fifth of the votes of the judges, he had to pay a fine of one thousand drachmae, and forfeited the right of ever bringing a similar action again. See 36 B. For further details of procedure, see *δίκη*, *δικαστής*.

Δ

δαιμόνιος 3: *pertaining to a daemon* (*δαίμων*) or *daemones; δαιμόνια πράγματα* 27 C. When applied to persons, *δαιμόνιος* properly means 'under the influence of a supernatural power,' in good or bad sense, and is apt as a form of address to convey a mild reproach, as *ὦ δαιμόνιε* ('thou strange being') *Σώκρατες Crit.* 44 B. Cp. the words of Andromache to Hector: *δαιμόνιε, φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος*, Z 407. Cp. the similar *ὦ θαυμάσιε Crit.* 48 B, *Apol.* 26 D. In the *Symposium* Alcibiades points to Socrates as *τούτῳ τῷ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ* 219 C. As substantive, *δαιμόνιον, a divine being, a divinity;* thus, in the plural, in the indictment of Socrates, *Apol.* 24 B, 26 B. In 27 C *δαιμόνια* is at first purely adjectival with *πράγματα*, then approaches a substantive meaning in allusion to the terms of the indictment. *τὸ δαιμόνιον*, in especial sense, 'the divine sign' of Socrates, frequently mentioned by both Xenophon and Plato, 40 A. In Plato more usual are the fuller expressions *τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον* 40 B, *τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον* 40 C. In 31 D the sign is described as 'a sort of voice,' which had been wont to come to Socrates ever since he could remember, never to impel him but always to deter him from something he was going to do: *ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἡ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε.* Thus it had opposed his engaging in public life (31 D), and from its silence on the occasion of his trial he infers that the event would be for the best (40 A–C). But while, according to Plato, the function of Socrates' *δαιμόνιον* was a negative one, Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as a disapproving force, *φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἃ τε δέοι καὶ ἃ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν Mem.* 4. 8. 1. Neither Plato nor Xenophon explains the *δαιμόνιον* as a divine *being*, but only as an agency; while the accusers of Socrates wrested the sign into the sense of a being, and charged him accordingly with introducing 'new deities' into the state. See Xen. *Mem.* 1. 1. 2: *διετεθρύλητο ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον αὐτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν.* This representation is termed by Plato a *caricature, ὃ δὴ ἐντῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο* 31 D. Since the mission of Socrates, who refused to apply the term 'knowledge' to anything but *reasoned* truth, was to en-

large the sphere of *consciousness* in his fellow-men, those instinctive promptings, which belong to the Unconscious and which he could not rationally explain, were naturally and very properly referred by him to divine agency. But where other men sought help externally in the traditional art of divination (*μαντική*), Socrates found a guide within himself. Cp. *ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου* 40 A. Plato's restriction of the sign to a negative function probably means that when the divine influence coincided with the positive will and conscious resolve of the sage its voice would be superfluous and hardly noticeable. See Riddell, *The Apology of Plato*, Appendix A.

δαίμων, -ονος, ὁ, ἡ: *a daemon*, a divine being, properly a god viewed in his relation to man. The *daemones* were popularly believed to be either gods or the offspring of gods, 27 D. The divine sign (*τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*) of Socrates is called *τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον* 40 B. Cp. *θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον* 31 D.

δέ: a postpositive particle of contrast, tho' its adversative force is often very slight. See *μέν*. There is no equivalent word in English for *δέ* ('on the other hand'); it must often be translated 'but,' 'and,' or 'while.' The fact that *δέ* is not the same as 'and' or 'but,' since it only *offsets* things, renders its occasional use "in apodosis" less paradoxical than the learner is at first prone to regard it. See *Crit.* 51 A, *ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι . . . καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς . . . ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι*. Here, instead of the clauses being coördinate, as is usual when *δέ* occurs, a condition and its conclusion are in a manner contrasted. For rhetorical repetition of *δέ*, see notes on *Apol.* 28 E, 32 D.

δεινός (*δέος, δέδια*) 3: *fearful, dreadful, shocking*, 28 D, 29 A. *κατήγοροι . . . οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς* ('formidable') 18 B, C. *οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν* ('there's no fear') *μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ* 28 B. In Attic, colloquially weakened to denote a high degree of skill in anything, with accusative of specification or limiting infinitive. Thus, *δεινὸς λέγειν*, 'a clever speaker,' 17 B (three times, explained by *ῥήτωρ*). The substantive *δεινότης* thus came to mean 'skill' or 'power,' or especially 'eloquence.'

Δελφοί, Δελφῶν, οἱ: *Delphi*, a town in Phocis, on the south slope of Mt. Parnassus, seat of the most celebrated of all the oracles of Apollo, 20 E, 21 A. The oracle of Delphi was consulted as to matters both of a public and a private nature. See the account of Xenophon's inquiry of Apollo regarding his intended expedition in Asia Minor, *Anab.* 3. 1. 5. The responses of the god were delivered thro' the medium of a priestess (*προφῆτις*), the Pythia or Pythoness, while seated upon a tripod within the temple over a chasm in the earth and subjected to the influence of an exhalation therefrom. The regular expression for an oracular response by the Pythia was *ἀναιρεῖν, ἀνελεῖν* (*Apol.* 21 A, Xen. *Anab.* 3. 1. 7). Her utterances were taken down by the attending priest (*προφήτης*) and

submitted to the inquirer, mostly in metrical form. The oracle reputed to have been given to Chaerephon has been preserved by Diogenes Laertius as one iambic trimeter, *ἀνδρῶν ἁπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος*; by Suidas (s.v. *σοφός*) as an iambic distich, *σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος Εὐριπίδης, | ἀνδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος*. Upon the walls of the temple of Delphi were inscribed brief maxims attributed to the Seven Sages of Greece. The most famous of these was *γνῶθι σεαυτόν, know thyself*, a sentiment precisely in accord with the spirit of the Socratic philosophy.

δέχεσθαι: *to receive, accept.* Followed by *ἤ* (with or without *μᾶλλον*), 'to prefer,' 22 E. Similarly, with a phrase denoting the *price* or *terms* of acceptance, *Ὀρφεῖ συγγενέσθαι . . . ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτο* ('on condition of how large a sum would one accept'), *i.e.* how much would one *give* to have a meeting with Orpheus? 41 A. Again, B. Thus, where our idiom regards the paying of the price, the Greek regards the *receiving* of that for which the price is paid.

Δήλιον: *Delium*, a temple and precinct of Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra in Boeotia, on the coast of the Euboean strait, 28 E. Properly *the* Delium, *τὸ Δήλιον*, Thuc. 4. 89. Hence, of the battle, *ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ*, not *ἐν*, there being no town here. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War, 424 B.C., the place was seized and fortified by a large force from Athens under Hippocrates. On their return march the Athenians were attacked and disastrously defeated by an army of Thebans and other Boeotians who had assembled at Tanagra. Socrates served as a hoplite at the Battle of Delium, and his courageous and even formidable demeanor in the retreat was celebrated by his friends Laches and Alcibiades, who were present. Cp. *Lach.* 181 B, *Symp.* 221.

Δῆλος, ἡ: *Delos*, one of the Cyclades Islands, sacred as the birth-place of Apollo and Artemis, *Crit.* 43 C. Delos was the center of an amphictyony of the Ionians, and a great festival was celebrated there every fifth year. There was also a lesser festival celebrated every year, when the Athenians sent to the island the sacred vessel mentioned by Plato in connection with the death of Socrates. The Delian galley was believed to be the same as that wherein Theseus had once conveyed the seven youths and seven maidens to Crete to be offered up to the Minotaur, when by the aid of Ariadne he threaded the mazes of the labyrinth, slew the monster, and brought back the victims safe and sound. During its absence on the holy mission (*θεωρία*) to Delos no public execution could take place at Athens. It thus happened that the execution of Socrates came to be deferred during the whole time occupied by the voyage of the sacred vessel to and from Delos. *ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης* (*i.e.* on the day before the trial of Socrates) *ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν . . . τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε*

εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δὶς ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους ᾤχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὔξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἣν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο . . . διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ θανάτου *Phaed.* 58.

Δημόδοκος: *Demodocus*, an Athenian, the father of Paralus and Theages, 33 E.

διαφεύγειν: *to flee through* or *between*, *escape* by contrivance, *elude*, 29 C. Cp. 39 A, ἀποφεύξεται, 'get *off*'; ἐκφύγοι, ἐκφυγεῖν, 'come *out* alive'; while διαφεύγειν implies effort and *contrivance* (cp. μηχαναί in the same sentence). μὴ . . . τοῦτ' . . . κακίᾳ τινὶ . . . τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκῇ ('may seem thro' some cowardice on our part to have *baffled* us completely') *Crit.* 45 E. Cp. τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς . . . ἰατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα ('why most ailments baffle the skill of the Greek physicians') *Charm.* 156 E. Here again there is a virtual personification of the subject, *νοσήματα*.

δίκαιος 3: *righteous, just*, 18 A. τὸ δίκαιον, 'the right,' 'right,' 32 A, C. τὰ δίκαια, 'the matters of right' (pertaining to the case), 'justice,' 35 C. δίκαια πεπονθώς, 'fairly treated,' 'recompensed,' 41 E. With an infinitive the personal construction of δίκαιος is usually preferred to the impersonal in Attic. δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, 'it is fair for me to make a defense,' 18 A, *Crit.* 45 A. See HA. 944 a, G. 1527, B. 634.

δικάζειν: *to be a* δικαστής or *juror, to judge*, 35 C, 41 A; 'to decide a case at law,' 'render judgments,' δίκας δικάζειν, *Crit.* 50 C, 51 E, 53 C. Passive 50 B. Mid. δικάζεσθαι, 'to be at law,' 'go to law'; said of the parties to a suit.

δικαστήριον: *a court of justice, dicastery*; indicating both the aggregate judges (δικασταί) who sat in court and the place where they held their sittings, 17 D, 29 A. Of the latter there were at one time ten in Athens, most of them probably situated near the ἀγορά. See δικαστής.

δικαστής: *a judge, juror, dicast*, 18 A, 35 C, 40 A, 41 A, C. The largest body of judges or jurors at Athens was called the ἡλιαία, its members were ἡλιασταί. Socrates was tried before a Heliastic court. Six thousand dicasts (heliasts) were chosen by lot every year from those who had made application for the office. To be eligible the juror must be a free citizen, in the enjoyment of his full franchise, and not less than thirty years of age. The 6000 were divided into sections of 500 each, probably ten, with 1000 reserves. Each section was designated by a letter of the alphabet, and a small tablet was delivered to each dicast, inscribed with his name, his father's name, that of his Deme, and the letter of his section. Similarly, upon entering a

particular court to which he was appointed, the dicast received a staff (*βακτηρία* or *ῥάβδος*), and upon leaving he was paid his fee of three obols (*τριώβολον*). Before proceeding to the exercise of his functions the dicast was obliged to swear the official oath (*Apol.* 35 C). It ran about as follows: *ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῆς πεντακοσίων, περὶ δ' ὧν ἂν νόμοι μὴ ὦσι, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ καὶ οὔτε χάριτος ἕνεκ' οὔτ' ἔχθρας. καὶ ψηφιοῦμαι περὶ αὐτῶν* ('precisely') *ὧν ἂν ἡ δίωξις ᾖ καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τῶν τε κατηγορούντων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν. ὄμνυμι νὴ τὸν Δία, νὴ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, νὴ τὴν Δήμητρα, καὶ εἴη μέν μοι εὐορκοῦντι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, ἐπιορκοῦντι δ' ἐξώλεια αὐτῷ τε καὶ γένει.* The oath being taken, the courts in which they were to sit were assigned by lot to the several sections every time that it was necessary to impanel a number of dicasts. According to the nature and importance of the case to be tried one or more sections of 500, or fractions of sections, made up the number of any particular dicastery. The voting was by ballot, with shells, either real or artificial. There were two urns, or boxes, one for condemnation, the other for acquittal; and the juror dropped his ballot (*ψῆφος*) into the one or the other of them, in some way so as to secure secrecy of voting. A tie vote was accounted as acquittal. At the trial of Socrates the dicastery consisted apparently of 500. Had only 30 votes changed sides, he would have been acquitted (*Apol.* 36 A). That is to say, 250 votes being needed for acquittal, there must have been 280 for guilty and 220 for not guilty on the first ballot. In an Athenian dicastery unwelcome remarks were apt to be received by the judges with many noisy demonstrations of disapproval, pounding with their staves and vociferation, *θόρυβος καὶ βοή, θορυβεῖν.* Hence numerous passages in the Attic Orators where such interruptions are deprecated by the speaker. Plato has availed himself of this habit to heighten the lifelike effect of many scenes in the *Apology*. Cp. 17 D, 20 E, 21 A, 30 C.

δίκη: *right, justice;* in law, *a suit, case, trial, judgment, Crit.* 45 E, 50 B; *penalty, Apol.* 39 B. The suits which came before the Athenian jurors were private or public, according as the offense charged was against an individual or against the state. A private suit was termed *δίκη ἰδία* or simply *δίκη*; a public suit was *δίκη δημοσία* or, usually, *γραφή*. See *γραφή*. Proceedings were begun by a summons to the defendant to appear before the proper magistrate and answer the charges preferred against him. Thus Socrates, at the beginning of the *Euthyphro* 2 A, is encountered at the porch of the *ἄρχων βασιλεύς*, where he has come to answer to the charge of impiety entered by Meletus. There a preliminary examination was held, beginning with the affidavit of the plaintiff or accuser (*προωμοσία*), answered by that of the defendant (*ἀντωμοσία, ἀντιγραφή*). But the latter terms were sometimes applied also to the writing of the accuser (*Apol.* 19 B, 27 C).

These documents were then sealed and finally produced and opened at the trial. The president of the court was the magistrate to whose province the subject of the charge belonged, as for example at the trial of Socrates the King Archon, the second of the nine archons. The parties pleaded their own cases before the judges, the speech of the accuser being followed by that of the defendant. The time allowed to each speaker was measured by the flow of water from the κλεψύδρα or water clock. Either party during the course of his speech had the right to put questions to the other party (ἐρώτησις), and these questions the person interrogated was obliged by law to answer. See Lysias 12. 25. Plato avails himself of this custom in the *Apology*, 24 C–27 E, with telling effect, since he is thus enabled to throw the defense into the form of dialectic, the regular Socratic method of refutation. If one of the parties to a suit failed to appear, the case was called δίκη ἐρήμη (ἐρήμην καταγοροῦντες, sc. δίκην, 18 C) and went against the absent party by default. For the method of voting by the jury, see δικαστής. For expressions denoting conviction, acquittal, etc., see αἱρεῖν, ὀφλισκάνειν, φεύγειν. For some offenses the penalty was fixed by law, and the verdict of guilty carried with it the sentence; for others the penalty had to be determined at the trial, after an unfavorable verdict had been announced. Trials of the latter sort were called ἀγῶνες τιμητοί ('to be assessed'); the former were ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι. See τιμᾶν. In an ἀγὼν τιμητός (such was the γραφὴ ἀσεβείας preferred against Socrates) the accuser named a penalty (τίμημα, *valuation*) which he called upon the court to inflict as suited to the gravity of the offense. Cp. τιμᾶταί μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου 36 B. The convicted party then named a counter-penalty (ἀντίτιμημα) of milder character, and without discussion or modification of the two penalties proposed the court decided by a majority vote which one of them should be inflicted.

δοκεῖν: *to seem*, to the mind; verb of opinion, imagination, belief. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι, 36 D. ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος . . . δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφός . . . εἶναι δ' οὔ, 'I came to believe that he seemed to be wise, but was not,' 21 C. καί μοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔδοξε, 'I came to exactly the same opinion as before,' 21 D. ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν, 'as subsequently you all came to think,' 32 B. ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι 34 C. Here we say 'as *it* might seem.' Cp. ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ (videor mihi) 36 A. But, except usually with ὡς or ὥσπερ, or when it means 'to seem *best*,' the verb must not be used impersonally, *i.e.* without a substantive or a pronoun as its subject. Sometimes δοκῶ means *I think*, but no example of this usage is afforded by the *Apology* or *Crito*. ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει, ''tis but few either hold or will hold these views,' *Crit.* 49 D. οἷς οὕτω δέδοκται, 'they who have this fixed resolve,' *ib.* σοὶ δ' εἴ πῃ ἄλλῃ δέδοκται, 'if *your* mind is made up some other

way,' 49 E. δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι, 'it is at any rate a settled opinion' (people have made up their minds) *Apol.* 35 A. Idiomatic phrase, δοκεῖν μοι, 'as I believe,' *Crit.* 43 B. Absolute Infinitive. See HA. 956, G. 1534, B. 642, 1, Gl. 569. The nearest synonym of δοκεῖν is οἴεσθαι. Cp. δοκεῖν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι σοφός, then οἴοιτο εἶναι σοφός *Apol.* 21 C. But δοκεῖν by its construction is seen to indicate that the thought comes to the mind thro' an impulse *from without.* Cp. also ἡγεῖσθαι (ἡγήσονται, after δόξης, *Crit.* 44 C), and νομίζειν. See δόξα.

δόξα (δοκεῖν): *an opinion, view, belief,* ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δόξα *Crit.* 44 C, 46 C, D; also the opinion others hold of one, *fame, name, reputation, Apol.* 34 E, 35 B, *Crit.* 53 B. The relation of δόξα to δοκεῖν is clearly brought to view in the passages above cited. *Crit.* 44 B–D affords illustration of both the subjective and the objective meaning of the substantive: πολλοῖς δόξω . . . ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ('reputation') ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; . . . ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν . . . οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης ('opinion') μέλει;

Ε

εἰδέναι (ϝιδ-, ἰδεῖν): *to know;* οἶδα, ᾔδη 22 D, εἴσομαι. ὅ τι ὑμεῖς πεπόνθατε, οὐκ οἶδα 17 A. ἃ μὴ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι, 21 D. ἄνθρωπος ὅστις . . . τοῦτο οἶδεν, τοὺς νόμους, 24 E. When a *person* is the object of εἰδέναι the verb does not mean merely to know who he is (γιγνώσκειν), but significantly *to know him,* have a knowledge of him (alive or dead), know 'all about him' as we say. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που (tho' Chaerephon was then no longer living) 20 E. Cp. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν 21 A. πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, . . . ἀμελῆσαι, *Crit.* 44 B. Since εἰδέναι properly applies to a knowledge of *facts* (first-hand knowledge) it became naturally the word for Socrates to employ in his philosophical way to denote knowledge of (reasoned) *truth.* See σοφία, ἐπιστήμη, also ἔλεγχος. To those persons who have no claim to be called σοφοί in the Socratic sense, τὸ εἰδέναι τι is denied. οὗτος μὲν οἴεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς 21 D. ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι 21 E. πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν ὀλομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν, 23 C. προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι τι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν, 23 D. The works of poets and other inspired persons do not proceed from (conscious, reasoned) *knowledge.* καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι, 21 C. The skill of artisans (handicraftsmen, χειροτέχναι) seemed to Socrates a little nearer to wisdom than that of statesmen and artists, because they really knew *how* they made things. Yet even their knowledge was not τὸ εἰδέναι τι, for the reason given 22 D. See ἐπίστασθαι.

εἰσάγειν: *to lead into.* In law, 'to bring into court,' 'prosecute.' ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις εἰς τουτουσὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς 24 D. περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις 25 C, 25 D,

26 A. *τότ' ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον* 29 A. See *εἰσελθεῖν*.

εἰσελθεῖν: *to come into*. Equivalent to a passive of *εἰσαγαγεῖν*, 'to prosecute,' 29 C. See *εἰσάγειν*. Of the trial itself, *ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, Crit.* 45 E. Cp. *εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι* (*εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς*, 'into the presence of the judges,' 'into their assemblage,' 'into court') *Apol.* 17 C.

ἐκκλησία (*καλεῖν*): the general *assembly* of the citizens of Athens, the *ecclesia*, 25 A. In it the affairs of the commonwealth were discussed and voted upon. In certain cases it exercised judicial functions, especially where serious offenses were concerned which required immediate condemnation and were not provided for specifically by law. Such was the trial of the generals alluded to *Apol.* 32 B. See *ναυμαχία*. Regular meetings of the ecclesia were held four times in each prytany (see *βουλή*), the prytanes presided over them, and any measure presented for discussion must first have been prepared and considered by the senate. Extraordinary meetings were also called when occasion required. The usual place of assembling was the Pnyx, a slope connected with Mt. Lycabettus, to the west of the Areopagus. Cp. *ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον* 31 C. The right of attending and voting was enjoyed by all legitimate male citizens who were of the proper age, probably twenty years. Thus *Apol.* 25 A *οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί*, is meant merely to designate typically a more numerous class of persons than was implied in *οἱ βουλευταί* previously suggested. In the allusion 32 B *ὑμεῖς* applies to the judges of Socrates as representatives of the whole body of Athenians who met in the Pnyx.

Ἕκτωρ, -ορος: *Hector*, son of king Priam and Hecuba, and foremost champion of the Trojans in the Trojan War, 28 C. See *Πάτροκλος*.

ἐλέγχειν: *to prove* by questioning, *test, confute*, 18 D, 21 C, 39 D. Cp. *ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω* 29 E. See *ἔλεγχος*. A strengthened form of the verb is the compound *ἐξελέγχειν*, 17 B, 23 A.

ἔλεγχος: *a proof* by questioning, *test*. *Apol.* 39 C *ἔλεγχον διδόναι τοῦ βίου*, viz. by submitting to cross-questioning as the touchstone of knowledge. *ἐλέγχειν* and *ἔλεγχος* are so strictly characteristic of the method of the Platonic Socrates that *elenchus* has been adopted as an English word by some writers. Speaking of the way in which Plato tests the efficacy of any expository process, Grote says, *Plato* vol. I, c. 6: "the standard which he applies is, that the learner shall be rendered able both to apply to others, and himself to endure from others, a Socratic Elenchus or cross-examination as to the logical difficulties involved in all the steps and helps to learning. Unless he can put to others and follow up the detective questions — unless he can also answer them, when put to himself, pertinently and consistently, so as to avoid being brought to confusion or contradiction — Plato

will not allow that he has attained true knowledge."

ἐνδεικνύναι: *to point out, show,* in or in regard to any matter. Mid. *ἐνδείκνυσθαι, to show, demonstrate, prove* one's contention, 23 B, 29 D. *τότε . . . αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει . . . οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν* 32 D. As Attic law term, act. *ἐνδεικνύναι,* 'to report' one before the magistrate, 'inform against,' in cases of summary jurisdiction, by the process termed *ἔνδειξις,* 32 B. In the passage cited *ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν* is merely a forcible expression for summary procedure in general, not implying that both *endeixis* and *apagoge* would be technically applicable to the case in hand. See *ἀπάγειν.*

ἕνδεκα: *eleven.* *οἱ ἕνδεκα, the Eleven,* a board of magistrates at Athens, chosen annually, one from each of the ten tribes, with a clerk (*γραμματεύς*) who formed one of their number, *Apol.* 37 C. The Eleven had the care and management of the public prisons and carried into effect the death sentences pronounced by the courts of law and the public assemblies.

ἐξετάζειν: *to inquire into, scrutinize, examine* thoroughly, 23 C, 28 E. The word is characteristic of the Socratic method, cp. *ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω* 29 E. *χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὖσι δ' οὔ,* 33 C. The famous saying *ὁ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ* 38 A means that life is a failure when a man fails to apply to his mind that scrutiny which alone enables him to know himself and to govern himself by principles consciously reasoned out.

ἑταῖρειν: *to understand* as an expert, *to be specially versed* in something, *περί τινος,* 19 C. Cp. *τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἑταίροντι Crit.* 47 B. *ὁ ἑταῖρων . . . ὁ εἷς* 48 A. The simple verb *αἴειν* is poetic and means *to perceive,* especially *to hear.* *ἑταῖρειν* is of frequent occurrence in Plato, the imperfect stem only.

Ἐπιγένης, -ους: *Epigenes,* a follower of Socrates, son of Antiphon of Cephisia, 33 E. Epigenes appears in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon 3. 12. 1; and in the *Phaedo* of Plato 59 B he is named among those present at the death of Socrates in the prison.

ἐπιεικής, -ές (*εἰκός*): *fair, reasonable.* Neut. plur., *ἐπιεικῆ λέγειν,* 34 D. As applied to persons *ἐπιεικής* is a refined synonym of *ἀγαθός, ἐπιείκεια* ("sweet reasonableness") a characteristic of one who deserves the appellation *καλὸς κἀγαθός.* The *ἐπιεικὴς ἀνήρ* can see both sides of a question and has sufficient imagination to put himself when need be in another man's place. The *ἐπιεικέστατοι* are opposed to the *πολλοί Crit.* 44 C, *τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας* to *τοὺς μοχθηρούς* Arist. *Poet.* 13. *ἠγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε . . . σῴζεσθαι* ('in truth *too good* a man to survive') *Apol.* 36 B. *ἐπιεικέστεροι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν,* 'better men as to wisdom,' 22 A. The adv. *ἐπιεικῶς* betrays the familiar use of the word.

ἐπιεικῶς: *fairly, tolerably.* *ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι,* 'pretty long,' *Crit.* 43 A.

ἐπίστασθαι (στα-): *to understand,*

20 C, E, 22 D; with inf., *to know how* to do something. Of the class of *artisans* (χειροτέχναι), to whom Socrates concedes a certain sort of wisdom, the verb ἐπίστασθαι is used with strict appropriateness, 22 D. See εἰδέναι and ἐπιστήμη.

ἐπιστήμη: *knowledge*, properly of the sort answering to ἐπίστασθαι as denoting *skill*, 19 C. Cp. the adj. ἐπιστήμων 20 B. But Plato uses ἐπιστήμη also to denote 'knowledge' in a sense answering to εἰδέναι, just as σοφία answers to εἰδέναι in the sense of 'wisdom.' In the *Theaetetus*, 201, the suggestion that ἐπιστήμη is δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου, "true opinion coupled with rational explanation," is set aside as not affording an adequate definition.

ἐρέσθαι: *to ask, inquire*; ἐρήσομαι. *Apol.* 21 A, 29 E, *Crit.* 50 A. Cp. the compound ἀνερέσθαι 20 A. The want of an imperfect stem is supplied by ἐρωτᾶν.

ἐρωτᾶν: *to ask questions, interrogate*, 23 D, 24 D, 33 B. The verb is regular, but the fut. and aor. act. occur less frequently than ἐρήσομαι, ἠρόμην.

Εὔηνος: *Evēnus*, a sophist, a native of the isle of Paros, 20 B. Evenus was both rhetor and poet. Plato mentions him also *Phaed.* 60 D, *Phaedr.* 267 A; there, as in the *Apology*, in a tone of irony and disparagement.

Z

Ζεύς (διϝεύς), **Διός**: *Zeus*, the supreme god in the Greek religion; Roman Diespiter, Iupiter. The name occurs in the *Apology* and the *Crito* only in the phrases μὰ (τὸν) Δία (negative) *Apol.* 17 B, 26 D, E, *Crit.* 43 B; νὴ Δία (affirmative), *Apol.* 35 D, 39 C, *Crit.* 50 C; πρὸς Διός, 'in Heaven's name,' *Apol.* 25 C, 26 E. Originally employed in the taking of an oath, μὰ Δία and νὴ Δία became colloquially weakened to mere formulas of asseveration. Thoughtful minds tended to avoid too frequent and familiar use of these phrases. See the note on νὴ τὸν κύνα 21 E.

H

ἡγεῖσθαι (ἄγειν): *to be leader, lead the way*, τινός; *to hold* an opinion (Lat. dūcere) 35 C, 36 B, *Crit.* 44 C, 47 E. τοὺς δαίμονας θεοὺς ἡγούμεθα ('deem them gods') *Apol.* 27 D. But θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι, 'to believe in gods,' *ib.* In this sense νομίζειν is usual, cp. 27 C. See the synonyms νομίζειν, δοκεῖν, οἴεσθαι.

Ἠλεῖος (Ἦλις) 3: of *Elis*, 19 E. Elis was in the northwest angle of the Peloponnese. The most important place in the country was Olympia, in the valley of the Alphēus, the scene of the great national festival.

ἦν: ἦν δ' ἐγώ, *said I*, 20 A, B; ἦ δ' ὅς, *said he*, 20 B. These forms of ἦμί (poetic) occur in prose (often in Plato's dialogues) only in the phrases here quoted.

Ἥρᾱ: *Hera*, the goddess, consort of Zeus; Roman Iuno. εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, 'well said, by Hera!' 24 E. The tone of the exclamation is strongly ironical.

Ἡσίοδος: *Hesiod*, the epic and didactic poet, 41 A. The names of

Homer and Hesiod are often coupled, as in the passage cited, as representatives of the old epos. Except, however, in the metrical form and the dialect employed, there is little or no resemblance between the Iliad and Odyssey and the poems of later date ascribed to Hesiod. Hesiod's *Works and Days* (Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι) is a sort of Old Farmer's Almanac in verse, the most ancient Greek example of a didactic poem. The name of Hesiod stands for a school of minstrelsy developed at the foot of Mt. Helicon in Boeotia. The poet himself is believed to have lived in the eighth century B.C., a native of the Boeotian town of Ascra. Hence the line of Virgil, who took the *Works and Days* as model for his Georgics, Ascraeumque cano Romana per oppida carmen *Georg.* 2. 176.

ἡσυχίᾱ: *quiet.* ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, 'to keep quiet,' 'mind one's business,' 36 B, 37 E, *Crit.* 48 D, 51 B. See πολυπραγμονεῖν.

Θ

Θεάγης, -ους: *Theāges*, an Athenian, son of Demodocus and brother of Paralus, 33 E. One of the Platonic dialogues bears his name. From the *Republic*, 496 B, we learn that Theages would have entered political life, but ill health detained him in the service of philosophy.

Θεόδοτος: *Theodotus*, an Athenian, son of Theozotides and brother of Nicostratus. He had been a follower of Socrates, but is mentioned as deceased at the time of the trial, 33 E.

Θεοζοτίδης: *Theozotides*, an Athenian, the father of Theodotus and Nicostratus, 33 E.

Θέτις, -ιδος: *Thetis*, a Nereid who became the wife of Peleus and the mother of Achilles, 28 C. See especially Catullus 64, Epithalamium of Peleus and Thetis. Thetis is an important figure in several of the most dramatic situations of the Iliad of Homer. She obtains for her son the promise from Zeus to turn the tide of war against the Greeks until Agamemnon shall be humbled, A 414, 495. Again, when Achilles is bent upon going forth to slay Hector, to avenge the death of his friend Patroclus, his mother, while not disapproving of her son's resolve, reminds him of the alternatives of his destiny, either to live long and ingloriously, or to meet an early death and achieve imperishable renown, Σ 95. Cp. I 410: μήτηρ γάρ τέ με φησι, θεὰ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα, | διχθαδίας κῆρας φέρεμεν θανάτοιο τέλοσδε. | εἰ μέν κ' αὖθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι, | ὤλετο μέν μοι νόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται· | εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδ' ἵκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν, | ὤλετο μὲν κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν | ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ' ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.

Θετταλίᾱ: *Thessaly*, a district of Northern Greece, *Crit.* 45 C, 53 D, E, 54 A. Thessaly is surrounded by well-defined mountain chains, Pindus on the west, Othrys on the south, Ossa and Pelion on the east, and the Cambunian mountains on the north. At the northeast angle stands Mt. Olympus, and between Olympus and Ossa

the river Penëus carries out the gathered waters of this great basin thro' the romantic Vale of Tempe. Thessaly figures conspicuously in the legendary history of Hellas. The district of Phthiotis in the south was the native land of Achilles, and from it the Argonauts had set out on their adventurous voyage. The plains of Thessaly were wide and suited to horse-breeding. The soil was rich, and in historical times was possessed by a few wealthy families, such as the Aleuadae of Larissa and the Scopadae of Crannon, and tilled by a serf population. The Aleuadae displayed the utmost zeal in forwarding the plans of Xerxes when that monarch invaded Greece, *Herod.* 7. 6. Political development under these circumstances was backward, cp. *Crit.* 53 B. The name of the Thessalians became proverbial for faithlessness, ἀεὶ τὰ Θεττα-λῶν ἄπιστα, cp. *Dem.* 1. 22. A typical Thessalian, apparently, was Menon the general, whose character is sketched by Xenophon, *Anab.* 2. 6. 21.

Θηβαῖος (Θῆβαι): *of Thebes, a Theban, Crit.* 45 B. Thebes, the capital city of Boeotia, lay halfway between the eastern and the western sea, about thirty-five miles northwest of Athens.

θνῄσκειν: *to be dying, to die;* τεθνάναι *to be dead,* 30 C, 38 E, 40 C, E, 41 A, *Crit.* 43 C, τέθνηκεν *Apol.* 41 B. In prose the *simple* verb occurs only in the imperfect and the perfect stem, the prosaic future and aorist being always ἀποθανοῦμαι, ἀπέθανον. See ἀποθνῄσκειν.

θόλος, ἡ: a round building with dome-like roof. At Athens, ἡ θόλος, *the Rotunda,* adjoining the βουλευτήριον or senate-house, in the ἀγορά. The Prytanes (see βουλή) took their common meals and offered their sacrifices in the Rotunda, and it was similarly used by the Thirty Tyrants, *Apol.* 32 C, D.

I

ἵνα: *where;* with clauses of finality, *that, in order that.* The subjunctive is the regular mode to denote finality of purpose, but a past tense of the indicative may be used with ἵνα, to show that the purpose is unattained or unattainable. See HA. 884, G. 1371, B. 590, N. 4, Gl. 642 C. Here there is usually assimilation of mode, to a past wish or unreal condition. εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον οἵοί τ' εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἵοί τ' ἦσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, *Crit.* 44 D. An elliptical idiomatic phrase is the interrogative ἵνα τί (in full, ἵνα τί γένηται) *to what end?* ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις *Apol.* 26 C.

Ἱππίας: *Hippias,* of Elis, a sophist, 19 E. He was distinguished for the wide range of his accomplishments, being a poet, a musician, an expositor of the poets, able to teach astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic, and giving lectures on subjects moral and political. Xenophon *Mem.* 4. 4. 5 ff. reports a conversation between Hippias and Socrates, in which the sophist mocks the sage for talking eternally about the same things, averring that he himself always endeavors to say something new. Two of the

Platonic dialogues bear his name, the *Hippias Major* and the *Hippias Minor*. He figures also in the *Protagoras*.

Ἱππόνικος: *Hipponīcus*, the father of *Callias*, 20 A. See **Καλλίας**.

K

Καλλίᾱς: *Callias*, the son of Hipponīcus, an Athenian, 20 A. He came of an old and distinguished family, and his father, Hipponicus, was reputed to be the richest Greek of his day. The large fortune which Callias inherited he squandered by extravagant habits, and died poor. In the *Protagoras* of Plato we are introduced to the sophists Protagoras, Hippias of Elis, and Prodicus of Ceos in the house of Callias, where they are stopping as guests. The scene of Xenophon's *Symposium* is also laid at the house of Callias. He appears several times in political history.

καλός 3: *beautiful*, 'fine,' 19 E, ironically 37 D. The neuter often in moral sense, 'honorable,' 34 E; thus opposed to **αἰσχρόν**, *ugly*, 'base,' cp. 35 A. Lat. *pulchrum* and *turpe*. **καλὸς κἀγαθός**, or **καλός τε κἀγαθός**, 'fair and good,' 25 A. A highly complimentary phrase at Athens, to express the combination of all noble and admirable qualities in a man. See Xenophon's highly instructive and entertaining account of the Athenian Ischomachus who bore this title, *Oec.* 6. 12 ff. The phrase is applicable to things as well as persons, 21 D. Of animals, 20 B. See **ἐπιεικής**.

καταλθεῖν: *to come down*. In a political sense, of an exile, 'to return,' 21 A. The imperfect is **κατιέναι**. The preposition has the same force in **κατάγειν**, 'to restore' an exile to his home.

Κέβης, Κέβητος: *Cebes*, a Theban, a friend and companion of Socrates, *Crit.* 45 B. Cebes and Simias were young men devoted to philosophy who at Thebes had come under the influence of Philolāus, an eminent Pythagorean. A cardinal doctrine of the Pythagorean sect was the metempsychosis or transmigration of souls; and their leaning to this belief rendered Cebes and Simias appropriate interlocutors with Socrates in the *Phaedo* of Plato, where the subject of the conversation is the immortality of the soul.

Κεῖος (**Κέως**): *of Ceos*, the nearest of the Cyclades Islands to Attica, between the promontory of Sunium and the isle of Cythnus, 19 E. Prodicus the sophist and Simonides the poet were natives of Iūlis in Ceos. The name of *Cean* was proverbial for temperance and integrity, cp. Plato *Prot.* 341 E.

Κηφῑσιᾱ́θεν: a native of *Cephīsia*, an Attic deme of the tribe Erechthēis, northeast of Athens, 33 E.

κινδῡνεύειν (**κίνδῡνος**): *to run risks, to be in danger*, 25 E, 28 B, D, E, *Crit.* 45 A. But the verb also has a special use in Plato, to soften confident abruptness of speech, conveying a plain fact with Attic reserve, as it were not to seem too sure about it. **τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός**, 'in truth I do stand some chance of being wise in *this* wisdom,' 20 D. **κινδυνεύει ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι**,

'tis likely that neither of us possesses any knowledge beautiful and good,' 21 D. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, 'the real probability, however, is that *God* is wise,' 23 A. κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με, 'you seem to have acted quite opportunely in not waking me,' *Crit.* 44 A.

Κλαζομένιος 3: *of Clazomenae*, an Ionian city of Asia Minor, on the Gulf of Smyrna, noted as the birthplace of the philosopher Anaxagoras, 26 D.

κορυβαντιᾶν (Κορύβᾱς): *to be possessed by Corybantic frenzy*, *Crit.* 54 D. οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται *Ion* 534 A, cp. *Symp.* 215 E. The Corybantes were priests of Rhea Cybele, the Great Mother or Mountain Mother (*μήτηρ ὀρεία*), an Asiatic deity whose rites were attended with wild music and dancing. In the *Ion* 536 C, the rhapsode capable of listening to the verses of Homer alone, is compared to the frenzied worshipers of Cybele who had ears only for the music of their own deity: ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὀξέως, ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται.

Κρήτη: the island of *Crete*, *Crit.* 52 E. Crete and Lacedaemon are often coupled, as in the passage cited, as conspicuous examples of the Dorian polity. The aristocratic institutions of the Dorian race were admired by Socrates and Plato for their stability, dignity, and apparent moral purpose, in contrast with the turbulence and laxity characteristic of the democratic states. See Λακεδαιμων.

Κριτόβουλος: *Critobūlus*, son of Crito, a follower of Socrates, present at the trial, and one of those ready to be sureties for the payment of a fine, 33 D, 38 B. He was also present, with his father, at the death of Socrates, *Phaed.* 59 B. Critobulus is the interlocutor with Socrates in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* and he appears also in the *Memorabilia*.

Κρίτων, -ωνος: *Crito*, an Athenian of the deme of Alopece, to which Socrates also belonged, and a devoted friend of the philosopher, 33 D, 38 B, *Crit.* passim. Crito was rich, and his wealth was ever at the service of his friend. He went bail for the appearance of Socrates before the dicastery, *Phaed.* 115 D; offered to be surety for a fine if the sentence of death were commuted, *Apol.* 38 B; and in the dialogue which bears his name is ready to bribe the jailer and make arrangements for the escape of Socrates from the prison. After the fatal draught of hemlock it is Crito who closes the eyes of his departed friend, *Phaed.* 118 A. Crito had two sons, Critobulus and another much younger. His principal occupation seems to have been the care of his estates. Xenophon *Mem.* 2. 9 reports a conversation between Crito and Socrates, in which the latter gives his friend some good advice about protecting himself against the syncophants or common informers, by keeping an honest man in his service to act as a sort of watch-dog in matters of law. Crito had a leaning toward philosophy, but in the dialogue which bears his name we note that he rises

with difficulty to the moral heights whither he is led by Socrates.

A

Λακεδαίμων, -ονος, ἡ: *Lacedaemon* (or, *Sparta*) in Laconia of the Peloponnese, *Crit.* 52 E. In the Odyssey, δ 1, the valley of Sparta is called 'hollow Lacedaemon' (*κοίλην Λακεδαίμονα*), from the character of the land, a deep depression between Mts. Taygetus and Parnon, intersected by the river Eurotas. Protected by its rampart of mountains, Sparta needed no walls, and was itself rather an agglutination of villages than a city. The government of Lacedaemon was a military oligarchy, the few Spartan citizens or 'peers' (*ὅμοιοι*), descendants of the Dorian invaders, holding in check the large conquered native population of Laconia and sometime of Messenia. The Laws of Lycurgus, the rigid and permanent system of the Spartan state, excited the admiration of Plato and other thoughtful Athenians who were repelled by the unstable and turbulent character of the democratic institutions under which they lived. For a highly instructive account of Lacedaemon, by a sympathetic hand, see Walter Pater's *Plato and Platonism*, c. 8.

λέγειν: *to tell, recount;* then, *to speak, say.* *εἰ . . . ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα*, 'if the tale is true,' 40 E. *κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα* ('tradition,' 'folk-lore') 40 C. *δεινὸς λέγειν*, 'a clever speaker,' 17 B. In particular *λέγειν* denotes the *content* of what is said (cp. *λόγος*), while *φάναι* (*φάσκειν*) is rather of *opinion.* *τί λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι*, 'what does he *mean* by affirming, etc.' 21 B, cp. 21 E, 22 B, *εἰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν* 17 B. *εὖ, κακῶς λέγειν τινά*, 'to speak well' or 'ill of one'; cp. note on 23 A, and see *ἀκούειν*. *μέγα λέγειν*, 'to speak boastfully,' 'to boast,' 20 E. *οὐδὲν λέγειν*, 'to speak to no purpose,' 'to utter nonsense,' 30 B. *λέγειν τι*, 'to speak to some purpose,' 'to talk sense,' *τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν* *Crit.* 46 D.

Λεοντῖνος (*Λεοντῖνοι*): *of Leontini*, an Ionian city in Sicily, to the northwest and not far from Syracuse, 19 E. It was to seek aid for his native city, Leontini, against her powerful Dorian neighbor, that Gorgias the sophist visited Athens, 427 B. C.

Λέων, -οντος: *Leon*, an Athenian of the deme of Salamis, put to death without a trial by the Thirty Tyrants, 32 C. He was one of those who owed their death to the possession of wealth which excited the cupidity of the Thirty. Xenophon *Hell.* 2. 3. 39 mentions the execution of Leon, with vindication of his character; and records *Mem.* 4. 4. 3 the refusal of Socrates to obey the mandate of the Thirty when ordered to assist in arresting illegally an innocent person.

λόγος (*λέγειν*): *tale, account;* then, *a speech, talk, discourse*, the substance of anything spoken. *τῶν θεῶν ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν* ('of whom we are now speaking') 26 B. Often in the plural, of any sort of speech-making or conversation. *ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι*, 'to be discoursing (talking) about virtue every day,'

38 A. ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ λόγους πλάττοντι ('inventing,' 'making up stories') 17 C. κεκαλλιεπημένους, 'a speech ornately composed,' 17 D. λόγος is a generic word, covering ground where in English various specific terms are needed for purposes of translation, as in the celebrated phrase condemnatory of the sophists, τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, 'to make the worse appear the better *reason* (argument),' 23 D, 18 B, 19 B. Cp. Ar. *Nub.* 112, εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς (the sophists) φασιν ἄμφω τὼ λόγω, | τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα· *Ib.* 882. Elsewhere in the play the terms δίκαιος λόγος and ἄδικος λόγος are employed. Also Cic. *Brut.* 8, docere se profitebantur (the sophists), adrogantibus sane verbis, quemadmodum *causa inferior* dicendo fieri *superior* posset. The truth was called ὁ κρείττων λόγος because the *natural* superiority (in power) of truth over falsehood is instinctively recognized by the moral sense. λόγον ἔχειν, 'to have reason,' 'to have an explanation to offer' for anything, have something *to say*, be able to account for it naturally or rationally. εἰ μὲν . . . μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον, 'if I took pay for these exhortations there would be some explanation of them for me to give' (I should seem to be acting in a way that could be accounted for by ordinary human motives), 31 B. Cp. οἱ ἀδιάφθαρτοι . . . τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν . . . δίκαιον ('what other reason can *they* have for aiding me than the right one') 34 B. λόγου ἄξιον, 'worthy of mention,' 23 B. λόγου ἕνεκα, 'just for talk,' *Crit.* 46 D. λόγῳ 'in word,' often opposed to ἔργῳ, 'in deed,' *Apol.* 40 B, *Crit.* 52 D.

Δύκων, -ωνος: *Lycon*, an Athenian, one of the accusers of Socrates, 23 E, 36 A. Plato makes him represent the rhetors (public speakers) in the prosecution, and assigns to him more influence than to Meletus. Lycon therefore must have held some prominence in the political life of the time. Whether the Lycon introduced in Xenophon's *Symposium* is identical with the accuser of Socrates is uncertain.

Λῡσανίᾱς: *Lysanias*, an Athenian of the deme of Sphettus, the father of Aeschines the Socratic, present at the trial of Socrates, 33 E.

M

μάλιστα (μάλα): *most, chiefly*, 18 C, 22 B, 23 C. μάλιστα πλησίον, 'nearest,' 25 D. As an affirmative answer, 'certainly,' 24 E. To denote an *approximate* statement of time or number. πηνίκα μάλιστα, 'about what time,' *Crit.* 43 A. μάλιστα μέν (followed by εἰ δὲ μή or some similar correlative phrase), 'if possible,' 'preferably,' *Apol.* 34 A.

μᾶλλον (μάλα): *more, rather*, 18 B, 28 D. μᾶλλον δέ, 'or rather,' *Crit.* 46 A, 49 E.

μανθάνειν: *to learn*, 22 B, 26 A. Idiomatic phrase, τί (ὅ τι) μαθών, 'why in the world?' in a tone of surprise or severity, 36 B. See H. 968 C, G. 1566, B. 653, N. 4. Some scholars,

however, deny the genuineness of this usage, as inconsistent with the meaning of *μαθεῖν*, and restore *τί παθών* in those passages of Plato, Aristophanes, etc., where *τί μαθών* seems to be used in the same sense. See *πάσχειν*.

Μέγαράδε: *to Megara* (Μέγαρα, τά) *Crit.* 53 B. The Megarid lay west of Attica and south of Boeotia, from which it is separated by Mt. Cithaeron. The town of Megara was situated about a mile from the sea and had two ports, Nisaea on the Saronic and Pegae on the Corinthian Gulf.

μέλειν: *μέλει μοί τινος*, or with infinitive, I *care* for, am *interested* in something, or to do something, 24 C, 32 D. The thing cared for may be the subject of the verb, 24 C. Cp. *οἶσθα μέλον γέ σοι* (object of *οἶσθα*) 24 D. See **Μέλητος**.

Μέλητος: *Meletus*, an Athenian, one of the accusers of Socrates, 19 B, C, 23 E, 30 C, 31 D, 34 A, 35 D, 37 B. The indictment was filed in Meletus' name, tho' in fact the other two accusers were more influential men. A tragic poet of inferior merit, Meletus was a butt of the ridicule of comedy; see the commentators on Ar. *Frogs* 1302. In the *Apology* he is conceived as standing for the poets as a class, and is treated everywhere by Plato with contemptuous satire. See especially the plays upon his name (*Μέλητος, ἐμέλησεν, μέλον, ἀμέλεια, μεμέληκεν*) 24 C, D, 25 C, 26 B. In the *Euthyphro* 2 B he is named as of the deme of Pitthus and described as a young man (at the time of Socrates' trial) with long straight hair, none too good a beard, and a Roman nose.

μέλλειν: forms with the infinitive future or imperfect (rarely the aorist) a periphrastic expression of futurity. See HA. 846, G. 1254, B. 533, Gl. 570 b. *μέλλω ὑμᾶς διδάξειν*, 'I am going to instruct you,' 21 B. Cp. 31 D, where *πράττειν* is to be taken with *ἀποτρέπει* and mentally supplied with *μέλλω*. *καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι*, 'if he is to survive ('expects' to survive, as we say) even for a little while,' 32 A. *μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν . . . ἀποδιδράσκειν* 'when on the point of absconding') *Crit.* 50 A. Very convenient is the past imperfect *ἔμελλον* with future infinitive when for any reason a future idea is not absolute but relative to a past action. *εἴχομεν ἄν . . . ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν . . . ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλώ τε κἀγαθῷ ποιήσειν* ('who *should* make them fair and good') *Apol.* 20 A. Here the thought is of *purpose*; absolutely, *ἐπιστάτην λαμβάνομεν ὃς ποιήσει*, but in the passage quoted this thought adapts itself in form to the Past Potential *εἴχομεν ἄν* κτλ. *ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα, οἳ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι* ('where, had I gone thither, I could have made myself of no use at all, etc.') 36 C. Here again there is a notion of purpose with the relative *οἵ* (note the form of the negative). *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτείσειν*, 'if I had money I would name a fine as large as I could pay,' 38 B. Here the fact that the payment would be *subsequent* to the naming of the fine

is neatly expressed by the periphrasis which is at the same time adapted in form to the Unreal Condition.

μέν: a postpositive particle of emphasis, never a connective, but always looking *forward* to some antitheton or contrasted member that is to follow, expressed or implied. The word or phrase, therefore, to which *μέν* is appended has always the emphatic position and is preceded by a greater or less pause in reading: *e.g.* ἀλλὰ | *δοκεῖν μέν μοι* | *ἥξει τήμερον Crit.* 43 D, *σοὶ δὲ* | *ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα* 45 B. The correlative particle to *μέν* is regularly *δέ*, often *μέντοι* 20 D, 38 D, sometimes other words, as *ἔπειτα* 21 B, *Crit.* 45 B, ἀλλ' *ὅμως Apol.* 34 D. Sometimes there is no single word answering to *μέν* preceding, cp. *Μέλητον μέν* 36 A, *Crit.* 43 D. Tho' for the most part hardly translatable, *μέν* finds in some connections precise English equivalents, 'to be sure,' 'indeed' (Lat. quidem), etc. *ἵππῳ* | *μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ*, 30 E, cp. 38 D. Clauses introduced by *μέν* and *δέ* are always coördinate in Greek, but in translating it is sometimes advisable to treat the *μέν* clause as if it were subordinate to what follows it, 'though,' 'while,' etc. *οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον . . . δεδίασιν δὲ* κτλ., 'tho' no man knows what death is, yet all men fear it,' etc. 29 A, cp. 20 D, 29 D, 40 A, *Crit.* 50 E end. See note on *Apol.* 37 C. The perspicuity of many a rhetorical period depends upon the distinct marking of antitheses by means of *μέν* and *δέ*; and this clearness of contrast may be maintained if necessary in a long passage by *repeating* the particles in appropriate positions. See *Apol.* 28 E.

μέντοι: *indeed, however;* a postpositive asseverative particle. *καὶ μέντοι* ('verily') *καὶ πάνυ τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι* 17 C, cp. 32 D. *οὐ μέντοι*, 'no indeed,' 26 E. Thus *μέντοι* is often clearly seen to be a strengthened *μέν* (+ *τοί*), cp. *ἀποκτείνειε μέντοι* ('to be sure') *ἄν* 30 D, cp. 37 C. But, on the other hand, *μέντοι* has acquired a certain adversative force (41 E, *Crit.* 43 D) and thus frequently appears as the correlative to *μέν*, instead of *δέ*, 20 D, 38 D. In crasis *μεντἄν* = *μέντοι ἄν*.

μή: *not;* as final particle, *lest, that not. μή* expresses negation as *conceived*, while *οὐ* expresses absolute negation. Thus *μὴ not*, with its compounds, is the appropriate negative for clauses of finality, for conditional clauses and participles with conditional force, and, ordinarily, for the infinitive (for exceptions see *οὐ*). *μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἅμα κἂν ἀπολοίμην*, 'but, never yielding (a case merely conceived of), I would even perish thereby,' 32 A. *μ:θ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων*, 'to side with you engaged in unrighteous deliberations,' 32 C. Here *μὴ δίκαια* denotes injustice viewed in a general way, as *characteristic* of the action of the people, while *οὐ* would have marked simply those particular deliberations as not tending to justice. *μὴ ὅτι*, 'not only,' 'not merely,' 40 D; an elliptical phrase, originally 'do not say that,' etc. See HA. 1035 A, G. 1504, B. 442 n. *μὴ οὐ*, with infinitive (with or without

the article). *οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν Crit.* 43 C. Cp. *οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως . . . ἀποδεδεῖχθαι Phaed.* 87 A. Thus *μή* with the infinitive after verbs of negation (denying, hindering, preventing, etc.) repeats the negative idea contained in the meaning of the main verb (*ἐπιλύεται μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν*). If that verb is itself negatived, as above by *οὐδέν*, a second negative regularly appears with the infinitive. Both negatives are idiomatic and untranslatable. See HA. 1034 A, G. 1616, B. 434, Gl. 572 a. For *οὐ μή*, see *οὐ*. *μή* is sometimes used with the subjunctive in cautious assertions or negations (*μὴ . . . οὐ*). *μὴ . . . ταῦτα . . . σκέμματα ᾖ τῶν ῥᾳδίως ἀποκτιννύντων*, 'I suspect these are considerations characteristic of those who lightly put men to death,' *Crit.* 48 C. *μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ᾖ ἢ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν*, 'I am inclined to think we ought to take nothing else into consideration than what we were just now saying,' *ib.* cp. *μὴ οὐ δέῃ*, 48 D, *Apol.* 39 A. See HA. 867, G. 1350. *μή* introduces *questions* which expect a negative answer (Lat. num). *μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου*, 'do you suppose he took thought of death,' 28 D. Similarly *ἆρα μή Crit.* 44 E. (But *ἆρ' οὐ* = nonne.)

μηδέ: *and not, nor, not even, not at all*, 17 B. For the difference between *μηδέ* and *μήτε*, see *οὐδέ* and *οὔτε*. The difference there explained is illustrated 30 A, B: *πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς*, 'urging both the younger and the older among you to care for neither the body nor goods sooner *or* (*μηδέ*) so sorely as for the soul.' Here *μήτε . . . μήτε* might have been preceded by *μή* to introduce the whole negative idea of which the two correlatives denote a subdivision (cp. the passage quoted under *μήτε*) ; but *μηδέ* adds a new negation, *οὕτω σφόδρα*, to that already stated in (*μή*) *πρότερον*.

μήτε: subdivides (with its correlative or correlatives) a negative statement introduced by *μή* expressed or implied. *μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως* (*neither . . . nor*) 36 C. See *οὔτε*, also *μηδέ*.

Μίνως, -ωος: *Minos*, an ancient king of Crete, who upon his death became one of the judges of the shades in Hades, 41 A. See the *Odyssey* λ 568: *ἔνθ' ἦτοι Μίνωα ἴδον, Διὸς ἀγλαὸν υἱόν, | χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν, | ἥμενον· οἱ δέ μιν ἀμφὶ δίκας εἴροντο ἄνακτα, | ἥμενοι ἑσταότες τε κατ' εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄιδος δῶ*.

Μουσαῖος: *Musaeus*, an ancient bard popularly believed to have lived before the time of Homer, 41 A. The names of Musaeus and Orpheus are often found coupled in literary allusions. See *Ὀρφεύς*.

μοχθηρίᾱ: *wickedness*, 39 B.

μοχθηρός (*μόχθος*) 3: *miserable, wretched, Crit.* 47 E; then, *wicked, Apol.* 25 E. *μοχθηρός* and *πονηρός* are current synonyms of *κακός*. Compare *χρηστός*, a frequent synonym of *ἀγαθός*.

N

ναυμαχία (*ναῦς, μάχεσθαι*): *a naval combat, sea-fight.* *ἡ ναυμαχία* 32 B, the battle of the Arginussae Islands (near Malea, the southeastern cape of Lesbos), August, 406 B.C. The Athenians were victorious over the Lacedaemonians in this engagement, having got together by extraordinary efforts 150 triremes, the opposing fleet consisting of 120. Callicratidas, the Lacedaemonian commander, was lost. On the Athenian side 25 ships had been disabled, and a large number of the men who formed their crews were left to perish, the generals alleging afterward that they were prevented by a storm which arose from attending to the duty of rescuing them. Of the ten generals one, Conon, had not been concerned in the battle. The other nine were superseded and directed to come home. Two of them, warned of the displeasure of the people, declined to come, preferring to pay the price of voluntary exile. One of the original ten had recently died at Mitylene. The remaining six, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Diomedon, Pericles, Lysias, and Thrasyllus, returned to Athens to stand their trial before the *ecclesia* for leaving the crews of the disabled triremes to be drowned, and of neglecting all efforts to rescue them. Plato's expression *τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς* 32 B (ten being the number of the whole board of *strategi*) is not meant to be adapted to the particulars of the case. Briefly, the result of the trial was the condemnation of the six generals. They were put to death by the draught of hemlock, and their property was confiscated to the state. At the tribal festival of the Apaturia, which happened to occur between the two meetings of the assembly at which the case of the generals was considered, the popular excitement, the sentiment of grief and indignation against the accused, was raised to the highest pitch. Thus it could happen that an unconstitutional proposal to vote upon the guilt and punishment of the six generals by one collective ballot (the law requiring each man's case to be considered separately) was entertained and acted upon. It was this illegality, not any question as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, which caused Socrates, who as *ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων* was chairman of the Assembly on the day of the trial, resolutely to refuse to put the question to vote. See *βουλή*. His protest was overruled and the vote taken by some more complaisant member of the board. See Xen. *Hell.* I. 7. Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. 8, c. 64.

Νικόστρατος: *Nicostratus*, an Athenian, son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus, who had been a follower of Socrates, present at the trial, 33 E.

νομίζειν (*νόμος*): *to own as custom* or *usage* (*τὰ νομιζόμενα*, 'the customary rites,' *Symp.* 176 A); *to regard, believe, think.* *ὅτε . . . σωφροσύνη ἐνενόμιστο* ('was in vogue') Ar. *Clouds* 962. *θεοὺς νομίζειν*, 'to believe in gods,' *Apol.* 18 C, 23 D, 24 B, 26 B. The transition to the current meaning

think is illustrated 26 C *νομίζω εἶναι θεούς*, D *ἥλιον . . . σελήνην νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι*. Cp. 27 B, C. *ἃ . . . οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι* 40 A. *νομίζειν* regularly takes accusative and infinitive, but the omission of *εἶναι* with this verb is far more frequent, as might be expected from its meaning, than with any of its synonyms, *ἡγεῖσθαι, δοκεῖν, οἴεσθαι*.

νόμος: *custom, law. τῶν τοιούτων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν* ('t is not usual,' *i.e.* not right or reasonable) 26 A. *ὁ νόμος* 25 D, *οἱ νόμοι* 24 E, *Crit.* 50 A.

O

Ὀδυσσεύς, -έως: *Odysseus* (Lat. Ulysses or Ulixes), king of Ithaca, whose wanderings after the capture of Troy and return to his home in the twentieth year form the theme of the Odyssey of Homer, 41 B. Odysseus is named in the *Apology* as one of those whose rich experience of life would render them worthy subjects of examination by Socrates in the Lower World.

οἴεσθαι: *to think, surmise, fancy; οἶμαι* or *οἴμαι, ᾠόμην* or *ᾤμην*; in crasis, *ἐγῷμαι* = *ἐγὼ οἶμαι*, 37 A. *οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν*, 'fancying that they did harm,' 41 D. *οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι*, 'conceive that I must first make a defense to *them*,' 18 E, cp. 32 C. *ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὔ*, 'that he fancied himself wise, but was not,' 21 C. *ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναι*, 'what I don't know I do not think I know,' 21 D. Often with an infinitive of the future, where we say 'expect,' 35 A, 36 A, 39 D, *Crit.* 44 A, 53 C, 54 D. *ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι*, 'as I remember it,' *Apol.* 28 C. *οἴεσθαί γε χρή*, 'we must certainly suppose so,' *Crit.* 53 C, 54 B. See the synonyms, *δοκεῖν, ἡγεῖσθαι, νομίζειν*.

Ὅμηρος: *Homer*, the great poet of the old epos, 34 D, 41 A. The Homeric poems were a sort of Bible to the Greeks, and it used to be said that Hellas had received her education from Homer, *ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαιδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητής*, *Rep.* 606 E. The Iliad and Odyssey are often quoted from in the dialogues of Plato, cp. *Apol.* 28 C, 34 D, *Crit.* 44 B. Tho' such quotations are sometimes made to enforce a moral purpose, as 28 C above cited, yet in general Plato protests vigorously against the bad influence of Homer and the other 'myth-makers' in the education of youth. See *Rep.* 377 ff.

Ὀρφεύς, -έως: *Orpheus*, an ancient bard popularly believed to have lived before the time of Homer, 41 A. The names of Orpheus and Musaeus are often coupled to represent a body of ancient minstrelsy, chiefly of a priestly or religious character, — oracles, hymns, theogonies, and the like, — which has now disappeared with the exception of a few inconsiderable fragments. Certain poetical works now extant under the name of Orpheus are known to have had a late origin, and probably much that passed as Orphic in the time of Plato was of no great antiquity. Plato mentions Orpheus and Musaeus here and there in his dialogues, and gives several brief quota-

tions from the poetry of Orpheus, as *Crat.* 462 B, *Phil.* 66 C.

ὀρχήστρα (*ὀρχεῖσθαι to dance*): *orchestra*, usually the central space of the Greek theater, in which the dramatic chorus had its position. But *Apol.* 26 E *ἡ ὀρχήστρα* is named as a place where books could be purchased, the reference being probably to an 'orchestra' in Athens other than that of the theater, a public place of which brief mention has been preserved in the Lexicon to Plato of Timaeus the Sophist.

οὐ, οὐκ(χ), οὐχί, in final position **οὔ**: *not, no.* *οὐ* differs from *μή* in expressing negation *absolutely*. See *μή*. Tho' the usual negative with the infinitive is *μή*, yet it may be *οὐ* when an infinitive conveys a *fact* of negation. *ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος . . . δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφός, . . . εἶναι δ' οὔ*, 21 C, D. Here what Socrates came to believe was *δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι σοφός, ἔστι δ' οὔ*; in effect the same as *οὐκ ἔδοξέ μοι σοφὸς εἶναι*. Cp. 26 C *παντάπασί με φῂς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς κτλ.*; like *οὐ φῂς με νομίζειν*. In cases like those above quoted we may say that the negative is *retained* in the form proper to the thought. Again, altho' the regular negative in a conditional clause is *μή*, yet sometimes *οὐ* is united so closely to a single word with which it forms a sort of phrase that it is retained even in a condition. *ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε* (phrase, *οὔ φημι I deny*) 25 B. See *φάναι*. Similarly, *ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι*, 'so as to be ignorant,' 26 D. Forcible negation may be expressed by *οὐ μή* with the subjunctive, 29 D, *Crit.* 46 C; or with the future indicative, *Crit.* 44 B. See HA. 1032, G. 1360, Gl. 489. The negative is doubled for the sake of emphasis and, to avoid cacophony, not by repeating the same word. See B. 432. *οὐ πάνυ, not very (much)*, said mildly (Attic) for 'not at all,' *Crit.* 48 A, cp. *Apol.* 41 D.

οὐδέ: *and not, nor, not even, not at all,'* 17 C. *οὐδέ* (the same is true of *μηδέ*) is never a correlative word, but always adds a *new* negation to one already expressed or implied. Thus *Crit.* 54 C *οὐδέ* occurs three times to enlarge successively the negative member introduced by the former *οὔτε* of two correlatives: (*οὔτε . . . ἐνθάδε*) *σοι . . . ἄμεινον . . . οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ . . .* (*οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον*), '(neither *here*) better or more just or more holy for you or for another (nor better *there*, etc.).' *Οὐδέ* (*μηδέ*) in negation corresponds to *καί* (*and, also, even*) in affirmative use. *ἐγὼ ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι* ('so *also* I do not *think* so') *Apol.* 21 D. *οὐδέ γ' εἰ . . . ἀκηκόατε . . . οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές*, 'no, nor if, . . . this is not true *either*' (this also is false), 19 D. Cp. *οὐδὲ δίκαιον* 35 C, and the note. Thus *οὐδέ* (*μηδέ*) is essentially different from *οὔτε* (*μήτε*), which is always correlative. See *οὔτε*. In cases where *οὐδέ* seems to answer to a preceding *οὔτε* there is *anacoluthon*, the speaker shifting his point of view ungrammatically and not ending his sentence as the beginning of it required. *Apol.* 19 D.

οὔτε: always in correlation, *οὔτε . . .*

οὔτε, *neither . . . nor*. The same is true of μήτε . . . μήτε. Thus these words divide *one* negation, whether that negation be (1) indicated as a whole at the outset by οὐκ, οὐδείς (μή, μηδείς), or be (2) merely implied by the correlatives themselves. (1) ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν | οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω 19 C. (So with μή 36 C, twice.) (2) ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν 21 B. Often οὔτε and τέ are correlative, a combination easy in Greek but awkward for purposes of translation. πανταπασί με φῂς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν, 'you assert that I am both myself a total disbeliever in gods and teach this unbelief to other men,' 26 C. See οὐδέ.

ὀφλισκάνειν: *to owe, incur debt.* In law, δίκην ὀφλεῖν, 'to be cast in a suit,' 'to be fined' or 'condemned to' undergo some punishment. θανάτου δίκην ὀφλών 39 B. κἂν ὤφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, 'he would even have incurred a fine of a thousand drachmas,' 36 A, cp. 39 B and the note.

Π

πάθος, -ους, τό, (πάσχειν): *an affection, experience*, of mind or body. τοιοῦτόν τι ἐφάνησαν πάθος πεπονθότες, 'in some such way they were seen to be affected,' 22 C. Here the πάθος consisted in an inability to explain one's own utterances (combined with a conceit of knowledge notwithstanding). τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη, 'my own *sufferings*,' 41 B. But agreeable experiences would have been designated by the same word. See πάσχειν.

Παλαμήδης: *Palamedes*, son of Nauplius, of Nauplia in Argos, one of the Greeks warring against Troy, 41 B. Palamedes was a sort of counterpart of Odysseus, distinguished for his wise counsels and his stratagems. In the post-Homeric legends the two heroes are involved in mutual enmity and conflict. Being in favor of a peace, Palamedes was falsely accused of treason and collusion with King Priam, condemned therefor, and stoned to death.

Πάραλος, *Paralus*, an Athenian, son of Demodocus and brother of Theages, present at the trial of Socrates, 33 E.

πάσχειν: means to be a subject of experience, as *acted upon* from without or inwardly *affected* in some way, *to suffer* good or ill, 35 A, 36 B, 42, *Crit.* 47 C. εὖ, κακῶς πάσχειν, 'to be well' or 'ill treated,' 49 D. ἦ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον, 'I declare to you I was affected in some such way' as I shall describe, *Apol.* 22 A. The explanation of this experience (πάθος) on the part of Socrates, this *impression* that he gained, is given in ἔδοξαν κτλ. Cp. 22 C, where the state of mind of the men themselves whom Socrates examined is described, τοιοῦτόν τί ἐφάνησαν πάθος πεπονθότες. See πάθος. Thus πάσχειν is a verb essentially *passive* in its signification, hence its frequent connection with a genitive and ὑπό. ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων οὐκ οἶδα, 'how *you* have been affected by my accusers (*i.e.* by their harangues) I know not,' 17 A. (In the next clause ὑπ' αὐτῶν can be joined with ἐπελαθό-

μην because 'I forgot' is a sort of ἔπαθον — forgetting is a πάθος.) Nevertheless, since πάσχειν implies *feeling* it may be joined with πρός and an accusative denoting the person *toward* whom the feeling goes out (after being excited *by* that person). πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ . . . τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον 21 C. Cp. ταὐτὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας, 'for my part I am affected in this same way toward those who cultivate philosophy,' *Gorg.* 485 C. (We should be apt to say, reversing the relation, 'those who cultivate philosophy *impress me* in the same way.') The idiomatic phrase τί (ὅ τι) παθών, παθόντες ('having suffered what,' *i.e.* why in the world) expresses an interrogation, direct or indirect, in a tone of surprise or severity. See HA. 968 c, G. 1566. (For the similar idiom τί μαθών, see μανθάνειν.)

Πάτροκλος: *Patroclus*, the son of Menoetius, bosom friend of Achilles, 28 C. While Achilles in his wrath held himself aloof from battle, and the Greeks had come to be in sore straits, Patroclus was moved to don the armor of Achilles and go forth to fight, II 1–220. He was slain and stripped of the arms by Hector, *ib.* 818 ff. It was the death of Patroclus that finally turned the mind of Achilles and caused him to take the field once more against Hector and the Trojans, Σ 18 ff.

πείθειν: *to urge, persuade*, τινά. Middle and passive πείθεσθαι, *to obey, comply with, believe*, τινί, 38 A, *Crit.* 44 B, C; *to be prevailed upon, persuaded*, ἐπείσθητε *Apol.* 37 B. In the active voice the imperfect stem is usually conative, 'try to persuade,' cp. 18 B, 30 A, 35 C. But as historical present (which is the equivalent of the aorist indicative), and in some other uses, πείθω may denote fulfillment, like an aorist. ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω, 'I do not succeed in making you believe this,' 37 A. The aorist participle πείσας is idiomatically employed as the opposite of βίᾳ *perforce* or of ἄκων *against one's will*. περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ('after gaining your consent') ταῦτα πράττειν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος *Crit.* 48 E. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν ('without permission from the city') 49 E. πείθειν may be followed by an accusative and infinitive, 'to persuade one *to do* something,' as τούτους πείθουσιν σφίσιν ξυνεῖναι *Apol.* 20 A. Differently with ὅτι or ὡς and a finite mode (the dependent clause sometimes in apposition to a cognate accusative like τοῦτο 37 A), 'to make one believe' that something is or is not true, 27 E. Cp. πείθειν αὐτὴν ᾗ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε (indirect question) *Crit.* 51 C. Perf. pass. πέπεισμαι, 'I have made up my mind,' 'am determined,' πέπεισμαι . . . μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων *Apol.* 37 A. πεπεισμένος . . . ἐγὼ ('determined as I am') μηδένα ἀδικεῖν 37 B.

Πλάτων, -ωνος: *Plato*, the philosopher, 34 A, 38 B. Born 427 B.C., Plato was twenty-eight years old at the time of the death of Socrates. His family, belonging to the deme Collytus, was noble and wealthy. Aristo, his father, traced his descent from king Codrus, while his mother, Perictione, was re-

lated to the family of Solon, the lawgiver. He had two brothers, Adimantus (*Apol.* 34 A) and Glauco. See the *Republic*, and, for Glauco, also Xen. *Mem.* 3. 6. On the mother's side Plato was related to Charmides and Critias, the interlocutors with Socrates in the dialogue entitled *Charmides*, and known to history in connection with the oligarchy of the Thirty and the Ten. Charmides was the brother of Plato's mother, and Critias the cousin of Charmides. By temperament a poet, Plato, it is said, at first devoted himself to the arts of poetry and music, but renounced poetic composition for philosophy when he attached himself to Socrates at about the age of twenty. After the death of Socrates in 399 B.C., we are told that Plato, with other companions of the sage, withdrew to Megara. Then follow his reputed travels in foreign lands, Cyrene, Egypt, and Italy. He is said to have made three journeys to Syracuse in Sicily, the first in 387 B.C. At the court of Dionysius the Younger, Plato and Dion, mentor of the youthful despot, finally failed, if the story be a true one, in their efforts to bring into being an ideal king and state. It was shortly after the first visit to Sicily that Plato began to teach or lecture at Athens in a garden adjoining the precinct sacred to the Hero Acadēmus, about a mile from the city on the road to Eleusis. The *Academy* of Plato, the earliest of the schools of philosophy in Greece, was attended by many afterward eminent in philosophy or letters, and the fame of the founder became world-wide. Until his death, at the age of eighty, in 347 B.C., Plato was engaged in teaching and in the composition of his written works. Forty-two dialogues have been preserved under his name, about one third of the number being regarded as spurious or of doubtful authenticity. There are also thirteen letters attributed to Plato that are probably not genuine. Plato is the foremost and greatest of the Attic prose writers. The *dialogue* admits the characteristics of every literary form, and the Platonic writing is free from the conventional trammels to which historical and oratorical composition were subjected. Philosophy had not yet learned to disguise her thoughts under a phraseology calculated to repel the unprofessional reader. The poetic flavor that enters upon occasion into Plato's prose is a further source of freedom and power. With all the wide dramatic range of the dialogues (in which the author never appears *in propriâ personâ*), with all the variety of philosophic speculation probed or outlined, the Platonic style carries with it a pervading sense of original force, of a consistent dominating personality.

ποιεῖν: *to make, cause, do.* ἔγνων . . . περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν . . . ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν ('what they *made*,' viz. their poems) 22 B. Cp. ἐπεποιήκεσαν *ib.* τοῦτο δ' ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν 20 D. ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, 'if I make any of my companions bad,' 25 E. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ποιήσω, 'this I shall do both for

young and for old,' 30 A. But the usual construction is the double accusative, ποιεῖν τινά τι. Cp. οἱ πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας 25 C. So often with adverb, τὸ κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει *Crit.* 49 C. πλέον ποιεῖν, 'to profit,' 'gain advantage.' εἴ τι οἴει πλέον ποιήσειν, 'if you expect to accomplish something thereby,' *Crit.* 54 D, *Apol.* 19 A. Mid. ποιεῖσθαι, *to make* or *get made for oneself*, *Apol.* 23 A, *Crit.* 52 C; then, 'to make out,' 'regard,' 'deem.' Thus in phrases with περί. ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ ('deem it very important') ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι . . . ἔσονται *Apol.* 24 C. τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, 'the things that are of most worth he treats as of least value,' 30 A. χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους 'to hold property in higher esteem than friends,' *Crit.* 44 C, 48 E, 54 B. With substantives as object ποιεῖσθαι forms a periphrasis for a middle voice of the verb allied to the substantive. λόγους ποιεῖσθαι (*i.e.* λέγειν, but mid.) *Apol.* 27 B, 38 A. ἀποδημίαν ποιήσασθαι *Crit.* 52 B. See γίγνεσθαι. Synonyms, δρᾶν, ἐργάζεσθαι, πράττειν.

ποίημα, -ατος, τό: *a poem, poetical work*, 22 B.

ποίησις, -εως, ἡ: *a making of poetry*, 22 C.

ποιητής: *maker, poet*, 22 A.

πολυπρᾱγμονεῖν (πολυπράγμων, πράττειν): *to be a busybody, to be officious, meddlesome*, 31 C. A common fault of the Athenian character was πολυπραγμοσύνη. The opposite idea to πολυπραγμονεῖν is expressed by ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, 'to mind one's business.' See ἡσυχία. Plato makes Socrates apply the derogatory term to himself *Apol.* 31 C, adopting the language of his enemies and detractors. What from Socrates' point of view was λέγειν καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττειν ('attending to my own affair'), 33, A, was to them πολυπραγμονεῖν, 'attending to *other people's* business.'

πονηρίᾱ: *wickedness*, 39 A.

πονηρός (πόνος) 3: *bad, wicked.* ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς (*i.e.* ἀγαθοῖς ἢ κακοῖς) 25 C, cp. *Crit.* 47 A. πονηρός and μοχθηρός are current synonyms of κακός.

Ποτειδαίᾱ: *Potidaea*, a Dorian town on the isthmus of Pallēne in Chalcidice, 28 E. Originally colonized from Corinth, it was later one of the tributary allies of Athens, Thuc. I. 56. In the year 432 B.C., shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Potidaea at the instigation of Corinth revolted. It was immediately invested by the Athenians, and capitulated after a blockade of two years. The siege had been a costly one and the hardships of the blockading army severe, especially during the winter season. Socrates served as a hoplite in the Athenian army and was present in the battle fought with the Corinthians and Potidaeans immediately before the siege. Here he saved the life of Alcibiades who had been wounded, and declined the prize of valor in the fight, when Alcibiades, to whom the generals awarded it, wished to turn it

over to Socrates. The passage cited below bears testimony also to the extraordinary powers of endurance exhibited by Socrates, wearing no more than his usual garments during the coldest weather, and going barefooted with ease thro' the ice and snow. It was at Potidaea, too, that his fellow soldiers once saw the philosopher stand wrapt in meditation all day from sunrise and thro' the following night until the sun rose again. See *Symp.* 219 E, 220.

πράττειν: *to act, proceed, do*, 31 D, 33 A, *Crit.* 44 C, 47 B. πράττειν answers to Lat agere, ποιεῖν to facere. ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, 'to look to this alone, when engaged in any course of action, whether what he is doing is right or wrong,' *Apol.* 28 B. Often εὖ, κακῶς πράττειν, of good or ill success. ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι (sc. πράξαντες) τοῦτο πράξουσι, 'the merest chance will determine what shall be their *fate*' (they will fare only as they happen to fare), *Crit.* 45 D. πράττειν thus verges closely on the meaning of πάσχειν. Cp. *Apol.* 40 A, C. Mid. χρήματα, μισθὸν πράττεσθαι, 'to make money,' 'exact pay,' 19 E. With acc. of the person made to pay, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα 31 C. Synonyms, δρᾶν, ἐργάζεσθαι, ποιεῖν.

Πρόδικος: *Prodicus*, of Iūlis in the isle of Ceos, a sophist, 19 E. He was one of the most renowned of the professional teachers. A subject to which he paid especial attention was the doctrine of *synonyms*. This specialty of Prodicus is mildly satirized by Plato in the *Protagoras* 337, 340 ff, 358. But the most popular lecture of Prodicus, for which he obtained the largest audience, was based upon the well-known fable called "The Choice of Hercules" or "The Parting of the Ways." The substance of this discourse is given by Xenophon, *Mem.* 2 1. 21–34. The youthful hero is approached at a critical point in his career by two female forms, Vice and Virtue, each of whom pleads eloquently to make him her own.

πρυτανεῖον: *Prytanēum*, strictly the place of the prytanes (see βουλή), 36 D. The Prytaneum of a Greek city bore the same relation to the community at large as the private house bore to the family. It was the "hearth-stone of the state" (ἑστία πόλεως), and a fire was kept continually burning on the public altar of the city in the Prytaneum, just as in private homes a fire was kept up on the domestic altar in the inner court. The Prytaneum of Athens was situated north of the acropolis, near the agora. The city of Athens exercised in its Prytaneum the duties of hospitality both toward its own citizens and toward strangers. Foreign ambassadors were entertained here, as well as Athenian envoys on their return from a successful mission. Moreover, the state conferred upon citizens who in consequence of personal or ancestral services to the community were regarded as its *benefactors* (εὐεργέται) the privilege of taking their meals in the Prytaneum at the public cost (σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ).

This honor was also conferred upon victors in the Olympic Games, as mentioned by Plato in the passage where Socrates is made to propose to his judges that he should be maintained at the public expense as a benefactor to the state, *Apol.* 36 D, E.

πρυτάνεις, πρυτανεύειν: see *βουλή*.

Πῡθία: the *Pythia* or *Pythoness*, priestess of Apollo at the temple of Delphi. See *Δελφοί*.

P

Ῥαδάμανθυς, -υος: *Rhadamanthys*, brother of Minos, made after his death one of the judges in the Lower World, as a reward for his virtues in life, 41 A. In the *Gorgias* 524 Rhadamanthys is represented as judging those from Asia, Aeacus those from Europe, while Minos exercises the final decision in doubtful cases. In the Odyssey Rhadamanthys is ruler of the Elysian Plain (*Ἠλύσιον πεδίον*), δ 564.

Σ

Σαλαμίνιος 3: *of Salamis*, 32 C.

Σαλαμίς, -ῖνος, ἡ: *Salamis*, an island off the western coast of Attica, forming the southern boundary of the Bay of Eleusis, 32 C, D. Its greatest length, from north to south, is about ten miles; its width, in the broadest part, from east to west, a little more. Salamis was an independent state until about 620 B.C., when, a dispute for its possession arising between Megara and Athens, it first fell into the hands of the Megarians, and then thro' a stratagem of Solon was taken possession of by the Athenians and became one of the Attic demes. Cp. Solon *fr.* 3: *ἴομεν εἰς Σαλαμῖνα, μαχησόμενοι περὶ νήσου | ἱμερτῆς, χαλεπόν τ' αἶσχος ἀπωσόμενοι.* Salamis is finally memorable for the great battle fought off its coast, when the Persian fleet of Xerxes was defeated by the Greeks, 480 B.C.

Σιμμίᾱς: *Simmias*, a Theban, a friend of Socrates, *Crit.* 45 B. See *Κέβης*.

Σίσυφος: *Sisyphus*, founder and king of Ephyra, afterward Corinth, 41 C. See the *Iliad* Z 152. The name of Sisyphus became proverbial for fraud and trickery, and famous for the punishment which he had to undergo in the Lower World — rolling a huge stone up hill that continually rolled back just before attaining the summit, *Odyssey* λ 593. Cp. *Gorg.* 525 E. But in the *Apology* Plato mentions him, along with Odysseus the fertile-minded, without derogatory suggestion of any sort. And in the passage cited above from the Iliad nothing worse is said of Sisyphus, grandfather of the 'blameless Bellerophon,' than *κέρδιστος γένετ' ἀνδρῶν.*

Σούνιον: *Sūnium*, a promontory forming the southeast corner of the Athenian territory, *Crit.* 43 D. Ships bound for Athens could be sighted early from the heights of Sunium.

σοφία: *wisdom*. Ordinarily the word signified the possession of positive knowledge and the skill pertaining to learned or artistic accomplishments. See *σοφός*. Thus of Athens, *πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν* 29 D. And of the artisans, *ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν* 22 D.

Socrates, however, in the *Apology* is made to give a higher and profound signification, of negative import, to *σοφία*, which he deduces from the suggestions of an oracle that had pronounced him the wisest of men. *οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν*, 23 B. This is *ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία*, the only wisdom of which man is capable, 20 D. For God alone is truly wise, *τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι* 23 A. Man, by accepting only *reasoned* truth as his own possession, arrives at a sense of his limitations in regard to knowledge. Wisdom consists in the fullness of this sense of what one does *not* know. For Socrates, *σοφία* thus comes to be the substantive answering to *εἰδέναι τι* and to *φρονίμως ἔχειν* 22 A. See *εἰδέναι*.

σοφιστής: *sophist*, properly one who has made himself "wise" (*σεσοφισμένος ἀνήρ*) 20 A. Then, a teacher, dealing with the higher education, giving instruction especially in rhetoric and dialectic, as did Protagoras, the greatest of the sophists, and others. See *Γοργίας*, *Ἱππίας*, *Πρόδικος*. No disparaging sense attaches to the word *σοφιστής* in itself considered, but a popular prejudice against the sophists arose early, and later was especially fostered by the Platonic writings. The stock reproach against them was, *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν*, "making the worse appear the better reason," 18 B. See *λόγος*. This accusation, however, they bore in common with all who were given to philosophizing, 23 D. From philosophers in general the sophists were distinguished as (itinerant) *teachers*. The sophists are contrasted with Socrates by Plato particularly with reference to their arrogation of positive knowledge and their custom of taking pay for the instruction which they imparted. Socrates, on the other hand, declined to receive pay from those who listened to his conversations, and disclaimed the ability to "teach" men anything, 33 A, B. See *σοφία*. The strongly condemnatory view of the sophists as a class that has prevailed among modern scholars, especially the Germans, — due mainly to the satirical irony of Plato, — was combated vigorously by Grote in his *History of Greece*, vol. 8, c. 67, as well as in his *Plato*, passim. The truth of the matter has been clearly set forth and the final word perhaps said in Sidgwick's reasoned discussion of Grote's view of the sophists, in the (English) *Journal of Philology*, vol. 4, no. 8 (1872).

σοφός 3: *skillful, clever, accomplished, learned, wise*. Thus Socrates found that the handicraftsmen of Athens were in their way *σοφώτεροι* (possessed of greater skill and knowledge) than he was, 22 D. But the word early came to be used in a sense of disparagement (see *σοφιστής*). Thus in the indictment of Socrates, *σοφὸς ἀνήρ . . . τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν* 18 B. *ἀνὴρ σοφός*, said with irony by Plato of the sophist Evenus, 20 A. In attempting to interpret the oracle which had pronounced him the

wisest of men Socrates is made to give a new, *negative*, turn to the word σοφός, 'wise in recognizing one's own limitations as to knowledge.' Cp. *Apol.* 21 D. See σοφία. He contrasts the sophists sharply with himself in this regard: οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἂν . . . μείζω ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν 20 D. A kind of superhuman presumption.

Σφήττιος 3: *of Sphettus*, an Attic deme lying toward Cape Sunium, of the tribe of Acamantis, 33 E.

σχεδόν (ἔχειν, σχεῖν): *nearly, pretty near, about.* Often in Plato, with a tone of Attic reserve, to prevent a statement from sounding harsh or too positive. οἶδα σχεδόν, 'I'm pretty sure,' 24 A. Cp. 34 B. With τι, *Crit.* 46 B. σχεδόν τι δῆλον, 'tolerably evident,' 53 B.

Σωκράτης, -ους: *Socrates*, son of Sophroniscus, the Athenian philosopher, 18 B, 19 B, C, 23 B, D, 24 B, E, 26 E, 27 A, 28 B, 29 C, 34 E, 38 C, *Crit.* 43 A, etc. His death, by the draught of hemlock, occurred 399 B.C., when he was seventy years of age (*Apol.* 17 D, see also *Crit.* 52 E). The year of his birth would accordingly be 469 B.C. His mother, Phaenarete, was a midwife, and Plato makes Socrates compare his process of delivering men's minds of the ideas with which they are pregnant to the maieutic art, *Theaet.* 149. His father was a statuary, cp. the allusion *Euthyphr.* 11. Socrates himself began by following the profession of his father, and is said to have executed a work deemed worthy of preservation, Paus. 1. 22. 8, 9. 35. 7. The name of Xanthippe, the wife of Socrates, has become proverbial for a termagant. See Xen. *Symp.* 2. 10, *Mem.* 2. 2, and cp. Plato, *Phaed.* 60 A. There were three sons, two of them mere children at the time of their father's death, *Apol.* 34 D. Socrates had the satyr-like physiognomy — flat nose, thick lips, and projecting eyes, Xen. *Symp.* 5, Plato, *Symp.* 215, cp. Ar. *Nub.* 362. His powers of physical endurance were extraordinary (see Ποτειδαία), and his self-control is celebrated in the *Symposium* of Plato and elsewhere. His courage in battle was conspicuous (see Δήλιον), while of the moral courage of Socrates memorable examples are preserved, apart from the culminating scenes of his trial and his death. See βουλή, ναυμαχία, Λέων. As philosopher his position was unique. Other men had asserted and practiced the ethical truths for which Socrates stood; but no man before Socrates had reasoned them out exhaustively and shown the identity of the intellectual and the moral. His was the first conscious elaboration of the scientific *definition* — arriving at a *general notion* thro' elimination of false or unessential accessories. Between what a man *knows* and what he does not know Socrates was thus enabled to draw a distinct line, relegating the unknown to the sphere of divine intelligence (see τὸ δαιμόνιον, under δαιμόνιος). See εἰδέναι, σοφία. Thus his mission came to be clearing the minds of men of the conceit of knowledge without its reality, hence the famous

paradox *Apol.* 23 A, B. The enthusiasm of Socrates in his great work of testing his own mind and the minds of other men in search of reasoned truth is celebrated by Plato in the *Apology* as an inspiration due to a divine command.

T

Τελαμών, -ῶνος: *Telamon*, king of Salamis, the father of Ajax, 41 B. Telamon was the son of Aeacus and brother of Peleus. Thus Ajax and Achilles were cousins.

τῑμᾶν (τῑμή): *to estimate, to value, prize, honor*, 32 A, *Crit.* 47 A. As Attic law-terms, the mid. τιμᾶσθαι, *to propose a penalty*, is said of either prosecutor or defendant, τιμᾶταί μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου 36 B, ἐξὴν σοι φυγῇ τιμήσασθαι *Crit.* 52 C; while the act. τιμῆσαι, *to decide upon a penalty*, is said of the judges, in an ἀγὼν τιμητός. Also ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι *Apol.* 36 B. The active and middle occur side by side 37 C, 38 B. See δίκη.

τίμημα, -ατος, τό: *a valuation, a penalty, punishment*, 39 B.

τις, τι, gen. τινός or τοῦ, dat. τινί or τῳ̂, enclitic; plur. neut. nom. and acc. τινά encl., ἅττα not encl., 30 C: *some one, one, something; any one, any, anything*. Idiomatic phrase, εἶναί τι, 'to be something,' *i.e.* to be of some account or importance, 'to be superior' in any respect, 41 E. δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δ' ἐργαζομένους, 35 A. τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀπῃοῦν τι εἶναι, 35 B. Cp. οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν σοφίᾳ, εἰς ἀρετήν, *ib.* Similar is λέγειν τι, 'to speak to some purpose,' *Crit.* 46 D. See λέγειν. ἢ τι ἢ οὐδέν 'little or nothing,' *Apol.* 17 B. So ὀλίγου τινὸς καὶ οὐδενός 23 A.

τριάκοντα: *thirty*. οἱ τριάκοντα, 'the Thirty' (tyrants, so-called), 32 C. Upon the surrender of Athens to Lysander the Lacedaemonian, at the close of the Peloponnesian War, 404 B.C., a committee of thirty citizens of anti-democratic views was appointed; ostensibly, 'to write up the ancestral laws for the conduct of the commonwealth,' Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 2. Practically, the Thirty assumed control of the government, securing a senate and magistrates subservient to their designs. Some wholesome measures were adopted at first, but the Thirty, with a Spartan garrison to back them, soon became genuine tyrants. Inoffensive persons, not aliens only, but even citizens, if possessed of wealth, were liable to be arrested and put to death without form of law, while their property was seized and appropriated. See Λέων. A schism presently showed itself in the board. Theramenes, who counseled moderation, stood against Critias, leader of the extremists. Its immediate result was the enrolling of a list of 3000 citizens, who might not be proscribed without a trial, and were nominally to share by their suffrages in the governing power. This led to increased severity toward those citizens whose names were not on the list of the 3000. Thus the faction grew hotter, until the death of Theramenes was compassed by the machinations of Critias. A veritable "reign of terror"

followed this event, and such patriotic men as were not counted in the 3000 were driven from the city. See Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 1. The régime of the Thirty is termed ὀλιγαρχία *Apol.* 32 C. It lasted eight months (April to December, 404 B.C.), ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη, 32 D. See φυγή.

Τριπτόλεμος: *Triptolemus*, an Attic legendary hero who hospitably entertained the goddess Demēter at Eleusis, and received from her the gifts of agriculture, 41 A. Plato in this passage associates Triptolemus with the judges of the Lower World.

Τροίᾳ: *Troy*, or *Ilium*, in Asia Minor, scene of the ten-years war described in the Homeric poems, 41 B.

Φ

φάναι: *to say yes, affirm, aver;* ἔφην, ἔφη (Lat. inquit), 20 B. Cp. φάσκειν, 21 B. φῂς ἢ οὔ, 'do you say *yes* or *no*,' 27 D, *Crit.* 49 B. οὔ φημι, Lat. nego. (The arrangement 26 C is not the usual one.) ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε, 'whether you deny it or not, *Apol.* 25 B. See οὔ.

φεύγειν: *to flee, shun, avoid*, 26 A, 29 B, *Crit.* 53 C; in civil sense, *to be in exile*, *Crit.* 53 B. In Attic law, φεύγειν, 'to be on trial,' 'to be defendant' in a suit; ὁ φεύγων, 'the defendant.' See αἱρεῖν. With gen. of the offense charged, ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου *Apol.* 35 D. With Cognate Accusative, μή πως ἐγὼ . . . τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι, 'may I ne'er come to be prosecuted on such grave charges,' 19 C.

φιλοσοφεῖν: *to be* φιλόσοφος or *wisdom-loving*, *to philosophize*, 23 D, 28 E, 29 D. Of learned study in general, πάντες οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, 23 D. Of the special activity of Socrates, 28 E, 29 D.

Φθίη: epic form of *Phthia*, name of an ancient city in Thessaly, on the river Spercheios, the realm of Peleus, father of Achilles, and the Myrmidons, *Crit.* 44 B (quoted from *Iliad* I 363). See *Iliad* B 683. The name likewise designates the district, the later Phthiōtis, *Iliad* I 395. See Θετταλία.

φρόνησις, -εως, ἡ (φρονεῖν, φρήν): *a thinking, reasoning, wisdom.* φρονήσεως καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς 29 E. φρόνησις is opposed to ἀμαθία (*folly*) in the same way as σοφία, cp. μεταξὺ ἀμαθίας καὶ φρονήσεως *Symp.* 202 A. Cp. φρονίμως ἔχειν 22 A, and see σοφία, ἀμαθία.

φρονίμως (φρόνιμος, φρήν): *thoughtfully, wisely.* φρονίμως ἔχειν, like φρονεῖν, 'to be wise' (in the Socratic sense of testing the truth by rational scrutiny) 22 A. The adjective occurs *Crit.* 44 D.

φροντίζειν (φροντίς, φρήν): *to be thoughtful, take thought of*, τινός, 28 D. Coupled with ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, 29 E. The verbal, φροντιστέον, *Crit.* 48 A.

φυγή: *flight;* in civil sense, *exile*, 37 C, *Crit.* 52 C. Particularly, *Apol.* 21 A τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην, 'the recent banishment,' of patriotic Athenians in the time of the Thirty Tyrants, 404 B.C. See τριάκοντα. The exiles took refuge mostly in Thebes and Megara. Starting from Thebes, Thrasybulus, with seventy friends, took possession

of Phyle, a little stronghold in Attica, on the road to Boeotia. An attack thereon by the Thirty proved a failure, who accordingly ensconced themselves at Eleusis. From Phyle Thrasybulus, whose force had swelled to upwards of 1000 men, entered the Piraeus. The Thirty were forced to rally with their adherents. In the conflict that ensued they were defeated, and their leader Critias was slain. After some complications, the Thirty being succeeded by a board of *Ten*, who with assistance from Sparta carried on the war against Thrasybulus, the final result was the overthrow of oligarchy and the permanent restoration of the Democracy of Athens in September, 403 B.C. See Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4.

X

Χαιρεφῶν, -ῶντος: *Chaerephon*, an Athenian of the deme of Sphettus, a companion of Socrates, 20 E, 21 A. Xenophon says that Chaerephon was one of those who listened to Socrates, not to become influential in public speaking or at law, but to make themselves "fair and good" in all social relations, *Mem.* 1. 2. 48. He was a butt of the ridicule of comedy, figuring side by side with Socrates in some of the ludicrous scenes of the *Clouds*, see vv. 140, 144, 156. In the *Birds* he is called the *bat* (*νυκτερίς*), on account of his cadaverous and sallow look, Ar. *Av.* 1564. Chaerephon had attached himself to Socrates from early youth, and was enthusiastically devoted to the master. Plato characterizes him as *σφοδρός* and *μανικός* (*Charm.* 153 B). He was thus well suited to the fiction of the *oracle*, capable of asking the god at Delphi whether any man was wiser than Socrates. And as he had been one of the exiles who returned with Thrasybulus (see *φυγή*), a reference to Chaerephon at the trial would presumably not be unacceptable to a dicastery impaneled under the Restored Democracy of Athens. See the note on *Apol.* 21 A.

χρηστός (*χρῆσθαι*) 3: *good*, 33 B. A synonym of *ἀγαθός*, as *πονηρός* and *μοχθηρός* are synonyms of *κακός*. Opposed to *πονηρός* 25 C, *Crit.* 47 A.

APPENDIX

TABLE OF VARIOUS READINGS

[The readings of the present edition are shown in the left-hand column of the Table, and when followed by no indication to the contrary, have the authority of the best Ms. (B), as far as they go. The words inclosed in brackets in the right-hand column have been rejected as spurious on the authority (originally) of the critic first named.

The readings of Schanz in his annotated edition of the Apology are followed by the date (1893) when they differ from those of his text edition of 1875.

B = Codex Bodleianus (Oxford).
C = Codex Crusianus (Tübingen).
D = Codex Venetus 185.
E = Codex Venetus 184.
F = Codex Vaticanus 1029.

The small letters b, c, d, e, f, indicate corrections by later hands in the above-named Mss. respectively.]

Apology

17 A	χρὴ f.	χρῆν BDEF, *ν* erased in B.
B	οὖν.	γοῦν Fb.
D	ἑβδομήκοντα.	πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα E.
18 A	κατηγορημένα.	[ψευδῆ] κατηγορημένα Hirschig.
B	οὐδὲν.	[καὶ] οὐδὲν Schanz 1893.
	κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ.	κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ [μᾶλλον οἰδὲν ἀληθές] Hermann.
	μετέωρα.	μετέωρα [φροντιστὴς] Schanz 1893.
18 C	οἱ ταύτην Heindorf.	ταύτην BDEF.
	ἀκούσαντες BD.	ἀκούοντες EF.
19 D	αὐτῶν ὑμῶν πολλοὺς Schanz 1893.	αὐτοὺς (or αὖ) ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς.
	ἐκ τούτου EF.	ἐκ τούτων Bd. ἐν τούτῳ D.
	οὐδέν.	οὐδέν [ἐστιν] Schanz.

19 E *ἰὼν.*	[*οἵός τ' ἐστὶν*] *ἰὼν* Schanz.
20 A *ἐνθάδε*	[*Πάριος*] *ἐνθάδε* Schanz 1893.
B *διδάσκοι* F.	*διδάσκει.*
C *γέγονεν.*	*γέγονεν* [*εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί*] Schanz.
21 A *ἐμὸς ἑταῖρός τε* Schanz 1893.	*ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος.*
πλήθει.	*πλήθει* [*ἑταῖρός τε καὶ*] Schanz.
C *σκοπῶν καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ.*	In the Mss. the last three words follow *Ἀθηναῖοι* below.
22 A *ἵνα μή* Stephanus.	*ἵνα.*
C *αὐτῶν οἰόμενος* anonym.	*οἰόμενος.*
23 A *λέγομαι* Schanz 1893.	*λέγεσθαι.*
τοῦτ' οὐ F. A. Wolf.	*τοῦτον.*
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ Stephanus.	*ὥσπερ ἄν.*
D *εἰδέναι τι* Schanz 1893.	*εἰδέναι.*
E *ξυντεταμένως* E.	*ξυντεταγμένως* BDF.
24 A *δημιουργῶν.*	*δημιουργῶν* [*καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν*] Cobet.
τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις Schanz 1893.	*τοῖς αὐτοῖς.*
D *εἰς τουτουσὶ* Cobet.	*τουτουσὶ.*
26 A *τοιούτων.*	*τοιούτων* [*καὶ ἀκουσίων*] Cobet.
οὗ γε Schanz.	*ὅ γε.*
D *Σωκράτους οἴει* Baiter.	[*Ἀναξαγόρου*] *οἴει* Schanz.
26 E *οὐδένα νομίζειν* Edf.	*οὐδένα νομίζω* BD.
27 E *καὶ ὄνων.*	[*ἢ*] *καὶ ὄνων* Forster, Heindorf, Cobet.
ὅπως σὺ.	*ὅπως σὺ* [*ταῦτα*] Schanz.
ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ.	*ὡς* [*οὐ*] *τοῦ αὐτοῦ* E, Stephanus.
καὶ αὖ.	*καὶ αὖ* [*τοῦ αὐτοῦ*] Hirschig.
θεούς.	*θεοὺς* [*μήτε ἤρωας*] Prammer.
28 A *καὶ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς* Cobet.	*καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς.*
D *τάξῃ.*	*τάξῃ* [*ἢ*] Wex.

29 B	καίτοι Eusebius.	καίτοι τοῦτο.
	καὶ ἐνταῦθα.	[τούτῳ] καὶ ἐνταῦθα Schanz 1893.
C	ἤδη.	ἤδη [ἂν] Schanz 1893.
	πειθόμεθα Schanz 1893.	πεισόμεθα.
30 B	ἀφίετε ἢ μή E, Hirschig.	ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε.
E	πόλει.	πόλει [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ] Hirschig.
31 C	δαιμόνιον γίγνεται.	δαιμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνή] Forster, F. A. Wolf.
D	εἰ ἐγὼ.	εἰ ἐγὼ [πάλαι] Cobet.
32 A	μαχόμενον Schanz 1893.	μαχούμενον.
	ἅμα κἂν Riddell.	ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν BD.
B	φυλή.	φυλὴ [Ἀντιοχὶς] Hirschig, Cobet.
	νόμους.	νόμους [καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην] Hermann.
33 A	ἐπιθυμοῖ E.	ἐπιθυμεῖ BDF.
B	οἱ ἄλλοι Ed.	ἄλλοι BDF.
D	μεμνῆσθαι.	μεμνῆσθαι [καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι] Bekker.
E	ἔτι δ' E.	ἔτι BDF.
34 B	ἄλλα.	ἄλλα [ἴσως] Schanz 1893.
35 B	ἡμᾶς χρὴ E.	ὑμᾶς χρὴ BDF.
	ποιοῦντος.	ποιοῦντος [ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος] Cobet.
35 C	ἡγοῦμαι μήτε Schanz 1893.	μήτε ἡγοῦμαι.
D	νὴ Δία.	νὴ Δία [πάντως] Schanz.
	πολλοῦ δέω Schanz 1893.	πολλοῦ δεῖ.
36 B	ἀντιτιμήσωμαι Hirschig, Cobet.	ἀντιτιμήσομαι.
C	ἕκαστον.	ἕκαστον [ἰὼν] Schanz.
D	καὶ ταῦτα.	καὶ ταῦτά [γε] Baumann.
	οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι.	οὐκ ἔστ' ὅ τι [μᾶλλον] Mudge.
37 B	τοῦ τιμησάμενος Meiser.	τούτου τιμησάμενος.
C	ἔστι μοι.	ἔστι μοι [χρήματα] Hirschig.

37 D	διατριβάς.	διατριβὰς [καὶ τοὺς λόγους] Schanz 1893.
	ἐμὲ αὖ Schanz 1893.	ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ.
39 C	δή με DE.	δὴ B.
39 C	οἰόμενοι μὲν Hermann.	οἰόμενοι . . . B. οἰόμενοί με DF.
	ἐλέγξοντες Schanz 1893.	ἐλέγχοντες.
40 A	μαντικὴ.	μαντικὴ [ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου] Schleiermacher.
	οἰηθείη ἄν τις.	οἰηθείη ἄν τις [καὶ νομίζεται] Schanz 1893.
B	ἐνταυθοῖ.	ἐνταυθοῖ [ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον] Hirschig.
C	ψυχῇ.	ψυχῇ [τοῦ τόπου τοῦ] Hirschig.
D	ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ Schanz.	ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν.
41 B	τίς ἄρ' Stallbaum.	τίς ἂν BDF. τίς E.
	ἐπὶ πόσῳ δὴ ἂν Schanz 1893.	ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν.
	ἀγαγόντα E.	ἄγοντα BDF.
D	τοῦτο δ' Schanz 1893.	τοῦτο.
	μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι DEFb.	δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν B.
42	πλὴν εἰ D.	πλὴν . . . B. πλὴν ἢ EFb.

Crito

43 A	πρῲ.	πρωὶ CD. πρωὶ ἔτι BE.
D	τούτων.	τούτων [τῶν ἀγγέλων] Hirschig.
44 B	πιθοῦ Burges.	πείθου.
	ἔσται Hirschig.	ἐστιν.
	ἔτι δὴ Schanz.	ἔτι δὲ.
45 B	ξένοι.	ξένοι [οὗτοι] Schanz.
	Σιμίας inscriptions, Cobet, Schanz.	Σιμμίας.
46 A	δοκῇ Mudge.	δοκεῖν.
	δ' ἔτι B.	δέ τι CD. δὲ E.
47 A	οὐχὶ καλῶς Hirschig.	οὐχ ἱκανῶς.
C	δόξαν.	δόξαν [καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους] Burges.

47 C	διολλύει CD.	διόλλυσι Ecb.
48 D	ἄγοντας οὔτ' εἰ Forster.	ἄγοντας οὔτε.
49 A	ὡμολογήθη.	ὡμολογήθη [ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο] Burges, Hirschig.
	ἄνδρες.	[γέροντες] ἄνδρες Jacobs.
50 D	τούτοις ἡμῶν.	τούτοις ἡμῶν [τοῖς νόμοις] Hirschig.
	τεταγμένοι.	τεταγμένοι [νόμοι] Hirschig.
52 A	καὶ σὲ.	καὶ σὲ [Σώκρατες] Schanz.
B	ἐξῆλθες BCD.	ἐξῆλθες ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς ἰσθμόν E.
53 A	οἱ νόμοι.	οἱ νόμοι [δῆλον ὅτι· τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων] Schanz.
	ἐμμενεῖς b.	ἐμμένεις.
C	φανεῖσθαι.	[ἂν] φανεῖσθαι Schanz.
E	ἀνθρώπους καὶ.	ἀνθρώπους καὶ [δουλεύων] Schleiermacher.
	εὐωχούμενος.	εὐωχούμενος [ἐν Θετταλίᾳ] Schanz.
54 A	οἱ σοὶ.	οἱ σοὶ [ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν] Schanz.
D	ἑταῖρε.	ἑταῖρε [Κρίτων] Cobet.
	τῶν αὐλῶν.	τῶν αὐλῶν [δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν] Burges.

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